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“Persons and their Minds is a remarkably elegant, deeply scholarly and integrative proposi-
tion for a new ‘hybrid psychology’. Drawing on classical and current debates in philosophy, 
cognitive sciences, social sciences and psychology, Svend Brinkmann proposes an original 
theory of persons, with their minds as sets of practices and dispositions, mediated by their 
brain, bodies and social worlds. Written with simplicity and humor, this monograph brings 
much-needed theoretical and epistemological clarifications – demonstrating why, among 
other things, people’s actions cannot be explained by brain mechanisms. This groundbreak-
ing work offers a new basis for understanding psychopathology and paves the way for an 
integrative psychology of people’s everyday life in society.”
– Professor Tania Zittoun, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland
“Brinkmann’s book provides the long-sought integration of the various strands of psychol-
ogy and will be the starting point of the unification of the sciences of the mind.”
– Professor Rolf Reber, University of Oslo, Norway
 Today’s approaches to the study of the human mind are divided into seemingly opposed 
camps. On one side we find the neurosciences, with their more or less reductionist research 
programs, and on the other side we find the cultural and discursive approaches, with their 
frequent neglect of the material sides of human life.  Persons and their Minds seeks to 
develop an integrative theory of the mind with room for both brain and culture. Brinkmann’s 
remarkable and thought-provoking work is one of the first books to integrate brain research 
with phenomenology, social practice studies and actor-network theory, all of which are held 
together by the concept of the person. 
 Brinkmann’s new and informative approach to the person, the mind and mental disorder 
give this book a wide scope. The author uses Rom Harré’s hybrid psychology as a meta-
theoretical starting point and expands this significantly by including four sources of media-
tors: the brain, the body, social practices and technological artefacts. The author draws on 
findings from cultural psychology and argues that the mind is normative in the sense that 
mental processes do not simply happen, but can be done more or less well, and thus are 
subject to normative appraisal. 
 In addition to informative theoretical discussions, this book includes a number of detailed 
case studies, including a study of ADHD from the integrated perspective. Consequently, 
the book will be of great interest to academics and researchers in the fields of psychology, 
philosophy, sociology and psychiatry. 
 Svend Brinkmann is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Communication and 
Psychology at the University of Aalborg, Denmark. His primary research areas are general 
psychology and qualitative methods. He is currently Co-director of the Center for Qualita-
tive Studies at the University of Aalborg and member of the Center for Cultural Psychology. 
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 The series  Cultural Dynamics of Social Representation  is dedicated to bringing 
the scholarly reader new ways of representing human lives in the contemporary 
social sciences. It is a part of a new direction – cultural psychology – that has 
emerged at the intersection of developmental, dynamic and social psychologies, 
anthropology, education and sociology. It aims to provide cutting-edge examina-
tions of global social processes, which for every country are becoming increasingly 
multi-cultural; the world is becoming one “global village”, with the corresponding 
need to know how different parts of that ‘village’ function. Therefore, social sci-
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 “The mind has no breakfast” 
 –  but we have a new theory! 
 It is time to set basic ideas into their rightful places – after science journalists have 
frantically displaced them for the sake of creating a public interest havoc. Topics 
like “mind”, “self” and “brain” are of that kind. The promises made about the 
almighty power of the neurosciences have become a discourse form that makes 
a link with serious science in its popular representation – and hence ends up in 
a fashion show of multi-coloured brain images that hide the reality of basic sci-
ences about the mind actually cover (Werbik & Benetka, 2016). This reality – or 
maybe best called counter-representation of socially over-represented knowledge 
domain – needs to be revealed before the “bubble” of contemporary neurosciences 
“bursts” and we again are facing the nakedness of the Brain-King in front of all 
of us, the mental miserables. 
 Although the critique of neurosciences – or better – publicized travesties of the 
brain sciences – is a theme in this book, the reality of the constructive offering 
that the reader can encounter here is elsewhere. Brinkmann replaces both brain-
based and mind-based reductionist accounts of the human psyche by a third 
alternative – structured dynamic processes in-between. The “in-between” involves 
two interspersed domains – that of the relation of the body (and the brain) with its 
environment, and that of the person (with her mind) with the society (and its social 
norms for “the mind” – patriotic, feminist, masculinist or just plainly “pathologi-
cal”). The idea – that there is no way for the mind to have a breakfast – like we nor-
mal persons do easily every morning – is the crucial starting point to create a new 
theory of the mind-in-life and to maintain psychological theory as a framework that 
goes beyond any version of reductionism. 
 Svend Brinkmann is in the best position to systematically sieve through the 
various representations of the mind, and the misplaced precision on which 
claims of contemporary neurosciences are built. He is both a philosopher and 
psychologist – a rare combination in our contemporary world. In this book he 
undresses the excessive garments of the neurosciences in his systematic, careful 
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and silently humorous manner that is his intellectual trademark across all of his 
books (e.g. read Brinkmann, 2011; 2013; 2017). 
 This book is a careful move towards a new kind of psychology. It is rooted in 
the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Dewey and Rom Harré. Of these three, it is 
the latter two who have made constructive suggestions for psychology to develop 
a humanly adequate general framework. Brinkmann takes up their challenge and 
provides a new solution. It could perhaps be called a Theory of Human Dynamic 
Normative Intentionality. What is proposed in this book is a theory that deals 
with human life experiences as these are cultural in their nature. The proposed 
theory is a major contribution to our contemporary area of cultural psychology – 
a burgeoning area of research uniting developmental and social psychology with 
anthropology, sociology and history – but which nevertheless has suffered in its 
history of past three decades from absence of unifying general theories and lack 
of methodology. 
 Brinkmann’s theory is of such a unifying kind. It emphasizes the dynamic nature 
of the personal making up of one’s mind – culturally, through signs. The beneficial 
background of John Dewey is clearly behind his way of building the dynamic 
focus of human subjectivity through semiosis. The normative focus in the theory 
is based on the advancement of the focus in psychology introduced by Rom Harré, 
but left without the elaboration of implications that the notion of multiplicity of 
grammars brings to our understanding of the human mind. Brinkmann makes that 
bold step beyond Harré – and with productive outcomes. In his own words: 
 If only one conclusion is to be drawn from this book’s chapters, then it should 
be that psychology needs more than one form of understanding and more than 
one level of analysis. The brain alone is not enough, nor is the body, culture 
or materiality. This is why the attempts at monopolization that we have seen 
in the history of psychology have been unproductive when they seek to dispel 
one of the two halves of psychology that were outlined in the beginning of the 
book – the nomic or normative. Against this background we have to conclude 
that both psychologies – or rather both sides of psychology – are relevant and 
indispensable within its respective domain. But this is where the problem 
comes in: can we have both of these psychologies at the same time? 
 (p. 129) 
 Brinkmann answers the last question in the affirmative. The notion of multiple 
grammars fits here – human beings are constantly constructing experiences 
through signs, organized by the norms of multiple grammars at the same time. 
The result is sometimes clarity, at other times confusion. The latter was Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of psychology as science in the 1950s. Unfortunately 
Wittgenstein had no intention for getting out of the confusion – his “language 
games” did not provide constructive solutions. Brinkmann does. 
 How does he arrive at a productive solution? By accepting that the intentional 
action by human beings – the idea that Franz Brentano posited in the 1870s but 
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failed to elaborate in the dynamic realities of living – requires the use of multiple 
normative orders. These are “grammars” – that organize human experiencing. The 
reader will find these grammars the framework that guides intentional actions. 
Intentionality is always finding its expressions through the grammars-guided 
production of experiences. And the grammars themselves are human inventions. 
Human psyche regulates itself through creating normative systems for oneself, 
and then acting as if negotiating the borders of such normativity (Valsiner, 1999). 
 The result of Brinkmann’s theoretical synthesis is a hybrid theory – inclusive of 
biological, psychological and social facets, and not prioritizing any of the levels. 
What links the levels is the agentive role of the human being who seeks cultural 
solutions for biological necessities and feels annoyed if these are not available. In 
Brinkmann’s own final synthesis: 
 . . . the mentalistic or mindist approach, which regards the mind as a men-
tal world in its own right, which can be discussed independently of neural, 
physical, social and technological conditions. Such a world does not exist. 
The mind is not a “world”, nor is it a “thing”, but rather a range of skills and 
dispositions that exists in the world and which is identified on the basis of a 
normative order of human activities and practices. 
 (p. 150) 
 The reader of this book is up to the experience of seeing a new theoretical system 
in the making. For Brinkmann psychology is not “in crisis” but a productive arena 
for new value of careful philosophical thinking in the solving of basic problems 
of human being. I think we have much to learn from him. 
 Jaan Valsiner 
 Aalborg, January, 2017 
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 In a certain sense, this book has an almost impossible ambition: To articulate a 
general theory about persons and their minds in a single book. There are so many 
classical and modern ideas about what the human mind is that a full explanation 
and discussion could fill countless books. A book about the mind is therefore 
always a partial contribution to the existing corpus of ideas that needs to be under-
stood in the historical and cultural context in which it is written. There is so much 
disagreement about what the mind is, how it should be studied and whether it even 
exists that you would end up with a very fragmented book on the subject if you 
did not find a specific perspective from which to analyze it. In this book I present 
just such a perspective; it does not, therefore, represent a neutral introduction to 
the subject. The book only indirectly provides an overview of theories and studies 
of the mind, and is, in a more direct sense, a specific theory of the mind, which 
also seeks to synthesize many diverse theories under the umbrella term of cultural 
psychology. One of the book’s ambitions is to show that many of these theories 
can coexist. 
 A first edition of the book was published in Danish in 2009, entitled  The mind – 
between synapses and society , by Aarhus University Press. The manuscript has 
been thoroughly revised and expanded for the English-language version. I wish 
to thank Aarhus University Press for giving me full permission to develop the 
Danish manuscript into a longer and more comprehensive book in English, and 
Asher Ariel for help with translations. I would also like to thank Cecilie Eriksen, 
Jacob Klitmøller, Casper Larsen and anonymous reviewers for many helpful and 
relevant comments on the original manuscript. I am particularly grateful to Jaan 
Valsiner for inviting me to write a volume for the book series on the  Cultural 
Dynamics of Social Representation . In recent years, Jaan has been an incredible 
source of inspiration for me as a scholar and colleague. As always, my greatest 
thank you goes to my family – Signe, Jens, Karl and Ellen – for coping so well 
with me through the years. 
Foreword 

 This book is about a phenomenon that on the surface seems like the most obvi-
ous and relevant thing for people, while at the same time it is perceived by many 
as one of the most mysterious and inaccessible to us – and this in spite of recent 
advances in modern science: the mind. On the one hand, the fact that we have a 
mind (whatever that means, which is the central question of this book), or that 
we are psychological beings, is a matter of course for us since we, as long as we 
are alive, have a mental life: We think, feel, act and dream, along with a host of 
other things that would reasonably be regarded as psychological processes. The 
fact that my limbs can move in specific ways is an expression of my  physiological 
and  anatomical characteristics, but the fact that they are moving because I want to 
achieve a specific objective with that movement (like writing a book by moving 
my fingers on the keyboard) is the expression of specific  psychological capacities 
within me. Everything we do falls within the field of psychology (although not 
exclusively within this field, since neighbouring disciplines like sociology and 
anthropology are also relevant when studying human action), and the fact that 
we can do things intentionally is what justifies the assertion that we have a mind. 
That is why the mind, at first glance, is entirely obvious and continuously present 
for us. 
 On closer inspection, however, the mind has proven extremely difficult to 
examine scientifically, and the sciences that deal with the mind (psychology and 
psychiatry in particular) are full of controversial views that certainly are not obvi-
ous, including the notion that the mind does not even exist (as argued by elimi-
native materialists), that it can be reduced to processes in the brain (according 
to some neuroscientific theories), that it can be dissolved into social relations in 
its entirety (as some social constructionists have claimed), or that individuals do 
not have any privileged insight into their own mental and psychological lives (as 
the behaviourists say). In the book we will see examples of these and many other 
challenging, controversial and hopefully exciting ideas about the mind, which – 
if it exists – can reasonably be said to be the most complex phenomenon in the 
universe. 
 People are greatly interested in theories of the mind around the world. Psychol-
ogy is one of the university subjects with the most applicants in many countries, 
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and psychological knowledge is used almost everywhere in society where people 
are involved: in education, parenting, business, marketing, politics and many 
other fields (Brinkmann, 2008a). Popular science books on all sorts of psycho-
logical phenomena, from self-esteem to psychopathy, are being read like never 
before, and self-help books that encourage the use of psychological techniques 
like coaching, self-improvement and therapy, are among the best-sellers (Brink-
mann, 2017). Much of the current discourse on the mind is marked by almost 
religious language, which recommends that you “find yourself” and “develop 
yourself”, but, almost paradoxically, nearly as much of the discourse is marked by 
a scientific way of thinking. Books about brain research and the effects of genet-
ics on behaviour are read with great interest today and they stand side by side on 
bookstore shelves with New Age–inspired self-improvement literature. We have 
many different conceptions of the mind these days, which are all far from compat-
ible, but which affect the way we understand ourselves to varying degrees. This 
book seeks to create a language of the mind that enables the integration of some 
of the actual portrayals of the mind that  can and  should be integrated, but which at 
the same time allows for rejection of the numerous portrayals that are unproduc-
tive, distorted or patently wrong. 
 One false portrayal depicts the mind as a disembodied object, which is based in, 
or which can be directly identified with, the human “inner world”. This portrayal 
plays a major role, for example, when we imagine that we each possess an “inner 
self” or an “inner potential” that can and should be realized both at work and in 
our private lives. Whereas this portrayal is associated with some semi-religious 
conceptions, where psychology acts as a kind of secularized religion and where 
the Christian notion of a disembodied soul is merely replaced by a psychological 
notion of a disembodied self, another equally false portrayal is more often associ-
ated with modern science. This is the portrayal of the mind as simply an aspect 
of the brain. In recent years, confidence levels in the results of brain research and 
their importance for psychology and psychiatry have been extreme (see  Chap-
ter 2 ). This book in no way rejects modern brain research, but raises serious doubts 
about the current imperialistic colonization of brain research that we are witness-
ing today in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, culture, science and even ethics 
and theology. One goal of this book is to put brain research in its rightful place 
among the many types of research that are needed to understand the mind. But it 
belongs in only one place among the many. 
 This book is about the human mind as a product of nature/biology and culture/
society, respectively. My own scientific background is in philosophy and psychol-
ogy, which literally means the science (logos) of the mind (psyche). There has been 
a distinct ideological conflict between perspectives from biology and society – or 
between the brain and culture – in scientific psychology in recent years. The cen-
tral message of the book is that there is no contradiction between the biological 
investigation of the neural basis for the mind (brain) and the societal imprinting of 
the mind (culture and social practices). Consequently, I try to develop a compre-
hensive and coherent understanding of the mind that is explicitly multidisciplinary, 
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and which implies that neuroscientists and cultural anthropologists, for example – 
or scientists and humanists more generally – should not be regarded as being in 
opposition to one another, but should instead be seen as each having a grasp on the 
two sides of the hybrid phenomenon that we call the mind (this is argued in Brink-
mann, 2011b; 2012, which together comprise some of the background research 
for this book). Although my point of view is broad, inclusive and pluralistic, the 
book is not neutral in its position – far from it. The book attempts to show that 
two approaches to the mind in particular are flawed: The first is the  mentalistic 
approach, which says that the mind is a world in its own right and that it can be 
studied independently from the brain, body and culture. Mentalism is the view that 
there are self-contained mental states (e.g. beliefs or emotions) that underlie human 
actions – that there is a dualism between the mind and the world, and that there is 
an external relation between mental states and observable actions, such that private 
mental states  cause the actions that other people can see. 
 Mentalism can be traced back to the philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650), 
who believed that the mind was a  thinking thing – an independently existing meta-
physical realm – which was connected to a living organism almost only by chance. 
For Descartes the mind was a  substance , a kind of medium for the metaphysical 
soul. Although there are practically no psychologists and philosophers who adhere 
to Descartes’ form of mentalism today, mentalism has nevertheless survived in 
many newer guises and it is often seen, paradoxically enough, among researchers 
who explicitly criticize Descartes – certain materialists, for example, who believe 
that everything in existence must be understood in terms of physical matter. Some 
of them can be criticized for being “neural Cartesians”, since they may well have 
killed Descartes’ idea of the mind as an independent metaphysical realm, but 
at the same time they have retained his idea that the psychological realm is an 
inner, private world, which is now merely believed to exist in the brain and not 
as a substance of the soul (Coulter & Sharrock, 2007, p. 11). Other psychologi-
cal researchers in the cognitive science tradition (Gardner, 1987) also perpetuate 
mentalism by operating with a theory of the mind as inner, mental representations 
that are sought to be understood in separation from the world they represent. 
 The second overarching approach that this book is critical of is the impending 
 reductionism that we have seen in recent years in psychology, where brain research 
in particular is experiencing rapid growth. In very general terms, the reductionist 
approach argues that “A is nothing but B”. Reductionism may well be a legitimate 
approach in certain fields. For example, I think it is reasonable to make the follow-
ing reduction: “Crystal healing is nothing but an activity that exploits the placebo 
effect”. But when it comes to the relationship between the brain and the mind in 
general, I think it is a misguided approach. I would argue, for example, that one 
would be mistaken to say that “psychological processes are nothing but electricity 
in a pattern of synapses,” although I do not doubt that neural activity is a necessary 
condition for the existence of psychological processes as such. 
 My pluralistic and anti-reductionist perspective has not simply been conjured 
up out of thin air, but is mainly based on the thinking about the mind that has 
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developed in the wake of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951) philosophy. Witt-
genstein, who was undoubtedly among the most important thinkers of the twen-
tieth century, dealt intensively with the philosophy of psychology and was highly 
critical of the psychology of his day because he did not think that its experiments 
answered the basic conceptual problems that plagued the science. This book is 
not a thorough interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, nor of the specific 
part of his philosophy that relates to the mind, but is instead based more on the 
insights that some of Wittgenstein’s more recent successors have developed in 
the fundamental thinking about the mind. 1 I would highlight three researchers in 
particular that are crucial to the perspective developed in this book: Peter Hacker, 
Rom Harré and Jeff Coulter. 2 They come from a philosophical, psychological 
and sociological research environment, respectively, which is completely in line 
with the multidisciplinary approach of this book. In recent years, all three of them 
have used Wittgenstein’s thinking as a springboard, in part to criticize mentalism 
and mind-brain reductionism, but also to develop more constructive suggestions 
for what modern thinking about the mind should look like. Harré and Coulter 
have also been involved in empirical research, and Harré in particular has been 
constructive and not just critical; he has developed what he calls a “hybrid psy-
chology”, which, like this book, seeks to integrate the neural and the cultural in an 
understanding of the mind that does not end in a case of reductionism (Harré & 
Moghaddam, 2012). 
 In addition, the American pragmatist John Dewey (1859–1952) and the Russian 
psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) are important sources of inspiration for 
this book’s arguments, and the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(1908–1961) also plays a certain role. The book, like its sources of inspiration, is 
multidisciplinary and the reader should therefore not expect a book about  psychol-
ogy in the traditional sense. The book is more precisely about the  mind , where a 
psychological angle is just one of many, and where philosophy in particular is 
also brought into play. I give many examples from psychology throughout the 
book, but the book is not intended as an introduction to psychology’s many areas, 
such as clinical psychology and personality psychology. Rather, it is an attempt to 
define what the mind is, and it thus represents a philosophically inspired general 
psychology, closely aligned with cultural psychology, which I see as the most 
sophisticated and philosophically mature version of contemporary psychology 
(Valsiner, 2014). I share with many cultural psychologists a distrust of a reifica-
tion of the mind and also a wish to put the concept of the person at centre stage in 
the discipline of psychology. The book is thus called  Persons and their Minds to 
underline the fact that minds are skills and dispositions of persons, the latter being 
psychologically fundamental (Harré, 2016). 
 The book’s basic idea, to which I continually return and reveal the implications 
of, is that the mind as a concept refers to a range of abilities and dispositions 
of living human beings and not to any particular “thing” attached to persons. A 
widespread metaphysical preconception is that what something “is” is identical 
to what it is “made of ” (Coulter & Sharrock, 2007, p. ix). This may apply when 
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we talk about phenomena like water, which we all know is “made of” water mol-
ecules, each of which consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. But 
if we transfer this metaphysical concept to the mind, we can easily end up saying 
strange things such as “the mind  is the brain.” If the mind, however, is not a thing 
but rather a range of abilities and dispositions (to think, feel and act), then we 
avoid this conclusion because these abilities cannot be attributed to the brain in a 
meaningful way. The brain does not think, nor does it feel or act. Only human per-
sons, or creatures that act like humans in required ways such as some non-human 
animals, can meaningfully be said to think, feel and act. Naturally, they could not 
do so without their brains, but that does not mean that their brains are performing 
these activities. Similarly, you cannot drive a car without an engine, but that does 
not mean that it is the engine that is driving. The book attempts to describe some 
consequences of this insight, which seems so simple at first glance. 
 The idea of this book is that we need a number of very different levels of analy-
sis in order to understand our abilities and dispositions – and thereby understand 
our mind. I highlight the brain, the body, society’s social practices and things/
technologies as being relevant analytical dimensions for understanding the human 
mind. None of these levels can stand alone, and, in principle, none of them can be 
dispensed with either. If you imagine an everyday phenomenon such as a group of 
schoolchildren building a bridge in order to learn practical mathematics, there is 
a huge amount of psychological processes involved. The most important among 
them is that the children have the  intention to build the bridge. But they can have 
such an intention only provided that they have brains that function in certain ways. 
They also have to have bodies with which to act in the physical world and realize 
their intentions. They also have to be able to work together, so that when one of 
them acts, the others respond accordingly in a social context. The children are also 
standing on the shoulders of the traditions of mathematics, education, building 
bridges and cooperation, whether they are conscious of it or not. And, finally, the 
children are also in a world of things; these are in part physical things, including 
the materials that the bridge will be built from, with all of the possibilities and 
limitations that these things entail for the children’s realization of their goal, but 
also things that have semantic content, such as the books that the children can 
consult to get ideas for the construction of the bridge. At first glance it seems to 
be a simple psychological event – wanting to build a bridge – but it turns out that 
it depends on a wide variety of conditions such as brains, bodies, social relation-
ships and culture as well as physical objects. That is the main thesis of this book: 
that this complexity applies to the mind in its own right as well as to all mental 
phenomena. 
 The book begins with a chapter that provides some background knowledge 
about the key concepts of the person and especially the mind. In this context, I 
also touch on some of the history behind the ideas that underlie the contemporary 
investigation of the mind. This is probably the most difficult chapter, since it 
describes lengthy and complicated historical developments in a very condensed 
format. The reader may want to skip this chapter initially and then return to it 
6 Introduction
after having read the remaining chapters. Next, I focus on the four analytical 
levels, which consist of the brain, the body, society’s social practices and things 
and which also constitute the book’s four central  chapters (2 ,  3 ,  4 and  5 ). In 
 Chapter 2 , which discusses the  brain , I work from the premise that the brain is 
a necessary organ for a psychological life to exist, but I argue at the same time 
that the mind cannot be said to end at the skull – and that the mind’s location 
therefore cannot be restricted to the brain.  Chapter 3 expands the boundaries of 
the mind, so that the psychological realm can also be said to include the  body as 
a central component. In recent years, this has been investigated in particular by 
phenomenologists of the body, based on the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. But 
not even the body’s skin forms the boundary for where the mind ends, because 
a complex psychological life also requires certain social practices and relations, 
certain forms of human sociality – or  society in the literal sense (“society” comes 
from Latin  societas “fellowship, association, alliance, union, or community,” 
from  socius “companion”) – which contributes to shaping the abilities and dis-
positions that constitute the mind. Social practices, including family and com-
munity life, are the subject of  Chapter 4 , which is based in particular on current 
theories in cultural psychology. Next, in  Chapter 5 , I argue that not even a pure, 
intersubjective sociality (“society”) marks the boundaries of the mind, because 
to fully understand the mind we also have to include the  things and  technologies 
that surround us. Most mental abilities and dispositions are possible only because 
we as people avail ourselves of tools, artefacts and other material objects (every-
thing from reading glasses and alphabets to personal computers), which therefore 
become essential for the sophisticated forms of mental life that we humans have 
developed. The book’s perspective in this regard comes close to the point of 
view of modern theoretical psychology called  externalism – which means that the 
mind, in a certain sense, is something “external” and does not exist solely inside 
people’s heads (Noë, 2009). Man is a tool- and technology-using species, so the 
notion that we are  cyborgs , whose lives depend on things and technologies, is 
not just a distant vision of the future. We have been this way since the Stone Age. 
 The argument, then, is that we should not look for a “boundary” within which 
the mind can be confined (not the skull, skin, community or material objects) 
because the mind – as a range of abilities and dispositions – is understandable 
only if we include every level: the brain, the body, society and things. The mind is 
“spread out” over all of these levels. A metaphor for the mind could be an onion 
that you can peel without ever finding the core. We cannot find the mind as a 
“thing” by peeling away analytical layers and, for example, ending up looking into 
the brain, because  the mind is simply not a thing . But  neither is it nothing , which 
is also an important point for the book’s rejection of reductionism. The concept of 
the person emerges as the necessary connection point between the different layers. 
Mental phenomena belong irreducibly to persons and not to any of the layers or 
tools that persons use in living their lives.  Chapter 6 summarizes the arguments 
that back this up and outlines a “hybrid psychology” with inspiration from Harré 
in particular, which, as a science, is intended to involve the brain, the body, society 
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and things when the mind is investigated. The final  Chapter 7 applies the theory 
to mental disorders and develops a way of thinking about the psychological prob-
lems that humans face from time to time in their lives. 
 Notes 
 1 For works that specifically deal with Wittgenstein’s philosophical psychology, reference 
can be made to Budd (1989) and Harré and Tissaw (2005). 
 2 See (Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Coulter, 1979; 1989; Coulter & Sharrock, 2007; Hacker, 
2007; Harré, 1998; 2002). 
 When we reflect on the psychological concepts in our language, ordinary language 
should have, if not the  last word, then at least the  first word, as the philosopher 
John Austin said. In this context, it is interesting that the word “mind” is actually 
not very commonly used in ordinary language. When the term is used, it is often in 
a context where we are talking about people’s difficulties. We can talk about people 
having “psychological problems” and we understand what is meant by “a fragile 
mind” (and of course “a strong mind” as well), but only rarely do we talk about 
the fact that “thinking is a mental process” or that “the mind can be confined to the 
brain”. In that sense, both “mind” and “mental” are scientific and semi-technical 
words. In this book’s perspective, this means that we should be wary when theoriz-
ing or constructing scientific models of “the mind”. What is it exactly that we are 
theorizing  about and constructing models  of   ? This is particularly important when 
dealing with the sciences that examine human experiences and actions, because if 
the results produced by these sciences cannot be traced back to something that is 
literally  meaning  ful for the people who are the subject of the research, then there is 
reason to doubt the legitimacy and validity of the research altogether. 
 This differs from the natural sciences, where there is no requirement that theo-
ries about quarks and superstrings need to mean something to so-called “ordinary 
people”. But if psychologists tell people that they (psychologists) have discovered 
that feelings are something  completely different than what we thought they were, 
then there is good reason to doubt that it is actually feelings that these psycholo-
gists have discovered something about. Again, as mentioned in the introduction: 
the psychological realm is something that is “close” to us and something we are 
all familiar with, so there is a limit to how ground-breaking the “discoveries” 
made by the sciences that study the mind can actually be. That is not to say that 
you cannot discover anything new about the mind, but even Freud’s (1856–1939) 
psychoanalysis, which was very revolutionary and shocking to many people’s 
understanding of the self, had to draw upon terms taken from ordinary language 
(“feeling”, “sexuality”, “dream”, etc.) in order to be formulated, and psychoana-
lysts have to use such terms extensively in the  same way as the terms are used 
in everyday language for the theory to be at all meaningful. This is an absolutely 
fundamental point, and it means that the sciences of the mind and psychology 
Chapter 1 
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must always have a perspective from “within” human existence – at least in part. 
There are limits to how far the sciences of the mind can be from recognizable 
and everyday matters (from what is sometimes referred to as “folk psychology”) 
before these sciences are no longer about what they intended to be about at the 
outset. For example, it is perfectly legitimate and necessary to study the impor-
tance of the brain for the mind, but if this leads to psychological concepts and 
explanations from everyday life being replaced by more “scientific” neurologi-
cal concepts and explanations, then you quickly end up in a situation where you 
are no longer talking about something psychological. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, this is the problem with what is known as “eliminative materialism”, a 
philosophical position which, among other things, aims to replace our vocabulary 
from “folk psychology” with a more “scientific” vocabulary. The achievement 
of this aim would mean that, for example, instead of saying “it hurts” we should 
say “my C-fibres are stimulated”. One of the problems with this is the fact that it 
is not interesting for the person who was hurt that his C-fibres are stimulated as 
such – rather, what is interesting is that his finger was hit by a hammer and it hurts! 
 However, terms like “mind” and “consciousness” are more common in every-
day language than “psyche”. The latter term is older and virtually synonymous 
with the term “mind” and I will use them interchangeably throughout the book. 
“Psychological state” can be translated into “state of mind”, and the slightly out-
dated “sentiment” translates into “emotion”, which is a more modern psychologi-
cal term for what we call feelings in everyday language. The term “consciousness” 
is a bit different. “Consciousness” is probably more widespread in ordinary lan-
guage than “mind” (for example in questions such as “is he conscious?”). There 
is a branch of philosophy that we call “philosophy of mind” in English, and this 
term is often translated into other languages as “philosophy of consciousness”. 
In Danish it is thus “bevidsthedsfilosofi”. The philosophy of consciousness has 
become a major and important area in international philosophy, and there is also 
great interest in consciousness research within the fields of psychology and neu-
roscience. But even though the concept of consciousness is closely related to the 
concept of the mind, it cannot replace it. The most obvious reason is that not 
all psychological phenomena are conscious, although there may be grounds for 
considering that they must  potentially be conscious in order for us to be able 
to correctly classify them as psychological. All phenomena of consciousness are 
psychological, but not all mental phenomena are conscious, which means that the 
concept of the mind is broader than the concept of consciousness. The human abil-
ity to solve complex problems, for example, is an ability that can be said to belong 
to the mind (and thus rightfully studied by psychology), and this is true regardless 
of whether problem solving is done consciously or not. Not all forms of problem 
solving are conscious in the sense of involving experiences of certain qualities (or 
 qualia ), and the concept of problem solving is not an experiential concept, but a 
 normative concept in that it is about solving problems  correctly . Consciousness is 
not, however, a normative concept, but an  experiential concept; it is about what 
we experience and what we are aware of. The distinction between the normative 
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and the experiential disciplines of psychology is elaborated in further detail below. 
For the time being we can say that the term “consciousness” refers specifically 
to our awareness and our ability to perceive the world, whereas the term “mind” 
also refers to all sorts of other ways of being in the world that are not necessarily 
directly related to perception and experience, but which instead have to do with 
acting or thinking, for example. 
 A third term that I have already used, which is related to “mind” and “con-
sciousness”, is the “mental”. One can talk about “the mental realm” as akin to “the 
mind”. In principle, this book could have used this term in its title, but it is not 
as flexible, linguistically speaking, since it does not work very well as a noun (it 
is reasonable to speak of “the mind”, but “mentality” doesn’t really work all too 
well). That is why I ended up using the term “mind”, which has the disadvantage 
of being somewhat abstract and technical, but which in turn is broad enough to 
capture what this book is really about. 
 Like so many other words, the term “mind” has a predecessor in the ancient 
Greek in the form of  psyche . In Greek mythology, Psyche (from the Greek  psukhē 
meaning soul or breath of life) is a goddess who is married to the probably more 
well-known god of love, Eros. The goddess Psyche personifies the soul and is 
depicted as a woman with butterfly wings. Psyche and Eros had a daughter together 
named Hedone, who is the goddess of pleasure. We have an interesting Greek fam-
ily of gods representing the soul, love and pleasure, and the first-mentioned lent 
her name to the human mind or psyche. It is thought-provoking that pleasure is 
an offspring of the soul and love: It is love that gives rise to pleasure and not the 
other way round. Incidentally, however, Psyche was not born a goddess, but was 
a princess whose beauty could compare with Aphrodite’s (the goddess of beauty). 
 For the Greeks, Psyche did not represent the soul in the Christian sense, nor is 
it equivalent to a modern understanding of the mind as the seat of thoughts and 
emotions. In Greek thought, such as that of the philosopher Aristotle (384–322 
BC), about whom we will hear more below, the psyche is practically a biological 
concept. The mind is spirit, but first and foremost a biological kind of spirit. The 
mind is the first principle of living things, so all living things – animals, plants, 
humans – have psyche in virtue of being alive. The Greek  psukhē also means 
respiration, and when you “expire” (from Latin meaning to breathe out) literally, 
you cease to be alive. In Danish we say “udånde”, which literally means that 
“spirit” goes “out”. According to Aristotle, the human mind distinguishes itself 
from the minds of other animals and plants in that it is rational. We can think and 
talk because we can use concepts, and, as rational beings, we can act on the basis 
of more or less good reasons. We can do this because we are raised, educated and 
cultivated by our social circumstances; “ polis andra didaske ”, said the Greeks 
(“the city is man’s teacher”). Since the times of the Greeks, the belief has been 
that we, as psychological beings, belong to biology (nature) on the one hand, and 
to society (the city) on the other. This duality is also the focal point of this book. 
Persons have minds because they result from cultivated nature in “cities” (a broad 
term here standing for organized social relationships). 
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 Before human beings began investigating the mind scientifically by using vari-
ous psychological methods, and before we started treating psychological disorders 
with psychotherapy and psychotropic drugs, other concepts and practices were 
relevant for what we now regard as the mind. A large portion of these concepts 
and practices were religious and were associated with what is conceived of as the 
soul in Christianity. We must be wary here of uncritically thinking that the Greek 
concept of  psukhē , the Roman concept of  anima and the Christian concept of  the 
soul correspond to what we today call  the mind (Danziger, 1997). There have 
been a number of crucial conceptual transformations in the course of history. A 
large portion of theories about the mind in modern psychology depend on a basic 
concept of an “inner world”, but this is far from the Greek concept of the mind as 
a biological principle and from the Christian idea of a substance of the immortal 
soul. 
 As the philosopher Charles Taylor has argued, the modern idea of the psycho-
logical realm as an inner world of thoughts and feelings is “a function of a histori-
cally limited mode of self-interpretation, one which has become dominant in the 
modern West and which may indeed spread thence to other parts of the globe, but 
which has a beginning in time and space and may have an end” (Taylor, 1989, 
p. 111). Taylor thus relativizes the notion of the psychological realm as an inner 
world to a specific culture and historical epoch, the beginning of which can be 
approximately determined as the eighteenth century. Interpreting the psychologi-
cal realm as an inner, private world is a historically and culturally specific notion, 
derived from the Christian conception of an immortal soul; this conception, how-
ever, also existed prior to Christianity, among certain ancient Greek philosophers, 
for example. But for Aristotle, the concept of the mind was something altogether 
different, and therefore it is difficult to believe that the historically changing dis-
courses about “the psychological realm” have always been about the same thing. 
In certain respects there are also similarities among the concepts of the mind that 
have dominated in different epochs. Both the Christian conception of the soul and 
the modern conception of the mind, for example, have been involved in governing 
human life in a similar manner. In medieval society, people were to live their lives 
in a certain way in order to achieve salvation of the soul and avoid perdition, which 
was a process that could be controlled by the Christian clergy. In modern society, 
the goal of existence, according to some psychological self-help literature, has 
correspondingly been the realization of the psychological self, mediated by listen-
ing to and accepting what psychotherapists, coaches and other self-improvement 
experts have to say. It is not difficult to see structural similarities between the way 
the soul was involved in the pre-modern governance of human life and the way in 
which conceptions of the mind shape our lives today (Rose, 1999). For many 
of us, developing ourselves, our personalities or our minds is not a right but an 
obligation that is imposed on us in the educational system (when, for example, we 
have to develop our social and emotional skills) or at work (when we are sent to 
personal development courses or when we are coached by our managers) (Brink-
mann, 2017). In this sense, conceptions of the mind are not only scientific but also 
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political and woven into various societal power relationships, just as the religious 
conceptions of the soul have always been. 
 Kurt Danziger, an influential historian of psychology, argues that the modern 
idea of the psychological realm as a distinct research field with its own subject 
matter can hardly be said to have existed before the eighteenth century (Danziger, 
1997, p. 21). Before that time, its existence was thought of in religious, ethical and 
medical terms, but not yet in psychological terms. In short, people did not think 
of themselves as having a mind in the modern sense. But in the eighteenth cen-
tury, British empiricist philosophers, perhaps especially David Hume (1711–1776), 
started to regard the mind as a piece of machinery with Newton’s mechanical phys-
ics as a scientific model. When this mechanical psychology was combined with the 
experimental practices for investigating the life of the soul, which were developed 
by German physiologists about 100 years later, we had, for the first time in history, 
isolated the mind in the modern sense, which academic psychology takes for granted 
today. Some very specific conditions had to be met in order for it to make sense to 
start regarding the mind as a scientific object, and there are indications that these 
conditions are in large part linked to the historical processes of individualization. 
Psychology did not emerge as a science of the individual mind until the individual 
entered into history as an independent figure and God, tradition and society took the 
backstage. This is why we also see that psychology historically spread most quickly 
in relatively individualistic Western cultures, and it is not until much later that more 
collectivist cultures like Arabic or East Asian societies have developed psychology, 
which they have often imported from the West despite the fact that they already had 
well-developed scientific disciplines in other areas. Our conceptions of the mind are 
always historically and culturally influenced, and sometimes we are not even talking 
about the same thing, although we may use the same word: the mind. 
 Two main tracks in the history of ideas 
about the mind 
 Even though I think there is reason to caution against reading the Western history 
of ideas uncritically, as if the changing ideas about the psyche/soul/mind have 
always been about the same thing, I will tentatively identify the two main tracks 
in thinking about the human mind that still influence our conceptions today. These 
main tracks can be called (1) the mind as consciousness and (2) the mind as ratio-
nality. The first track focuses on the mind primarily as a mechanism for  experienc-
ing the world, while the second track regards the mind as a designation for our 
ability to think and act  rationally . These two tracks are still both very important 
in current psychological research: the consciousness standpoint underlies much of 
neuropsychology, where consciousness is often sought to be reduced to something 
neurological, whereas the rationality standpoint primarily underlies various forms 
of cultural psychology, and it is a version of this that I shall defend in this book. 
I should emphasize, however, that the two tracks are not mutually excluding in 
the sense that the former track denies that people can be rational or that the latter 
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track denies that we experience the world. That is not the point, but it is, rather, to 
find the foundational principle of the mind in either consciousness or rationality. 
 The mind as consciousness 
 Figure 1.1 aims to provide an overview of the historical development of concep-
tual relationships (inspired by Hacker, 2007, p. 27). 
 We can trace the consciousness approach to the mind back to the father of West-
ern philosophy, Plato (427–347 BC), because of his argument that a human being 
consists of a body and a soul, and that it is the soul that essentially  is the human; 
this idea finds particular expression in the dialogue  Phaedo . The notion that all 
human beings carry something immaterial within them, which is what individu-
alizes them (i.e. that which makes the individual who he or she is), was of great 
importance for the originator of modern philosophy, René Descartes, who, in the 
first half of the seventeenth century, developed his dualistic theory of two essen-
tially different metaphysical substances: the extended substance and the thinking 
substance (Descartes, 2002). The thinking substance is the human mind, which 
Descartes understood as consciousness. For Descartes, to think something is to 
have conscious awareness of something – an idea, as he called it, or a “mental 
representation”, as many modern cognitive scientists call it. 
Figure 1.1 Conceptions of the human mind
Platonic dualism Aristotelian monism




Idealistic variations Materialistic variations
Berkeley Hume Kant Behaviourism Physicalism Wittgenstein
Materialistic identity theory Functionalism
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 Descartes’ concept of the “idea” is akin to Plato’s, but whereas Plato saw ideas 
as referring to the basic cosmic forms that underlie and organize the world and 
appear to us phenomenally through our sense perception, Descartes’ philosophi-
cal revolution consisted in attributing these ideas to man’s inner self. In popular 
terms, he put the universe into the human mind and believed that the only things 
that people could ever perceive are the ideas that appear in their consciousness. 
An important transitional figure in the conceptual history from Plato to Descartes 
is the Church Father Augustine (354–430). For probably the first time in history, 
Augustine elaborated the very notion of the inner world that has been so central 
to modern man’s self-understanding. Descartes could then subsequently assert 
that the inner world was populated with ideas. Consciousness is understood here 
as a kind of container in which there are certain objects, ideas or experiences that 
presumably correspond to phenomena in the outer world. But strictly speaking, 
we can only assume this – we can never know it – because when the only thing 
we can recognize is the content of our own consciousness, everything else (the 
outer world, other people’s existence) becomes purely hypothetical, and we do not 
really have any reason to believe that anything other than the content of our own 
consciousness should exist. This absurd conclusion is called  solipsism – the idea 
that one’s own mind (understood as consciousness) is the only thing that exists. 
 Descartes had to perform some difficult moves in his arguments to try to 
avoid the solipsism to which his own starting point had led him. The existence 
of God was among the issues he argued for in the course of his philosophy, and 
his view led him, as mentioned, to conclude that there are two essentially differ-
ent substances: the mental (consisting of ideas as experienced) and the physical 
(consisting of extended things). This dualism might seem strange to a modern, sci-
entifically minded reader, but it is not as foolish as it is sometimes made out to be. 
For example, it is obvious that there is a difference between the physical Mount 
Everest, which is 8,848 metres high, and my mental conception or idea of Mount 
Everest, which is certainly not 8,848 metres high. My conception is not even 8,848 
millimetres high, nor does it weigh 8,848 grams, because that is the case with this 
as well as all other mental phenomena: they do not extend in space nor do they 
have mass. There is no length, height or weight to my ideas and conceptions. 
 Descartes was right to respect this difference between material phenomena 
(e.g. Mount Everest) and psychological phenomena (e.g. my conception of Mount 
Everest). Some of the more recent and contemporary materialistic philosophers 
and scientists, by contrast, have a tendency to neglect this difference when trying 
to find the place in the brain where, for example, my “representation” of Mount 
Everest is supposedly located. They envision my idea of Mount Everest as being, 
in some sense, a small (mental) representation of the real Mount Everest in all 
its grandeur. The basis for Descartes’ thinking about mental objects is that these 
have no spatial properties or other physical dimensions, although he was not com-
pletely consistent on this point when he nevertheless tried to confine the location 
of interaction between the body and soul to the pineal gland in the brain. Des-
cartes’ problem is how these two essentially different things can interact. Thinking 
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about Descartes’ problem can cause some serious bouts of headaches – and I speak 
from experience! And how do we even make room for phenomena of the mind 
and consciousness in a world that modern science has taught us is material? It was 
a great relief for me personally to discover that these unsolvable problems ought 
 not to be resolved, since they are formulated in a way that makes them unsolvable 
from the outset. The very premise of the problems is wrong. The premise is that 
the psychological realm is a kind of consciousness container, and that psychologi-
cal phenomena are objects in that container. In my opinion, we can resolve these 
problems only by dissolving them, in other words, by starting from quite a differ-
ent premise, which is what Aristotle and much later Wittgenstein did – and what 
the rationality viewpoint of the mind more generally attempts, as is elaborated in 
this book. 
 Although Descartes, in his own way, was right to respect the difference between 
physical things and mental conceptions and did not seek to reduce the one to the 
other, he was wrong in that he interpreted this difference as a specific  metaphysi-
cal difference that required the development of a dualistic world view. The differ-
ence in the way that we can meaningfully speak of the physical and the mental, 
respectively, is in reality – as this book will attempt to prove – a  grammatical 
and not a metaphysical difference. It is thus not a difference that relates to the 
world’s basic structure and being (metaphysics) but rather a difference that stems 
from the fact that we necessarily talk about different phenomena in different ways 
(grammar). The concept of being “grammatical” comes from Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy, and grammar is to be understood as the network of rules and norms that 
determines which uses of language make sense and which do not (Wittgenstein, 
1953). For example, it makes no sense to say that “the colour red weighs two 
kilograms”, but not because red weighs a different amount or because we have 
not yet developed sufficiently sophisticated methods for weighing colours. The 
reason is simply that we cannot meaningfully attribute weight to colours – at 
least not when using the concept of colours that we currently avail ourselves of. 
To give another example, we can say that a book weighs 1 kilogram, but we can-
not ask how much its contents weigh. If its content is weighty, it is only a figure 
of speech; the fact that the plot of a novel does not weigh anything is not a deep 
metaphysical insight. This “insight” does not require that we develop a dualistic 
metaphysical perspective about the difference between tangible and intangible 
things. More modestly, it requires that we become aware that different linguistic 
or grammatical rules apply when we talk about a thing’s physical properties and 
its abstract properties, respectively. 
 We will see that many of the problems that the sciences of mind have faced over 
the course of history in fact stem from grammatical problems in the sense of Witt-
genstein, rather than being empirical problems. What it comes down to, if we are 
to make progress in developing knowledge of mind, is thus not merely conducting 
new experiments and other empirical studies. Of course these are also necessary, 
but if we neglect the basic work, which is to clarify first what our concepts about 
the psychological realm really mean, then we risk conducting thoughtless or even 
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meaningless studies. In his major work,  Philosophical Investigations , Wittgen-
stein expressed it this way in the very last lines, which deal with psychology’s 
status as a science: 
 The confusion and barrenness of psychology are not to be explained by call-
ing it a “young science”; its state is not comparable, for instance, in its begin-
nings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and  conceptual confusion . (As 
in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) 
 The existence of the experimental method makes us think that we have the 
means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method 
pass one another by. 
 (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 232) 
 Problem and method pass one another by in the science of the mind, according to 
Wittgenstein, because the problems are (at least primarily) conceptual, while the 
dominant methods are experimental (and typically seek to demonstrate a statisti-
cally significant difference between two populations). A great deal of experimen-
tal psychological research is simply conceptually naive and sometimes outright 
tautological. To say that something is tautological means that it does not prove or 
disprove empirical hypotheses, but instead is built on unrecognized conceptual 
relations. For example, an experimental study on the relationship between a stim-
ulus such as an “unexpected situation” and the human response of “surprise” is 
tautological because surprise is  defined as what one feels in unexpected situations 
(Smedslund, 2008). If such a psychological experiment, contrary to expectations, 
were to show that there is no connection between these two variables, then we 
would not revise our hypothesis about a real relationship but instead look for 
an error in our methods of measurement. The fact that we would react like this 
is generally an indication that we are dealing with a conceptual, rather than an 
empirical, relationship. One goal of this book is to conduct a conceptual inves-
tigation of the mind in order to avoid spending time on such pseudo-scientific 
studies. 
 In addition to Descartes’ dualism between the mental and the physical, another of 
his dualisms has proved particularly persistent in Western thinking about the mind, 
and that is the dualism between the inner and the outer. If we commit ourselves to 
the notion that all existing objects can be localized in space, and if we acknowledge 
that thoughts, feelings and ideas cannot be located in the outer world, then we are 
obliged to invent an inner world where these phenomena can be placed. It is for 
this reason that the dominant depiction of the mind since Descartes – in science 
as well as in “folk psychology” – has been one that conceptualizes the mind as an 
inner world. This depiction is often coupled with a belief that the “things” that can 
be confined to the inner world are conscious experiences – and thus we have the 
main assumptions behind the idea of the mind as consciousness. 1 Some conscious-
ness researchers actually speak of consciousness as a “Cartesian Theatre” (Baars, 
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1997). The mind is understood here by analogy with a stage on which conscious 
phenomena appear, and, regardless of the scientific progress that has been made 
since Descartes, it is plain to see that the mentalistic and reifying conception of the 
mind has been maintained. 
 Many modern consciousness researchers regard themselves as materialists and 
therefore cannot accept Descartes’ idea of two essentially different metaphysical 
substances, only one of which is material. Instead, they argue that consciousness, 
as a “Cartesian Theatre” or the like, must have material dimensions like every-
thing else in the universe, which means that it must be an aspect of the brain. They 
therefore attribute psychological states and conscious experiences to the brain, 
which as such comes to look like a materialist version of Descartes’ “thinking 
thing” (see Bennett & Hacker, 2003, pp. 68–70, for numerous examples of this 
kind of Cartesian materialism). In the next chapter we will elaborate on why it is 
problematic to attribute psychological properties to the brain (e.g. that it experi-
ences, reasons, chooses, etc.). At the moment it is enough to observe that we 
could easily end up adopting this view as soon as we accept the premise that the 
mind is essentially defined as consciousness. The argument goes roughly as fol-
lows: Descartes was right in that conscious experiences form the core of the psy-
chological realm; however, these experiences cannot (as he mistakenly believed, 
according to contemporary scientists) be attributed to a metaphysical other world 
(metaphysical dualism is rejected here); therefore, conscious experiences and thus 
the psychological realm must be properties of the brain (the dualism between the 
inner and the outer world is thus retained). 
 We can characterize the philosophers who reject Descartes’ metaphysical dual-
ism but accept his inner-outer dualism as “degenerate monists” (see figure above) 
(Hacker, 2007, p. 27). They are “degenerate monists” because they accept most of 
Descartes’ premises, but they deny the existence of one side of his metaphysical 
dualism. Monism is the viewpoint that there is only one metaphysical substance 
in the universe, for example, that everything in existence is fundamentally com-
posed of physical matter in motion. There are two types of degenerate monists: 
(1) the idealistic type (which is rare today), which includes the empiricist theo-
ries of Berkeley and Hume and (on some interpretations) Kant’s transcendentalist 
theory, and (2) the materialistic type (which is dominant today), which includes 
behaviourism and the various forms of physicalism that will be discussed in the 
next chapter (see again the figure above). 
 The idealistic monists started from the premise that Descartes was right in 
saying that the only thing that we stand in epistemological relation to (and thus 
can have knowledge of) is the content of our own consciousness. Bishop George 
Berkeley (1685–1753) drew the logical conclusion from this, claiming that, con-
sequently, only the contents of consciousness – or  ideas – exist (hence the term 
“idealism”). “Esse est percipi” said Berkeley: To be is to be perceived by a con-
sciousness. The fact that something exists simply means that it is perceived, but 
fortunately for the proverbial tree in the desolate forest, which is not perceived by 
humans or animals, Berkeley thought that it is nevertheless perceived by God’s 
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consciousness and thus exists, despite the fact that it is not observed by any mortal 
beings. Thus, according to Berkeley’s metaphysical theory, everything is mental, 
ideal, conscious. 
 The Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume continued and radicalized 
Berkeley’s idealism, among other things by pointing out that if Berkeley was right 
in that something exists only insofar as it is perceived by a consciousness, then the 
self does not exist because we do not perceive the self when we have conscious 
experiences. We can perceive the smell of coffee, the taste of liquorice and pain in 
our fingers, but to date no one has managed to perceive a self, which therefore – 
according to Hume – must be considered non-existent. Hume was also inspired 
by Isaac Newton’s mechanical physics, which had charted the laws of motion 
of physical bodies, and Hume believed that philosophy would chart the laws of 
psychological objects in a similar manner. In this sense, Hume is the grandfather 
of scientific psychology because he, as the subtitle of his impressive work  A Trea-
tise of Human Nature indicates, was attempting to “introduce the experimental 
method of reasoning into moral subjects” (Hume, 1978). And by “moral subjects”, 
he meant the phenomena which today are studied by psychology: how people 
think, feel and act, and not least what factors make them do so. 
 The German enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) regarded 
Hume’s conclusions as scandalous. But we can nevertheless place Kant’s ideal-
istic theory of the mind in the same group as Berkeley and Hume’s “degenerate 
monism”. Kant is undoubtedly one of the greatest philosophers and I cannot do 
justice to his views and arguments here, but the way in which his philosophy has 
been read by modern psychologists undoubtedly places him in the same camp 
as Descartes. He was read, for example, by the influential psychologist Howard 
Gardner, who, among other things, is the originator of the current theory of mul-
tiple intelligences, as an early cognitive psychologist who was interested in how 
knowledge is created when the outer world meets the various schemes, forms of 
intuition and conceptual categories that organize our experiences (Gardner, 1987). 
These schemes can be understood as an early version of what is known today as 
cognitive structures, i.e. the mind’s way of structuring and processing informa-
tion so that the world can be represented to consciousness and known. This is an 
updated version of Descartes’ idealism, and whether or not Kant himself took this 
view (probably not) is not something I will attempt to resolve here, but in any case 
it is a fact that his philosophy has been used to legitimize certain types of mentalis-
tic psychology in contemporary times. As previously stated, mentalism is the view 
that there are independently existing mental states and objects in an inner, mental 
world, which cause external behaviour. Regardless of their many differences, the 
common starting point for Descartes, Berkeley, Hume and (possibly) Kant is that 
the psychological realm is an inner world made up of conscious experiences. 
 As I mentioned before, very few researchers today, if any, accept Descartes’ 
metaphysical dualism. However, there are many researchers who basically accept 
Descartes’ way of formulating the problem, but who then deny the idealistic 
side of Descartes’ philosophy and argue instead for the materialistic view that 
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everything in existence consists fundamentally of physical matter. This kind of 
materialism is put forward by both behaviourists and physicalists. Both positions 
are reductionist. Behaviourism, in brief, is the theory that psychological proper-
ties are properties of behaviour, and physicalism is a theory that the mind is either 
equal to the brain in the strict sense (this view is called the materialist identity 
theory) or equal to the brain’s functions (a theory that is called functionalism). 
Materialistic identity theory and functionalism are discussed in the next chapter, 
where I will try to shed light on the relationship between the brain and the mind 
(for there  is undoubtedly a relationship, although it is not a relationship of same-
ness or equality). 
 The notion that the mind must fundamentally be understood as consciousness 
thus stems from Plato’s dualistic teachings, via the Church Father Augustine and 
Descartes’ establishment of modern philosophy and modern forms of thinking 
about consciousness, which accept Descartes’ dualism between the inner and the 
outer, but which at the same time deny that inner conscious experiences belong to 
a non-material substance. This story ends, for now, with modern scientists, typi-
cally psychologically oriented neuroscientists, who work from Descartes’ inner-
outer dualism and take it for granted that the mind is “inside the head” – more 
precisely, that it is in the brain as a materialistic version of Descartes’ “thinking 
thing”. One example of many is the trendsetting psychologist Steven Pinker, who 
says that the mind is what the brain does (Pinker, 1999). 
 The mind as rationality 
 The other main track in Western ideas about the mind is almost as old as the first 
and can be traced back to Plato’s student, Aristotle. Aristotle was a great philoso-
pher and scientist. He is responsible for having organized the sciences in a way 
that by and large has stood the test of time, and he was probably the greatest natu-
ral scientist in history until Charles Darwin (1809–1882). Plato’s metaphysics had 
built on a distinction between eternal, immutable ideas, on the one hand, and the 
reflection of these ideas in earthly phenomena, on the other, and Plato ascribed the 
human soul to the realm of the eternal world of ideas, which is why the soul must 
be understood as being immortal. The naturalist Aristotle rejected this view: The 
soul –  psukhē – is not immortal, since it cannot exist without the body, so when 
the body dies, the soul dies too. Aristotle’s metaphysics more generally implied 
that form and substance, ideas and matter, always appeared together. There are no 
ideas in separation from their earthly incarnations; they are always immanent in 
the material world. Form cannot exist without substance, and substance cannot 
exist without form. Raphael’s famous Renaissance fresco, the “School of Athens”, 
illustrates the relationship between Plato and Aristotle on this point: Plato is seen 
pointing up towards the eternal heaven of ideas, while Aristotle points out in the 
world as sign that the ideal is inherent in things. 
 For Aristotle, substance is something that has the possibility of changing, while 
form is what makes a particular substance what it is. An object can change without 
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changing form (for example, if you paint your car a different colour), but it can 
also change form in a substantial way (for example by melting the car’s metal 
down and using it to make knives and forks instead). Forms designate the func-
tions of things: the car’s function is as a means of transport, while knives and forks 
function as eating utensils. According to Aristotle, everything has a function, and 
we can understand things fully only if we know their functions. Even if I were to 
map out all possible physical and chemical facts about a car (its dimensions and 
weight and its molecular and atomic structure), we can understand what a car  is , 
strictly speaking, only when we know its function. The function –  the purpose – of 
an object cannot be deduced from knowledge about the object’s substance alone – 
its physical and chemical nature, for example. Hundreds of years later, Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976), as a modernized Aristotelian on this point, would make 
this a cornerstone of his existential phenomenology, according to which things of 
the world show up for us as  Zeug or “equipment”, defined by the ways in which 
they are “ready-to-hand” in patterns of practical engagement (Heidegger, 1927). 
A hammer, to invoke his most famous example, is first and foremost a tool that I 
can use to hammer, and is only in a secondary sense a detached object made from 
wood and iron (Heidegger thought that we become aware of the object as “present-
at-hand” with such properties only when there is a breakdown in our practice, e.g. 
if the hammer malfunctions and we step back and begin inspecting it). 
 The fundamental difference between the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle 
affected their views of the mind. I have already touched on how Aristotle regarded 
the mind or  psyche as a biological concept. His book on the mind,  De Anima , is not 
a modern psychology of mental phenomena in the broad sense, but rather a book 
on biological principles for life (Aristotle, 1957). One has to go to his works on 
ethics to find descriptions of human activities that resemble modern analyses in 
social and personality psychology (Aristotle, 1976). Aristotle understood the mind 
quite generally as “the animal principle of life”, which in essence also applied to 
plant life. As a principle of life, the mind is the form of the living body, accord-
ing to Aristotle. The mind is thus not a thing, an entity, but represents instead the 
defining properties of a living thing. Aristotle compares the relationship between 
a living organism and its mind to the relationship between the eye and vision. If 
an animal were an eye, the mind would be the ability to see. The mind is thus not 
an object that is “attached” to the body; it is not an object at all, just as vision is 
not an object attached to the eye. The human mind consists of abilities, capabilities 
and dispositions to know the world and act reasonably in it. Abilities and capa-
bilities cannot logically be localized in physical space, which is why it makes no 
sense to try and find  where the mind is localized (in the brain, for example). This 
is a grammatical point, as Wittgenstein would say. 
 As the living body’s form, the soul is what makes the organism what it is. 
What makes a human being a human being is not only that we are alive, because 
beech trees and seagulls are alive too. What makes us human is the fact that our 
mind is  rational . In addition to having motor and sensory functions, which our 
minds share with other animals, the human mind also has rational faculties. This 
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is unique and defining for human beings. We are the only species that has a sub-
stantially complex language, and we are thus the only species that can reflect on 
our own actions and, for example, ask whether there are  good reasons to act in a 
certain way. That is why we are also the only moral species in a strict sense. 
 Our rational faculties, according to Aristotle, can be divided into those that 
belong to  theoretical rationality and those that belong to  practical rationality . 
Theoretical rationality, according to Aristotle, refers to our ability to comprehend 
those aspects of reality, which exist independently from human doings and suffer-
ings. Scientific discovery, such as in astronomy, is the paradigm for the applica-
tion of theoretical rationality according to Aristotle. Practical rationality, however, 
is our ability to act rationally in our own lives, which is the domain of ethics, and 
in relation to the community that we are part of, which is the domain of politics. In 
this context, Aristotle uses the term  phronesis , which is our ability to act prudently 
in the here and now while having an eye on life as a whole. 
 We train our practical rationality by being socialized into the collective world of 
social norms. As previously mentioned, it can be expressed with the phrase: “ polis 
andra didaske ” (“the city is man’s teacher”). The rational mind comes into being 
in the organized community – which in Aristotle’s time was the city-state. Our 
upbringing teaches us which events give us a reason for certain reactions, which 
is to say that we cultivate a sensitivity about when certain actions and feelings are 
legitimate or perhaps even required – and when they are illegitimate (McDowell, 
1998). We do not learn merely to act mechanically, but to consider whether there 
are enough good reasons for us to do something. We thus acquire a “second 
nature”. The mind has both a “first” and “second nature”. The mind’s “first nature” 
is our biological predispositions (e.g. instincts), of which we share many with 
the other animals, especially mammals and higher primates. The mind’s “second 
nature” is then the acquired, encultured and socialized aspects of our lives – and 
not least our practical rationality. Theoretical and practical rationality are both 
essential abilities of the well-cultivated mind. 
 For the sake of completeness it can be added that, just as Augustine was cru-
cial for the continuation of Plato’s dualistic human understanding, the Catholic 
Church’s most important philosopher, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), was crucial 
for Aristotle’s thinking to be able to continue to influence Western medieval phi-
losophy. Aquinas’s major project was incorporating thinking about Christianity 
with Aristotle’s philosophy. Aristotle’s world view was fundamentally  teleologi-
cal , meaning that he believed that every object should be understood in the context 
of its purpose ( telos in Greek). Aquinas endeavoured to combine this with Christi-
anity’s conception of a creative and sustaining God. But the Aristotelian teleologi-
cal cosmology suffered a major blow with modern science’s breakthroughs in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when scientists like Galileo (1564–1642) and 
Newton (1642–1727) replaced the image of a purposeful universe with an image 
of a mechanical universe. The mind’s place in this new scientific view was as a 
piece of machinery among other pieces of machinery. At least Hume was of this 
opinion, as we saw above, and it cleared the way for scientific investigations of 
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the mind and later the establishment of modern scientific psychology in the nine-
teenth century, when psychologists began conducting experiments, for example, 
by confronting a subject with a particular stimulus in order to observe the causal 
responses. Because the teleological world view went under, Aristotle’s approach 
to the mind did as well – at least until recently. 
 The breakthrough that resulted from this mechanical world view partly explains 
why there is no mention in the figure above of an Aristotelian, monistic under-
standing of the mind from the time of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century 
to Wittgenstein in the twentieth century. This is illustrated by a dotted line from 
Aristotle to Wittgenstein in the figure above. Aristotle’s, Aquinas’s and Wittgen-
stein’s ideas of the mind were incomprehensible within the mechanistic meta-
physics that modern natural science was based on and helped to promote. How 
could there be reasons and purpose in a universe that could be comprehensively 
explained by causes and laws? How could there be meaningful actions in a world 
of purely physical events? These questions could not be answered within mecha-
nistic metaphysics. 
 Part of Wittgenstein’s philosophy consisted in breaking down the images that 
have kept us trapped intellectually since the mechanical world view emerged, 
including the image of the mind as some inner thing, and of the universe as a 
piece of machinery, so that we can better orient ourselves with regard to life’s 
basic questions. We can say that Wittgenstein’s basic understanding of the mind 
asserts that our mental life is not to be understood in a causal space, with causes 
and effects, but rather in a normative “space of reasons” (McDowell, 1998). We 
became acquainted with one example of an analysis of mental life in a norma-
tive space above when pointing out (with Smedslund) the conceptual relationship 
between experiencing surprise and an unexpected situation. This is a  normative 
relationship, and not a causal or empirical one. This is because surprise is what 
you  ought to feel in an unexpected situation, and if you do not, it is because you 
did not perceive the situation as unexpected. In much the same way, the relation 
that exists between bachelors and unmarried men is not causal or empirical. It is 
nonsense to say that being unmarried  causes you to be a bachelor. Rather, it is 
a conceptual and normative relationship. Everyone who has mastered the term 
“bachelor” knows that they  should (thus the normative) use it for unmarried men, 
since it is this class of people that the term refers to. The idea of the normative 
space of reasons plays a central role for me when we are to understand the human 
mind: the mental world is interconnected in a network of normative necessities, as 
well as in a network of causal necessities (Brinkmann, 2011a). 
 This also applied to Aristotle’s thinking about mental life. When Aristotle dis-
cusses a psychological phenomenon like anger, he argues that this phenomenon 
cannot be comprehensively understood by scientists, who hunt for causalities or 
seek to reduce the phenomenon to its physical and chemical constituents (see Rob-
inson, 1989). Natural scientists in Aristotle’s day used to define anger as “boiling 
of the blood” (today we have other physiological and brain-related explanations) 
and this is not wrong, according to Aristotle, but it is only half of the story. To 
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get the whole story, we have to supplement the scientific causal relation of the 
blood heating up with a normative or rhetorical explanation that considers the 
anger as a meaningful expression in an interpersonal situation. Today we would 
probably call the rhetorical side of anger discursive. Anger should be understood 
normatively or discursively as a response to having experienced injustice. Just as 
a bachelor is defined as an unmarried man, anger is defined as a justified response 
to experiencing injustice. We may well get angry in other situations too, but others 
will rightly reprimand us and say that there is no  reason to be angry (just as we 
could use the term “bachelor” incorrectly and others will correct us). The physi-
ological side of anger must be given a scientific, causal explanation, while the 
discursive side must be understood with reference to the specific situation that  jus-
tified the anger normatively, e.g. if an injustice had actually occurred. Of course, 
it is a fact that people will react differently to a given situation – for example with 
anger – so an essential part of a psychological understanding is also about physi-
ological differences among individuals as well as individual life story differences 
that manifest themselves in individuals within different discursive or normative 
frames of reference. 
 In somewhat technical terms we can say that anger as a psychological phe-
nomenon has both a  nomic side, i.e. it is part of nature’s causal chains that can be 
described by laws, but that it also has a  normative side, where the angry person not 
only can be  described by laws, but can (if her mind is cultivated adequately)  fol-
low local norms for when anger is a legitimate response to events in the world. The 
order of non-human nature is purely nomic, while the order of human existence 
is also normative (Hacker, 2007). Nature cannot be said to follow natural laws 
and therefore it cannot break them – rather, it can be correctly described by these 
laws. People can, however, follow social norms and are therefore also capable of 
breaking them. A list of opposites is summarized in  Table 1.1 . 
 In this book, I argue that the normative side logically prevails over the nomic 
side when it comes to psychological phenomena. If a phenomenon existed solely 
in a nomic and not a normative context, it would be wrong to regard it as a psy-
chological phenomenon and then potentially study its physiological correlate. We 
investigate the physiological correlate of something only when we know what it 
correlates  with (e.g. anger). The reason that, for example, we perceive anger as 
a psychological (normative) phenomenon, but fatigue or constipation as purely 
physiological (nomic) phenomena, then, is that only anger exists in what can be 




Behaviour can be described by the 
laws of nature and statistics
Individuals can either follow or break 
rules and norms
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called a  moral order where it makes sense to look for a  reason to be angry (Harré, 
1983, p. 36). Anger exists in webs of normative necessities in human social prac-
tices, since it can be justified or unjustified, but this does not apply to fatigue or 
constipation. We can have a reason to be angry, whereas fatigue and constipation 
are not explained with reference to reasons, but to  causes instead. There are situ-
ations in which you  should be angry, when you experience a blatant injustice that 
violates an individual’s rights, for example, and there are situations in which anger 
is  inappropriate , for example, getting angry with an infant who is not yet respon-
sible for its actions. But we cannot say in a corresponding manner, that there are 
situations where you should or should not be constipated. Constipation is not a 
normative phenomenon – and is therefore not psychological (although it may well 
be related to psychological processes, say, if it turns out that angry persons are in 
higher risk of suffering from it). 
 I will continually return to the normative view of the mind in the following 
pages. This view applies not only to emotions like anger, but equally well to 
reasoning, memories, actions, perceptions, and other psychological phenomena. 
When we argue, for example, our reasoning is open to judgement in the context of 
the normative standards of  good reasoning; the most basic of these standards come 
from logic. Reasoning is thus a psychological and not, for example, a physiologi-
cal phenomenon. When we remember, we try to remember  correctly , which means 
that remembering is a normative phenomenon. And when we act, the action can 
be judged from a variety of different norms (e.g. ethical, aesthetic, instrumental), 
but the fact that something  can be judged is what makes us call it an action rather 
than a mere physical movement. If a doctor tests my reflexes by tapping below 
my kneecap, my reaction is not to be judged as a more or less correct action (in 
the normative sense), nor am I to be morally blamed for my reaction. The reac-
tion is instead regarded as purely mechanical: Does the reflex mechanism work or 
not? The reaction is in fact not an action, but is pure behaviour, pure movement. 
Thus we are dealing with a  nomic process here. But if I move my leg in a way 
that is physically identical to the reflex movement, but this time in order to kick 
a ball and score a goal in a football match, then we are dealing with another type 
of process; i.e. an action that can be judged as more or less good and appropriate 
in relation to the norms that define the game of football. Here we are back in the 
 normative world, hence in the psychological domain. 
 In the tradition of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, the mind is, in short, something 
normative. The mind is not a “thing” that can be comprehensively understood as 
an element in the chain of mechanical causes and effects in the physical world, nor 
is it a “consciousness principle”, as Descartes believed. The mind is “a distinctive 
range of capacities of intellect and will, in particular the conceptual capacities of a 
language-user which make self-awareness and self-reflection possible”. (Bennett & 
Hacker, 2003, p. 105). In other words, the mind is an array of rational faculties, a 
widely ubiquitous term for our abilities and dispositions (Coulter, 1979, p. 13). The 
mind is  not a term that indicates a  location or a  thing : “the mind is not a  thing ; talk 
of our minds is talk of  world-involving capabilities that we have and activities that 
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we engage in ” (Putnam, 1999, pp. 169–170). As psychologists, we should therefore 
develop an understanding of the mind that takes into account the fact that there is a 
much closer relationship between the mind and the world than Descartes’ dualisms 
have led us to believe. From the viewpoint of “world-involving capabilities” (to 
use Putnam’s apt phrase) there is no more a metaphysical divide between the mind 
and the world than there is between our hands and the things we manipulate. The 
mind should be understood as a complex extension of our hands, which allows us 
to  do something in the physical world – which therefore can be assessed norma-
tively (Brinkmann & Tanggaard, 2010). The pragmatist philosopher John Dewey 
expressed this thought by saying that we should not perceive the mind as a noun 
but as a verb: 
 Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously 
and expressly with the situations in which we find ourselves. Unfortunately, 
an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of action into an under-
lying substance that performs the activities in question. It has treated mind as 
an independent entity,  which attends, purposes, cares, and remembers. 
 (Dewey, 1934, p. 268) 
 In reality, the mind is not a  thing behind our actions that  does something, but is 
instead a term for the abilities we have to do anything in the first place, which can 
then be judged as more or less correct, adequate, good or productive (for Dewey’s 
views on the mind, which, like Wittgenstein’s, are essential for this book, see 
Brinkmann, 2013). 
 I have presented this other track in the history of Western thought about the 
mind as a  rationality point of view in order to emphasize this perspective’s focus 
on the significance of normativity for psychological phenomena. That is to say 
that the normative and the rational are related. Something is a psychological phe-
nomenon within a normative framework only if one can distinguish between it 
being more or less correct; for example, more or less correct actions, percep-
tions, memories or emotional reactions. The fact that this point of view is called 
the rationality viewpoint does not mean that irrational things (e.g. phobias) are 
not a matter for psychology. Phobias are  psychological (and not physiological) 
problems, precisely because we judge them in the light of standards of rational-
ity, which is something we do not with, say, appendicitis (which is therefore not a 
psychological problem, but a physiological one). Moreover, this viewpoint does 
not entail excluding feelings and emotions from the field of psychology or having 
psychology deal only with thinking and cognition. On the contrary, it is about the 
fact that feelings  are psychological to the extent they can be evaluated to a greater 
or lesser degree based on reasons – in other words, that they are more or less ratio-
nal. It is rational to fear fearsome things, because a sense of fear will encourage 
us to escape, but it is dysfunctional to be afraid of harmless things. If something is 
completely outside the sphere of the normative – outside of the normative space 
of reasons, where it makes sense to ask people for rational explanations for their 
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thoughts, actions and feelings – then the phenomenon, like in the case of constipa-
tion, belongs to physiology (or similar sciences), but not to psychology. 2 
 One should, therefore, not misunderstand the rationality viewpoint as express-
ing an over-intellectualization of our mental life. The vast majority of everything 
we do takes place habitually and unconsciously and it is only when things go 
wrong or when we run into problems that we need to stop and use our reason 
and our ability to reflect (Dewey, 1922). The point is thus not that everything we 
do is rational. The point is rather that everything we do – if it can reasonably be 
regarded as psychological – must potentially be able to be considered relative to 
normative frameworks. So: the fact that I cry when I see a sad film is a spontane-
ous and immediate process, but it is psychological, because I can later consider 
whether I might have misunderstood the film and overlooked the fact that it was 
not sad at all (but comedic instead, for example). The next time I see the film I 
may have realized that there was not any reason to cry at all, but a reason to laugh 
instead. I cannot reflect in a similar manner on my digestive system’s reasons for 
reacting with constipation when it deals with a certain type of food, because it has 
no reason to react like it does. It merely reacts as a purely physiological and chem-
ical process, which is precisely why digestion is not psychological and is instead 
a phenomenon rightfully studied by physiologists. The rationality viewpoint will 
therefore in no way deny that we are often irrational, driven by emotions, or 
immoral. Something can be immoral or irrational only if it can also be moral or 
rational. The rationality viewpoint insists that when we talk about psychological 
processes, we talk not only about something that happens, but about something 
that is done – and therefore we can always judge, at least as a matter of principle, 
whether it is done well or poorly, morally or immorally, rationally or irrationally. 
 Mindism and personism 
 An immediate question arising for the rationality viewpoint, however, is about 
the reference of psychological terms. If the concept of mind names our rational 
powers and dispositions, then who has these powers and dispositions? It is not the 
mind that has them, because that would be circular. A key point of the present book 
is that it is wrong to ascribe psychological predicates to the brain, but it is equally 
wrong to ascribe them to the mind. The brain does not think, but neither does the 
mind (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 105). It is misguided to say that “my mind is 
sad” or “my mind remembers what I had for lunch yesterday”. It is correct to say 
that  I am sad, or that  I remember something. This  I , however, does not refer to an 
inner experiencing or thinking thing, because it does not refer at all. Rather, saying 
“I am sad”, for example, is a mode of expressing sadness for linguistic creatures. 
As Wittgenstein would say, “I am in pain” does not refer to anything, but is an 
expression of the pain one feels. In short, it is only the person who can be sad and 
remember yesterday’s meals. It is not the person’s brain (although the brain is 
needed for the person to have emotions and memories), and it is also not the per-
son’s mind. The mind stands for the person’s abilities to feel emotions, remember 
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things past, and much else, but it is irreducibly the person who does these things, 
and not the mind. Similarly, we can say that the car moves through the city. Mov-
ing is here equivalent to the mental functions of a person, and we cannot sensibly 
say that the car’s movement is what is moving it (just as we cannot sensibly say 
that the person’s mind is doing the thinking). 
 This means that we need a robust concept of the person as fundamental in psy-
chology. A forceful argument to this effect has been advanced by Elmer Sprague 
(1999). He invokes a useful distinction between two philosophies of the mind, 
which he calls “mindism” and “personism” respectively. Mindism is very close 
to what I have described as the consciousness track in Western thought about the 
mind. Sprague mentions Descartes, Locke, Hume, Davidson, Fodor, Dennett and 
Searle, and he could include many other contemporary cognitive scientists. Mind-
ists take what Sprague calls a “spectator stance” to mental phenomena and ascribe 
psychological properties to the mind as a peculiar kind of thing. Personists deny 
that the mind is a thing or an object, and they make the person the only subject of 
mental verbs (p. ix). Representatives of Sprague’s personism are much rarer than 
mindists in the history of philosophy, and he focuses on just three: Aristotle, Witt-
genstein and Ryle (1949). The personists attack the spectator stance of the mind-
ists, according to which we “observe” each other – including the “contents” of our 
own minds – as if they were objects. Instead, personists defend an agent stance, 
according to which acting persons in relationships represent the prime psychologi-
cal reality. Psychology should thus primarily be about persons and their doings, 
and minds do not exist as special kinds of objects. There is no “intelligence” as a 
reified object, for example, locked in a mind or brain, but only people acting (more 
or less) intelligently. There is no inner “memory” in a reified sense, but only people 
remembering things (more or less) correctly. This may seem like behaviourism, but 
it is not, for it does not involve a denial of the obvious fact that persons experience 
many things that they do not have to share with others, and, also unlike behaviour-
ism, the notions of meaning, reasons and actions become central to understand the 
lives of persons – rather than mechanism, causes and behaviours. This whole book 
can be read as an attempt to develop a “personist” foundation for scientific psychol-
ogy, and I return later to the central concept of the person. 
 Science of the mind: A brief scientific history 
 In addition to this book’s perspective on the mind as a range of rational abilities 
and dispositions that can be ascribed to living persons, we have a wide range of 
sciences that study the mind. Not only psychology but also sociology and social 
anthropology deal with the human mind from a social and cultural perspective, 
respectively. But psychology naturally has a certain centrality as the principal 
science of the mind, especially today, when we live in a psychological society, 
because we all use psychological concepts to understand our own and others’ 
behaviour – shyness has become social phobia, sadness has become depression 
and personal imbalances are now often seen as personality disorders, to name just 
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a few psychological difficulties (for a critique of diagnostic pathologization of 
human life, see Brinkmann, 2016a). 
 Consistent with the two-sided image of the mind that I have outlined as having 
both a nomic and a normative side, scientific psychology has also been two-sided 
throughout its historic development. This has given rise to great battles within the 
science over the correct way to regard the mind. This helps to explain why psychol-
ogy is full of dualisms like mind-brain, individual-society, action-behaviour, cause-
reason, explanation-understanding, quantitative-qualitative and many others. It 
seems that when we talk about human life in the psychological sense – in other 
words, not merely about purely biological life but about individuals’ existence – 
then we inevitably run into such dualisms. Some researchers have argued this means 
that we should have two psychologies: the first psychology would be experimental, 
quantitative and explain by causes, and the other psychology would be descriptive, 
qualitative and understanding by interpretation (the locus classicus is here Dilthey, 
1977, as we shall see below). This distinction corresponds roughly to the distinc-
tion between the nomic and the normative. 
 The relationship between these two psychologies is a thread throughout most 
of the history of psychology, and unfortunately modern psychologists have often 
been far less nuanced than Aristotle, who, as mentioned, respected the hybrid 
nature of psychological phenomena. Modern psychology is very much a product 
of the British empiricism of the 1700s and especially of David Hume’s attempt 
to develop a science of the mind using Newton’s mechanical physics as a model. 
Hume wanted to apply a way of thinking to the mind that was experimental and 
explained by causes, just as Newton had successfully done with the physical 
world. Hume never really realized this program, but the later empiricist John Stu-
art Mill (1806–1873) did; Mill has been singled out as being primarily responsible 
for having created modern scientific psychology since he formulated its scientific 
theoretical basis (Gazzaniga & Heatherton, 2003). 
 Mill insisted on the duality between human and social sciences. In addition to 
an elementary psychology that explained causes on the basis of experiments, Mill 
thought there was a need for what he called “ethology”, which was to be the science 
of the formation of the human character. Mill’s ethology has nothing to do with 
modern biology (today the term ethology denotes the study of animal behaviour), 
but refers instead to the Greek concept of character and custom:  ethos . Ethology is 
the study of human character and morality. Mill’s viewpoint was that human char-
acter is formed under very specific circumstances – historical, social and cultural – 
and this is why it is difficult to lay down universal laws for it. At one point Mill says 
that only “an oriental despot” would be able to educate people under the strictly 
controlled conditions necessary in ethological experimental science, and even then 
it would be impossible to control every single character-forming impression (see 
Cahan & White, 1992, p. 226). In Mill’s major work,  A System of Logic , published 
in 1843, he classifies psychology among “the moral sciences” and he believes not 
only that psychology’s subjects belong to the moral (i.e. the normative) domain 
in a broad sense, but also that psychology’s mission is to contribute to humanity’s 
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improvement in accordance with utilitarian principles (Mill, 1843). In any event, 
Mill was operating with a dual psychology: an experimental one and an “ethologi-
cal” one. Both of them, however, should be inductive and empirical. When Mills’ 
work was translated into German in 1849, “moral sciences” became “Geisteswis-
senschaften”, i.e. sciences of the spirit (Kessen & Cahan, 1986). “Geisteswissen-
schaften” was a new word in German at the time, at least in the plural form, and it 
paved the way for Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), who, if anyone, stands out as the 
one to bisect the science of psychology, as we shall see. 
 Dilthey is famous for having made clear the methodological differences 
between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities and social sci-
ences, on the other (Dilthey, 1977). His most famous quote is: We explain nature; 
we understand mental (or spiritual) life [ Die Natur erklären wir, das Seelenleben 
verstehen wir ]. This means that the nomic, causal world must be explained by 
uncovering the laws of nature, while the normative world must be understood by 
grasping the norms that order our historical lives. Mental (spiritual) life is, above 
all, historically determined, according to Dilthey, which is why we do not get a 
real insight into it through introspection, i.e. by turning “inward” into our own 
psychological world, or through experiments, but only by considering how it is 
historically embedded. If there were to be a science of humans and their minds, 
claimed Dilthey, then it should be an anthropology that aims to understand the 
totality of human experience in its context. It is commonly recognized in historical 
philosophy that we cannot formulate general historical laws like “every time an 
heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne is shot in Sarajevo, a new World War breaks 
out” – precisely because historical events are unique. 
 If natural science, in its essence, works deductively-nomologically, that is to say 
that it explains an individual phenomenon by subsuming it under a general law, 
then we must conclude that man’s historical and mental life does not lend itself to 
scientific study. As far as psychology is concerned, the conclusion is therefore 
that if its subject is historical, as Dilthey believed, then psychology should not 
belong primarily to the natural sciences. The theoretical scientific discussions 
that Dilthey set in motion have been very significant for later cultural thinkers in 
psychology – not least for hermeneutically oriented psychology, such as some of 
the cultural psychology discussed in  Chapter 4 , represented by names like Richard 
Shweder (1990a) and Jaan Valsiner (2014). 
 These discussions were also significant from a purely methodological perspec-
tive since they formed two basic ways to investigate the psychological realm: on 
the one hand, we can use various types of experiments in which researchers seek 
to isolate a specific factor that they believe will be able to explain a particular 
phenomenon. For example, if we are interested in what conditions are necessary 
for people to behave generously, we can create a psychological experiment. We 
then need an experimental group in which people are asked to donate money, for 
example, while they know that they are being observed, and a control group in 
which people believe they are not being watched. And we will then possibly find 
that statistically there is a significant difference and that people are more generous 
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when others observe their behaviour. We then seek to  explain the generous behav-
iour as being  caused by this particular factor. The behaviour is thus approached as 
something that simply  happens . 
 While this experimental logic regards humans as natural objects that, like 
everything else in the universe, work on the principle of cause and effect, other 
methodological traditions take a completely different approach. Within the field of 
what is called  qualitative research , there is insistence on  understanding people’s 
actions as meaningful, i.e. people are viewed as meaning-making agents and, for 
example, selected individuals are interviewed about their experiences of gener-
osity and this is potentially supplemented with field studies of human activities 
in real situations (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). Reducing the complexity of the 
human world through an experiment is not the goal in this tradition; it is rather 
to study the psychological processes as wholes in the real and complex contexts 
where they actually play out. One seeks to understand and not to explain. Generos-
ity in this context is not something that just happens, but something that is  done in 
the form of generous actions that people can talk about. 
 Here we have the basic distinction between the quantitative and qualitative 
methods, and this is reflected in psychology’s method books and has given rise to 
many fruitless battles. In reality the methods are not in competition since they do 
not provide different answers to the same question. On the contrary, they provide 
 different answers to  different questions. When you conduct experimental research 
with quantitative methods, the question you ask is “how much”. For example: 
“How much of human generosity can be explained by the fact that we want to be 
seen positively in the eyes of others?” Within qualitative research, however, we 
ask more descriptive “what” and “how” questions, such as: “What is a generous 
act from people’s perspectives?” or “How do we experience generosity?” Qualita-
tive methods have been marginalized for decades and have often been accused of 
being subjective and unscientific because they do not give results in the form of 
a numeric value. Just as this book will show that normative psychology is inevi-
table, it will also show that this applies to qualitative psychology as well: We must 
logically know  what the psychological phenomena are qualitatively, and describe 
 how they are played out in social and cultural practices, before it makes sense to 
ask “how much” questions that seek explanations. 
 A large number of psychologists since Dilthey have dealt with the dualization 
of psychology – in Europe, USA and Russia. One from each of these geographical 
regions can be mentioned here: Wilhelm Wundt, John Dewey and Lev Vygotsky. 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) is the official founder of psychology, according to sci-
entific mythology, since he created the first psychological laboratory for the study 
of psycho-physical processes at the University of Leipzig in 1879. But beyond this 
experimental part of psychology, he also created the other side of the science of the 
mind, which was based on ethnographic data about languages, myths and culture: 
a  Völkerpsychologie . In the American context, the first psychology textbook was 
written by John Dewey in 1887. In a later article from 1917 entitled “The Need for 
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Social Psychology”, Dewey says that all psychological phenomena can be divided 
into either the physiological or the social, and when we have relegated elementary 
sensation and appetite to the former, all that is left of our mental life, our beliefs, 
ideas and desires, falls within the scope of social psychology (Dewey, 1917, p. 54). 
A modern successor of Dewey’s thinking, the late Richard Rorty, believed that, 
by extension, mentalistic psychology will go under as developments are made in 
brain research, in much the same way that alchemy did after chemistry emerged 
as a mature science. For Rorty, there was no mental level between the brain and 
culture. Therefore, it is not the mind that is the brain’s software, as modern psy-
chologists have otherwise asserted. According to Rorty, culture – social life – is the 
software: he said that “culture is to software as the brain is to hardware”. (Rorty, 
2004, p. 231). We see here that Rorty dissolves psychology into its neighbouring 
sciences, which seems to be a constant danger for psychology because of its dual-
ity or hybrid nature. On the one hand, the fact that psychology has such a close 
relationship with both the biological and sociological sciences has provided a rich 
science, but, on the other hand, it has meant that it has been regularly argued that 
psychology is therefore superfluous. The argument in this book is that if psychol-
ogy is constructed on the basis of either mentalism (mindism) or reductionism 
(which we may call “brainism”, paraphrasing Sprague’s distinction), then Rorty 
and others are correct in saying that it is without justification. But if we start from 
a non-mentalistic and non-reductionist psychology (personism), which does not 
regard the mind as a “mental thing” but as a range of rational abilities and disposi-
tions of living and acting persons, then psychology has an important place among 
the sciences as the study of how people act and create meaning. 
 One of the non-American psychologists who was engaged in this kind of dis-
cussion was the Russian Vygotsky, with whom we will become acquainted later 
in  Chapter 4 . Vygotsky wrote insightfully about the crisis in psychology in the 
late 1920s (Vygotsky, 1927). The crisis consisted in scientific fragmentation and 
dualisms. Vygotsky believed that the two psychologies should be supplemented 
with a third psychology – primarily on Marxist foundations. The crisis in psy-
chology was precisely about the fact that there existed many different psycholo-
gies, which, however, were assembled in two general families: an explanatory 
psychology belonging to the natural sciences, on the one hand, and a descriptive, 
phenomenological psychology, on the other (phenomenology will be explained 
in  Chapter 3 ). Vygotsky viewed the diversity in psychology as a sign of sci-
entific immaturity, but dualism is nevertheless – and productively so – clearly 
reflected in his important work to develop a cultural and historical psychology 
of the “higher mental functions”. He perceived these as being created by linguis-
tic signs and symbols and (other) tools, and as being something other than the 
mental functions that are biologically determined. For Vygotsky, there is thus a 
clear distinction between lower and higher, biologically determined and cultur-
ally mediated, which is not far from the nomic and the normative dimensions 
discussed above. 
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 Conclusions 
 Throughout this book I will touch on many kinds of psychological research that 
come from both “the first psychology” and “the second psychology”. A goal of 
the book is to show that the two psychologies can and must coexist, but that we 
must take care to elucidate the proper relationships between them. This will be 
addressed directly in  Chapter 6 . First and foremost, we need to maintain that 
the “second psychology”, the descriptive, understanding, interpretive and norma-
tive kind, is justified  and necessary for a proper understanding of the mind, even 
though mentalism and reductionism deny this, each in its own way. In this chapter 
I may not have delivered any real “knock-down argument” against the mentalistic 
and reductionist traditions that stem from thinking about the mind as conscious-
ness (my first track in the history of ideas), but I hope that it will become clear 
in the following chapters why it is a much better alternative to think about the 
mind as rationality (my second track in the history of ideas from Aristotle to Witt-
genstein) and in terms of personism. In summary, we can say that the first track 
considers the mind to be a mechanism that primarily  represents the world and thus 
makes us conscious of properties of the world, while the second track considers 
the mind to be a name for the rational abilities and dispositions of persons to  act 
in the world. Whereas the first track is concerned with uncovering the causal laws 
that are believed to determine how we represent the world in our minds, the sec-
ond track is concerned with our ways of acting as always being open to normative 
judgements and interpretations. The psychological realm in the former case is thus 
something mechanical and causal, whereas in the second case it is meaningful and 
normative. 
 In my opinion, there are such major problems in regarding the mind as a rep-
resentational mechanism, regardless of whether the representations are Cartesian 
ideas or cognitive psychological information bits, that the first main track cre-
ates far more scientific and philosophical problems than it solves: What is it 
about a mental representation that makes it represent what we think it does? If 
mental representations exist, where are they and what form do they take? How 
can one person communicate her mental representation to another person? How 
do we even know whether our mental representations correspond to anything in 
the outside world? As we shall see in the following chapters, once we ask these 
questions we run into a philosophical impasse. The cure is not to provide better 
answers to the questions, but to start from a completely different tack; and that 
is to ask the questions that the Aristotelian tradition would ask. Here, the funda-
mental question is not about how the mind (the inner world) can represent the 
outer world. Instead, a fundamental question is: If the mind is a range of abili-
ties and dispositions, what do we need to know in order to be able to understand 
how these abilities result in actions? My proposal for an answer will be given in 
the following four chapters on the brain, the body, society and things. These are 
regarded as layers of mediators that make possible the sophisticated psychologi-
cal life forms of persons. 
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 Notes 
 1 Not all philosophical or psychological traditions envision consciousness as “an inner 
world”. For example, the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1936) is concerned 
with describing consciousness or the mind as “intentionality”, i.e. as a directedness that 
always points beyond itself and refers to something other than itself, which was the inspi-
ration for phenomenological psychology (e.g. Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). This is closely 
aligned with the perspective of the present book and its focus on rationality and more 
precisely  normativity . There was in Husserl’s phenomenology an acute awareness of 
the normativity of our experience. Intentionality was certainly a key concept from him, 
which he took from Brentano. It means that experience is always about something – 
our thoughts, feelings, perceptions and actions are always directed at something. But, 
as Crowell puts it, “intentionality is not simply the static presence of a ‘presentation’ in 
a mental experience (Erlebnis) but a normatively oriented claim to validity.” (Crowell, 
2009, p. 13). In colloquial terms, this means that what we experience can only be “about” 
something (intentionality), because there are more and less correct and valid ways of 
experiencing it (normativity). For example, we may see a dangerous snake in the forest, 
but – on closer scrutiny – it may turn out to be an innocent branch, and our intentional 
orientation toward the object involves a normative underpinning of trying to “get it right”. 
Simply put, it means that we experience normativity, valences and values in objects and 
events – something the Gestalt psychologists took up after Husserl (Köhler, 1959). 
 2 I am well aware that I am conveying a minority view within scientific psychology here, 
and the reader should of course be aware of this as well. The vast majority of modern 
psychology can be understood as seeking to uncover causal relationships rather than to 
elucidate normative connections in the social world. The forms of cultural psychology 
and discursive psychology conveyed in this book, and which, like me, put forward the 
view that normative explanations are far more important than causal explanations in 
psychology, represent a small portion of psychology overall; the vast majority is still 
positivistic (see Harré & Tissaw, 2005, pp. 16–19). 
Chapter  2 
 The mind and the brain 
 
Today, many people – scientists and laymen alike – will as a matter of course say 
that the psychological realm is essentially an aspect of the brain. Many people 
have a notion that the mind is  in the brain or even that it  is the brain. The mind is 
what the brain does, as it is sometimes expressed. The psychological realm is per-
ceived as something intracranial, something “inside the head”. This notion is also 
prominent in the public debate in my own country, Denmark, for example, where 
Lone Frank, a neurobiologist and science journalist, with a best-selling book on 
 The Fifth Revolution ( Den femte revolution ) – the revolution of the neurosciences 
after the scientific revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, and Watson and 
Crick – has made a significant contribution to the public discussion about the pos-
sibilities and implications of brain science in terms of human self-understanding. 
The book makes it clear that, at present, brain explanations are increasingly 
replacing psychological, humanistic and social-scientific explanations for human 
behaviour: “Whereas in the past speculations were made with reference to culture 
and to a mind that was curiously detached from the organism, the physical brain is 
now steadily becoming the reservoir and terminus for all of the questions we put 
to human nature and existence.” (Frank, 2007, p. 18; my translation). As a reader 
of newspapers in both Denmark and the English-speaking world, it is not difficult 
to recognize this description all too well: the results of neuroscientific research 
take up more and more space, often coupled with an interest in evolutionary psy-
chology. Biological and genetic explanations of human behaviour are increasing, 
while culture-oriented explanations are on the decline. 
 According to Frank, this is a sound consequence of advances in brain research; 
it is a consequence of the fact that we are coming to realize that we  are our brains: 
“my brain – it is  me !” (Frank, 2007, p. 17). When we acknowledge that we  are our 
brains, then it is of course in the brain we need to look to learn more about our-
selves. The way to get to know ourselves is not through individual self-discovery 
as in psychotherapy, for example, nor is it through a preoccupation with the his-
torical and cultural conditions in which we live our lives. When we  are our brains, 
it is obviously the brain that is interesting and not our biography, culture or his-
tory. And, according to Frank, we also need to accept that we are “responsible 
for own brains” (p. 140). Responsibility for dealing with life’s essential tasks can 
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no longer be “pushed over onto a convenient collective and shapeless mass like 
‘society’. The individual is irretrievably on the path back to the centre” (p. 114). 
The individual is back because the brain is back – and your brain is precisely  your 
brain; you  are your brain. Frank is very good at formulating sharp ideas, but they 
are nonetheless representative of a pervasive and significant way of thinking about 
humanity today. 
 When, according to such current ideas, we  are our brains, it is clear that brain 
sciences obtain a centrality that more traditional humanistic perspectives on man 
have had in the past. It is also understandable why brain research has been expand-
ing into various other subjects in recent years, resulting in peculiar configurations 
like neuro-ethics and neuro-theology, and also why brain research has entered 
into a partnership with the commercial sector, for example. According to news-
paper stories, the neuro-marketing firm Mindmetic, for example, has developed 
an emotion detector that uses brain measurements to enable advertising messages 
to be best adapted to consumers and their emotional preferences. 1 The company 
Nordic Living will be “emotion-testing” 100–125 new products in this way, and 
it can predict how an advertisement will be received with 75% accuracy. It could 
be argued that it would be cheaper, easier and more reliable to simply  ask the 
consumers who are exposed to the advertisements. But the people behind neuro-
marketing conclude quite the opposite: companies will be able to save money by 
using brain methods because traditional qualitative methods like focus groups are 
too slow and imprecise. The chairman of the Consumer Council in Denmark has 
understandably sounded the alarm and fears that, in the future, neuro-marketing 
will hit the mark every time so that our patterns of consumption will be able to be 
controlled remotely. 
 My view is that this debate is interesting primarily because of the surprisingly 
deep faith in brain research that has been flourishing in recent years. This faith 
suggests that we view neuroscientists to a great extent as the new wise men or 
priests who possess unquestionable knowledge about man that is far more tenable 
than that of other professions. If you take a look behind the catchy rhetoric that 
is used in neuro-marketing, for example, there is not much evidence to suggest 
that brain research could ever become a “remote control” for people – in much 
the same way as with the arguments and conclusions that Lone Frank so enthusi-
astically puts forward in her book. There are a lot of exaggerated, science-fiction 
conclusions and hot air in the debate about the brain and the mind. In this chapter, 
I will show that it is simply philosophically and scientifically untenable to say that 
“we are our brains” (Noë, 2009, likewise puts forth a number of such arguments). 
I will also argue that this notion of the brain has questionable ideological effects 
on our society. It will simply impoverish our lives if we “voluntarily” become part 
of the project, which in recent years is in the process of reducing thinking, feeling 
and acting people to their brains. If we start using these ways of thinking and talk-
ing about the brain, which are quite legitimate and indispensable in neuroscience, 
to understand our mental life more generally, then we will cut ourselves off from 
understanding key aspects of ourselves. 
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 The brain as an organ 
 There is no doubt that the brain is an amazing organ that we have actually come 
to know a great deal about. In humans the brain is the part of the central nervous 
system that is located inside the skull. The spinal cord is also part of the central 
nervous system, and it runs from the brain down to the second lumbar vertebra. 
All vertebrates have brains, but other living beings manage without. Jellyfish, for 
example, have decentralized nervous systems that are not controlled by a central 
organ, and mushrooms do not have a nervous system at all. The brain of an adult 
human weighs about 1,400 grams; a little less in women, and a little more in men. 
It contains about 100 billion neurons, which are nerve cells, each of which com-
municates with approximately 10,000 other neurons (Bloom & Lazerson, 1996). 
This makes the brain an incredibly complex organ. The number of possible neural 
circuits is hyper-astronomical – the number has to be written as 10 followed by 
at least a million zeros. In comparison, the number of particles in the universe is 
written as 10 followed by “only” 79 zeros (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, p. 38). 
 The connections between the neurons of the brain are made electrically and 
chemically via synapses, which are the spaces between the neurons where neu-
rotransmitters, or chemical messengers, transmit impulses from one neuron to the 
next – or from one neuron to other cells such as muscle cells. The neurons emit 
chemical messengers that cross what is called the synaptic cleft and bind to spe-
cific receptors on the postsynaptic neuron. The whole process takes place in a 
matter of milliseconds. When a neurotransmitter binds to the postsynaptic neuron, 
it becomes less negatively charged, and if it becomes sufficiently negative, then 
it “fires”, meaning that it conveys the impulse to the other neurons to which it is 
connected (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, pp. 40–41). Some of the most important 
systems of neurotransmitters are amino acids and monoamines, which include nor-
epinephrine, dopamine and serotonin. Changes in these last three may be related to 
psychological changes, where, for example, a well-known (but highly controver-
sial and quite possibly wrong) hypothesis is that depression is related to serotonin 
deficiency. The well-known SSRI antidepressants work by inhibiting the reuptake 
of serotonin, thereby increasing the concentration of the substance in the brain. 
 The brain consists of different structures, which can generally be divided into 
the cerebrum and cerebellum. The cerebrum is involved in higher mental func-
tions such as memory, thinking, problem solving and the ability to speak, while 
the cerebellum is involved in the control of more automatic functions, including, 
for example, the ability to keep one’s balance. Respiration and similar basic pro-
cesses are controlled by the medulla oblongata, which connects the brain to the 
spinal cord. Some specific areas of the brain can be designated as being more or 
less directly associated with a specific function; for example, Broca’s and Wer-
nicke’s areas in the left hemisphere are active in language and speech, but many 
other mental functions are not similarly associated with a particular, isolable area. 
Often – and possibly always – the cerebrum as a whole is involved as the neural 
basis of a mental function. 
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 The question of cerebral localization, i.e. whether the cerebral foundations of 
specific mental functions can be localized to specific areas of the brain, has been 
heavily debated throughout the history of brain science and continues to be con-
troversial today (Gerlach & Starrfelt, 2007). An early view from the eighteenth 
century was formulated by what is called phrenology, where the leading figure of 
the movement, Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), believed that personality traits 
and abilities were represented in specific parts of the brain. He also believed that 
it was possible to determine how well developed these traits and abilities were in 
individuals by measuring the size of certain locations on their skulls. If your skull 
bulged a lot on the morality spot, then you were a highly moral person. 
 Phrenology is often ridiculed today, but we would do well to remember that 
in its time it was a highly respected scientific approach with its own scientific 
centres, journals and standards for good phrenological research. Nowadays 
neuroscientists do not measure the size of bulges on the skull when conduct-
ing neuroscientific studies. Instead, they can directly measure activity (e.g. blood 
flow) in different parts of the brain using various imaging techniques and create a 
graphical representation of this activity, like the ones that most people have seen 
pictures of in books or on television. Regardless of how amazing these imaging 
techniques are from a purely technological standpoint, it is still unclear whether 
they are as conclusive in the scientific sense as some neuroscientists believe. First, 
many such studies are built on a principle of high cerebral localization, which is 
debatable, and second, it is uncertain whether the activities that can be measured 
in the brain are crucial for the mental function that one is interested in. It is pos-
sible that the activity in a particular place in the brain is merely a concomitant of 
a function rather than playing a crucial role in the function (Gerlach & Starrfelt, 
2007, p. 446). When some neuroscientists today claim to have found the place in 
the brain where morality or love is located, then it is, in my opinion, just as wrong 
as when phrenologists believed they could measure a person’s morality or love 
based on the bumps on their skull. I think that history’s verdict on the simplistic 
conclusions in current brain research will be just as tough as today’s verdict is on 
phrenology. 
 As many will know, the brain consists of two halves, and a lot of pop science 
and New-Age thinking has adopted the view that the left brain is analytical and 
intellectual, while the right brain is holistic and creative. This should probably be 
considered as both conceptual nonsense (because a hemisphere cannot be “cre-
ative” in any meaningful sense) and also scientifically wrong, because in reality 
both hemispheres are involved in the vast majority of mental functions. Neverthe-
less, it is an example of how brain research influences people’s thoughts in their 
everyday lives. Sometimes this notion of the two hemispheres is coupled with the 
idea that men and women use the one or the other half, respectively, the most. 
And at other times this idea of brain differences between the genders is used to 
legitimize different teaching methods for boys and girls in primary schools. In 
Denmark, the teacher Ann-Elisabeth Knudsen has been an advocate of this view 
in the public debate, which many school leaders have embraced, and she believes 
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that boys become losers these days because they are subjected to an educational 
approach that is best suited for girls’ brains. On her website, she writes that boys 
should be forced to do at least a half-hour workout with bead plates every day, as 
she believes this will strengthen the linguistic area in their frontal lobes. 
 Based on such more or less well-founded recommendations, it is good to 
remember what it is that the brain actually does when it shapes and determines our 
body’s functions – biological as well as psychological. And the brain’s function, 
as an organ, is basically to send electro-chemical signals along specific circuits. 
This happens as a causal or nomic process, as I called it in the previous chapter. 
These electro-chemical processes are necessary for our organisms to be able to 
live, breathe, keep balance, move and so on. Our biological functions are thus 
dependent on cerebral processes, and our mental functions are as well. Without 
brain processes we could not think, feel or act. That is a simple truism. 
 But does that mean that mental functions are  in the brain? Does it mean that 
thoughts and feelings are “inside the head”? Does it mean that it is the  brain that 
thinks, feels and acts? I have an adverse opinion on the matter. Although having 
a brain that functions in a certain way is a necessary condition for the existence 
of mental life as we know it, it is not the same as saying that mental life is equal 
to the brain’s functioning. As previously mentioned, it is similar to a vehicle: you 
cannot drive a car without an engine, but that does not mean that it is the engine 
that is driving. It is  the car as a whole that is driving, just as it is the individual 
who thinks, feels and acts – and not that individual’s brain. My argument is not 
empirical here, and no empirical data can be found that speaks either for or against 
it. Instead, it is an argument based on an analysis of the meanings of concepts. 
Regardless of what empirical neuroscience might teach us, it is a mistake to attri-
bute abilities and dispositions to the brain, which make sense only when attributed 
to the organism as a whole. 
 Many people – scientists and laymen alike – make this mistake, which has been 
dubbed “the mereological fallacy” (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). Mereology is the 
study of the relationships between parts and wholes, and the mereological fallacy 
consists in attributing characteristics to a part of something (e.g. the brain), where 
it is meaningfully attributable only to the whole (e.g. the organism). The world-
famous neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, for example, commits a mereological 
fallacy when he describes how the brain is aware of an image of an object, or 
when he analyzes how the brain perceives something (Damasio, 1994, p. 263; 
1999, p. 189) (see also the extended critique of Damasio in Brinkmann, 2006). 
The brain cannot be aware of anything or perceive anything. What it can do is 
transform energy, and this energy transformation obviously affects how a  person 
can be aware of something or perceive something, but it does not change the fact 
that it is the person and not the brain that can do these things. 
 Not only Damasio, but countless other leading neuroscientists excel at the 
mereological fallacy: Francis Crick writes that the brain has “convictions” and 
that it can “guess” and “interpret”; Gerald Edelman argues that the brain “cat-
egorizes” and “manipulates the rules” and Colin Blakemore writes that neurons 
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have “intelligence” and “knowledge” and that they “present arguments” for the 
brain (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 68). This is just a small sample from a very 
large number of mereological fallacies in scientific literature. However, it could 
be argued that this is merely an innocent metaphorical way of expressing oneself; 
these scientists are well aware that the brain cannot do these things (which is actu-
ally Blakemore’s response to the criticism), but scientists’ theories and models are 
often dependent on their meaning what they say – literally. 
 One should pay attention to the fact that if it does not make sense to attribute 
psychological characteristics (paying attention, for example) to the brain, then it 
does not make sense to attribute their  negations to the brain either. The fact that 
the brain cannot pay attention does not mean that it is therefore inattentive. The 
fact that the brain cannot see does not mean that it is therefore blind – in the same 
way as my oatmeal cannot be said to be either awake or sleeping! Again, this is not 
an empirical fact about brains and oatmeal, because we cannot someday  discover 
that the brain can actually see, or that my oatmeal can actually sleep. Instead, it is 
a conceptual fact, i.e. a fact about how we can meaningfully use our language’s 
psychological terms. Wittgenstein expressed this point as follows: “only of a liv-
ing human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one 
say it has sensations; it sees: is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §281). Our mental concepts can be applied only to living 
creatures with a certain range of behaviours – and the brain is not a creature in the 
required sense. It is an organ of such creatures. 
 So even though the brain is an amazing and fascinating organ, it is still an 
organ – and nothing else. Of course, the brain and the mental realm are linked, 
but so are the liver and the mental realm, for that matter. The psychologist Daniel 
Robinson, a current critic of brain reductionism, radically rejects the idea that a 
“neuro-philosophy” should be any more important than a “hepato-philosophy” 
(a liver philosophy) (Robinson, 2008, p. 210). I will not go that far. As a condition 
for mental life, the brain is an essential organ in a way that the liver is not, but 
Robinson is correct in that the mind is no more  identifiable with brain processes 
than it is with liver processes. 
 Materialistic perspectives on the brain 
and the mind 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed some different perspectives on the mind 
divided into two main tracks in the history of ideas: the consciousness viewpoint 
and the rationality viewpoint. I argued that modern variations of the first main 
track are often concerned with understanding consciousness and thus the mind 
purely materialistically as a property of the brain (as simply  as the brain as such). 
In this chapter, we will deal more thoroughly with the theories that link the mind 
very closely to the brain. This applies to the vast majority of theories in psychol-
ogy, psychiatry and cognitive science nowadays, and my remarks above have 
endeavoured to identify why this is problematic. It is obviously not problematic to 
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be interested in the significance of neural processes on psychological phenomena, 
but it is problematic to conclude that the mind is the brain. Hardly any psycholo-
gists or neuroscientists today are metaphysical dualists like Descartes. Neverthe-
less, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it can be said that many of them build 
on the premises that Descartes set out. They are often, in various ways,  neural 
Cartesians or  Cartesian materialists . Three major materialistic theories about the 
relationship between brain and mind emerged in the post-war era (see the over-
view figure from the previous chapter), i.e. three theories that have linked the 
mind very closely to the brain: the materialist identity theory, eliminative materi-
alism and functionalism, all three of which will be discussed below. 
 The materialist identity theory 
 The materialist identity theory was first formulated by the Englishman U. T. Place 
(1924–2000) (1956). The theory is that the mind, in empirical terms, will turn out 
to be identical with brain processes. A significant aspect of the theory is that it is 
not presented as a  logical or  conceptual truth that a mental state is identical to a 
state in the brain (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006, p. 147). We cannot infer from 
the concept of a mental state alone that it must be identical to a state of the central 
nervous system (whereas we may well infer from the concept of “bachelorhood” 
that it refers to unmarried men). 
 Proponents of the materialist identity theory therefore believe that we have 
different concepts of mental states and physiological states. They  also believe 
that it will turn out, as the neurosciences make further advances in the study of 
cognition, that mental states are equivalent to physiological states in the brain. At 
the same time, what is perceived as necessarily true is that (inner) mental states 
are the actual cause of (outer) types of behaviour. This can be said to be consistent 
with parts of “folk psychology”, i.e. our everyday, common-sense understanding 
of mental life: humans, as psychological beings, have specific beliefs and desires 
(which are perceived as something “mental”) that cause certain types of behaviour 
(perceived as something “physical”). This is mindism or a  mentalistic view. My 
desire to eat strawberry ice cream, combined with the belief that I can buy the ice 
cream from the kiosk, causes me to move to the kiosk and make certain sounds 
that get the clerk to hand me some strawberry ice cream. The materialist identity 
theory then argues that both the desire and the belief are purely physical states of 
the brain. 
 Identity theory is based on an inner-outer dualism and places the mental realm 
unambiguously in the inner. There is a separation between the mental realm as 
something inner, in the form of beliefs, desires, experiences, etc., and the outer, 
which can be observed, including behaviour and movements. The inner is claimed 
to  cause the outer, just as the outer can also affect the inner (e.g. if the kiosk is 
out of strawberry ice cream, which makes me buy chocolate instead). According 
to the theory, the inner is a part of the physical world. A classical example (within 
materialist identity theory) of a mental state being identical to a state of the brain, 
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from an empirical point of view, is the experience of pain, which is believed to 
be identical to C-fibres firing. This has subsequently been proved wrong from a 
neurophysiological standpoint, but this is merely an illustrative example so we 
will ignore that fact for now (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006). The problem is 
that, if there is to be identity between the experience (something mental) and the 
physical state in the central nervous system, then there must be identity between 
something that can be physically located (certain neurons firing in a particular 
place in the brain) and something else (the sensation of pain), which either cannot 
be located in space or can be said to be located somewhere other than where the 
neurons are firing. The point is that it is  not your neurons that hurt when you cut 
your finger, but rather your finger itself. If this difference between the physical 
and the mental realms does exist, it is hard to understand how the two processes 
could be identical. 
 This kind of identity, which the materialist identity theory is about, is called 
 type-identity . It is identity between a particular type of mental phenomenon and a 
particular type of neural process (e.g. pain and C-fibres firing). Uncovering this 
kind of identity relationship is an objective in many sciences; for example, tem-
perature is type-identical with mean kinetic energy (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006, 
p. 159). Identity theory asserts, then, that a certain kind of psychological phenom-
ena should be identical to a particular kind of neural phenomena. However, it has 
turned out to be particularly difficult to prove this assumption empirically. Neuro-
science has simply not been able to demonstrate the kind of identity relationships 
that proponents of the theory thought might apply for philosophical reasons. And 
since identity theory does not postulate any conceptual link between the physical 
and the psychological, it is dependent on the fact that empirical, scientific proof 
of the identity relationship can be produced. Its lack of success on that point is 
probably one of the reasons for the materialist identity theory generally being 
abandoned today. Few scientists currently adhere to the theory. 
 Newer materialist theories are not concerned with type identity, but rather 
with what is called  token identity , which states that we can describe only specific 
instances of mental events. Here it is merely argued that any  instance of a mental 
phenomenon, for example when I calculate the square root of 25, is at the same 
time an instance of a physical phenomenon, but the exact correlation between 
the mental and the physical can vary between species and individuals. This 
token identity theory leads to the view that the same mental process can be real-
ized in different types of physical processes, which is a key assumption in the 
functionalist theory, as we shall see below. A calculator can calculate the square 
root of 25 as well as I can, even though we use very different machinery to do the 
job. I use my neural structure while the calculator uses its chips and circuits, but 
there is no doubt that some physical activity must take place in order for us – the 
calculator and me – to be able to make the calculation, each in our own way. A 
modern materialist would then insist that the calculation process, as an instance, 
is identical to a physical process – whether this occurs in the brain or in the 
calculator. 
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 Eliminative materialism 
 An extremely radical thesis about the brain and the mind called eliminative mate-
rialism was developed in the last few decades of the twentieth century (Church-
land, 1981). In popular terms, the position is described based on the provocative 
assumption that there is no reason, as in identity theory, to discuss the identity 
relation between the mental and the physical, because the mental simply does 
not exist. And when something does not exist, it cannot be identical to something 
else! We should thus eliminate our concepts about the mind (hence the name of 
the position), as well as those of our explanations of behaviour that are based on 
psychological theories, and replace them with more tenable scientific concepts 
and theories, such as those found in the neurosciences. The most famous repre-
sentatives of eliminative materialism are the husband-wife philosopher team, Paul 
and Patricia Churchland. Paul is said to carry a picture of Patricia’s brain (from 
a brain scan) in his wallet instead of the usual portrait of her face, which seems 
to be quite a concrete expression of the idea that we  are our brains! In their later 
writings, the couple have entered into partnership with empirical neuroscientists, 
especially from the so-called “connectionist” positions in cognitive science (more 
on this below). 
 Whereas the materialist identity theory can be said to respect folk psychology 
(that we have beliefs and desires that cause actions), eliminative materialism con-
siders folk psychology to be an incorrect theory. According to eliminative materi-
alism, there are no such beliefs and desires with intentionality, such as we envision 
from a purely folk-psychological perspective, and we must therefore replace the 
vocabulary of folk psychology with scientific vocabulary – and thus talk about 
our neurons firing rather than, say, our feeling pain. Briefly put, we should change 
our language to be more scientific so we can avoid referring to mental phenomena 
like beliefs and desires that do not even exist, and which therefore do not fit with 
a scientific world view whatsoever. 
 Eliminative materialism has been heavily criticized, and I will mention only 
a single point of criticism here: its attempt to replace folk psychological theory 
with a scientific theory rests on the premise that folk psychology is a  theory in 
the first place, which is highly doubtful. Learning to use psychological terms in 
our language is not the same as learning a theory that can be falsified (Bennett & 
Hacker, 2003, p. 369). For instance, when we learn to attribute mental states to 
other people (e.g. “he is afraid of the dog”), it is not the case that we are learning a 
theory that emotions (e.g. fear), in reality, are inner mental states that are separate 
from the behaviour that can be observed. The case is rather that we learn to use 
a term for the behaviour we can observe: the person recoils, avoids the dog, tries 
to protect himself with his arms, etc. Fear, in this case, is observable for anyone 
who has mastered the term “fear” and the correct use of the term is not based on 
any theory. Wanting to eliminate a theory that is not a theory to begin with is a 
problematic endeavour. 
 Eliminative materialism rests on the false premise that every explanation and all 
understanding is theoretical. When we talk about scientific theories, it is obviously 
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reasonable to eliminate the false ones, but our everyday use of mental concepts 
is neither scientific nor theoretical, and it is difficult to imagine how human life 
should be lived without being able to use the explanations and understanding that 
our shared mental concepts provide. To understand how a body moves from point 
A to B, I can avail myself of physical causal explanations, but to understand why 
a person travels from his home to the local school to vote in the general election, I 
have to apply concepts that are retrieved from a system of intentions and reasons 
that cannot possibly be reduced to the way neurons fire (since neurons have nei-
ther intentions nor reasons to fire in a particular way). 
 By attempting to replace the everyday way of understanding and explaining 
actions with a more “scientific” way, eliminative materialism moves so far away 
from what it is really trying to explain that there is no longer anything to explain. 
For instance, if we want to understand the neurological basis for pain, which is a 
legitimate and important scientific ambition, then we can, for example, put people 
who are experiencing pain into a brain scanner, but in this case we are dependent 
on them being able to report in readily understood language  that they have pain, 
in order for us to be able to interpret the scanned images in a meaningful way. 
In short, we have to rely on an intersubjective, “folk psychological” agreement 
about the concept of pain in order to be able to meaningfully read the pain’s neu-
rological correlate. This folk-psychological qualitative reporting of pain cannot be 
eliminated, because then the scientific project – which consists in identifying the 
brain’s functioning – could not even get off the ground. If people could not tell us 
that something hurts, then we would not know when it would be relevant to scan 
their brains. Folk-psychological explanations and physiological explanations of 
behaviour do not represent competing theories on the subject, as is believed in 
eliminative materialism, because folk psychology is not a theory at all, but a way 
to give meaning to thoughts, feelings and actions. 
 Having said this, we also have to add that there are several current trends in 
our society that support and promote eliminative materialism in a way that risks 
making this opponent of folk psychology into a new – but impoverished – folk 
psychology. Biological psychiatry, for example, is rapidly growing and is close 
to becoming unchallenged as the explanatory system in psychiatry. Depressive 
patients today learn to say “I have low serotonin levels in my brain” rather than 
“I feel sad and empty”. Parents can teach their children to say “it is my ADHD’s 
fault” instead of “I am sorry I did not finish my essay”. 
 I will not pass judgement here on whether these in particular are reasonable 
ways to express oneself or not (but see discussions in Brinkmann, 2016a; Nielsen, 
2016). There is probably no doubt that a neurological vocabulary will increas-
ingly affect our interpersonal relationships and our self-understanding in the 
coming years. And in my opinion there is also no doubt that, if this influence 
is large enough, it will have significant negative consequences for our ability to 
understand the depths of human existence. Even though depression is potentially 
accompanied by altered brain chemistry, and in many cases there is a lot to suggest 
that this is the case, not all forms of depression can be reduced to this dysfunc-
tional brain chemistry. Anyone who reacts with depressive symptoms at the loss 
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of loved ones in a traffic accident is reacting in a way that is deeply meaningful 
in an existential sense, regardless of how his or her brain is constituted. Anyone 
who has ever been in love knows that neurochemical vocabulary will never be 
able to replace the language that poets, authors and singers use to describe and 
express being in love. Although my objections to allowing neurological forms of 
understanding to have too great an influence on our self-understanding may seem 
old-fashioned and romantic, I do not think they are. I believe instead that they 
arise from hardline, irrefutable arguments about our need for multiple forms of 
language in order to be able to understand and express the multitude of qualities 
that our lives have. And when we deal with mental qualities, folk psychology can-
not be eliminated. 
 Functionalism and cognitive science 
 The most prevalent perspective on the mind and the brain in psychology today is 
neither identity theory nor eliminative materialism, but rather what can be called 
functionalism in one form or another. Functionalism refers to all of the basic psy-
chological positions that essentially consider the mind to be an information pro-
cessing system, like a digital computer, where the idea of “mental representations” 
plays a key role. The reason that these ways of thinking are called functionalism 
is that mental states are perceived as having functional roles; they are causally 
affected by input from the outer world and have a subsequent causal relationship 
to other mental states and to outward behaviour (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006, 
p. 160). 
 In contrast to eliminative materialism, the view is that folk psychology is funda-
mentally right: thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires exist, and there is therefore 
no need to eliminate references to these real, existing mental processes. And in 
contrast to materialist identity theory (as mentioned above), this point of view says 
that there is a one-to-one relationship between mental and neural processes but 
that the same mental process can be realized in many different physical systems 
(this was called token identity above) – and some functionalists would even go 
so far as to say that there is not necessarily a need for a brain for this purpose, but 
that a digital computer can form an adequate physical foundation for the existence 
of mental processes if it is designed in the right way. However, according to the 
theory there has to be some kind of material hardware in order for the mind to be 
able to exist as software (in this sense the viewpoint is materialistic), but it is not 
given what form this hardware must take. The basic view is that the  function of the 
hardware (brain, computer or otherwise) is what is interesting, and not what the 
hardware is  made of . The same function can be realized in many different materi-
als, just like a mouse trap can be made in countless different ways and from vari-
ous kinds of materials. As long as it fulfils the “mouse-catching” function, it is a 
mouse trap, regardless of how and from what it is otherwise constructed. 
 Functionalism is not just a philosophy, but is very closely linked with empirical 
and multidisciplinary cognitive sciences, which have experienced an explosive 
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development since the mid-twentieth century, and which are often simply summed 
up as  cognitive science . The cognitive science perspective of the mind is pre-
dominant in psychology in particular, but is also strong in linguistics, anthropol-
ogy, sociology and the cognitive science of religion, and the paradigm is often so 
closely interwoven with the neurosciences today that the term  cognitive neurosci-
ence is used.  Cognitive science in general and  cognitive neuroscience specifically 
form the core paradigm in contemporary psychology upon which the basic empiri-
cal research and theory development has been based in recent years. Well-known 
psychological representatives include Stephen Kosslyn, Steven Pinker and Nobel 
laureate in economics Daniel Kahneman. 
 In a book about “the mind’s new science”, Howard Gardner (1987), himself a 
highly influential psychologist and the man behind the theory of “multiple intelli-
gences”, has written insightfully about the history of functionalism and the cogni-
tive science paradigm, and he summarizes the following basic assumptions of the 
paradigm – or the “cognitive revolution”, as Gardner calls it: 
 1 A first basic assumption is that we must work at a level of “mental representa-
tions” when investigating psychological phenomena and cognitive abilities. 
Mental representations are inner representations of an outer world, which 
exist at a level that is separate from the biological on the one hand and from 
the cultural on the other. 
 2 Moreover, a central premise is that the digital computer is the best model we 
have of the human mind. 
 3 Furthermore, cognitive science builds on consciously de-emphasizing certain 
factors at the expense of others. The fact that psychological phenomena have 
a physical and an emotional side, that they are influenced by historical and 
cultural factors, and that they are played out against the background of a given 
context is all set aside in order for researchers to be able to concentrate on the 
mental representations as such. 
 4 A fourth characteristic is the explicit multidisciplinary nature that cognitive 
science is based on (everything from artificial intelligence research to anthro-
pology is relevant). 
 5 And lastly, Gardner points out that researchers are concerned with using 
empirical research to solve the epistemological problems that Western phi-
losophy has worked with since the Greeks (Gardner, 1987, pp. 6–7). 
 Gardner’s book is thirty years old, and as such it is a classic, but it is important 
to be aware that a lot has happened in the cognitive science paradigm since then. 
Not least, basic assumption number 1 probably needs to be revised since many 
researchers today would not sign off on the statement that the relevant level of 
mental representations is separate from, or independent of, its neural basis. Cogni-
tive science, as mentioned earlier, has evolved into cognitive neuroscience, and 
many people are interested specifically in how mental representations exist in 
the brain. As mentioned in the section on eliminative materialism above, many 
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people today work from a connectionist starting point, where the so-called “neu-
ral network” is assumed to be the basis for cognitive processes and where mental 
representations are understood as patterns in which the nodes in the network are 
activated like the brain’s synaptic structure. However, the fact that the mind is 
perceived as a type of computer that processes information still applies today and 
the brain is perceived by analogy as an information-processing organ. 
 Mental representations 
 Despite the significant differences between classical cognitive science and newer 
connectionist variations, it is still the case that many of the fundamental problems 
that I will now point out in Gardner’s five basic assumptions are also true of the 
more recent developments in the cognitive sciences. The most important problem 
concerns the very idea of mental representations. This is in many ways the central 
idea of functionalist thinking and research in cognitive science. Functionalists 
think that mental representations are, simply put, the contents of the mind. They 
do not think we are in contact with the world as such, but instead with mental 
representations of the world. We do not see a tree in the garden, but a mental rep-
resentation of a tree in the garden. Nobel Prize winner in medicine Francis Crick 
(1916–2004), who discovered the structure of DNA, describes it as follows: 
 In perception, what the brain learns is usually about the outside world or 
about other parts of the body. This is why what we see appears to be located 
outside us, although the neurons that do the seeing are inside the head. To 
many people this is a very strange idea. The “world” is outside their body 
yet, in another sense (what they know of it), it is entirely within their head. 
 (Crick, 1995, p. 104) 
 True enough, this is a strange idea for many people, as Crick says, but in my 
opinion it is not because we are uninformed (as Crick insinuates), but because 
the idea itself is wrong. It is easy to imagine a psychiatric patient who has a 
delusion that everything that he sees is inside his head and not in the world. This 
“strange idea” would be a psychotic symptom – not a scientific insight, and it is 
not regarded as such until a recognized, Nobel Prize-winning scientist says it. 
Other neuroscientists similarly lock the perceiving subject inside the head. The 
famous neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes, for example, that ”when you and 
I look at an object outside ourselves, we form comparable images in our respec-
tive brains [. . .] Whatever it is like, in absolute terms, we do not know. The 
image we see is based on changes which occurred in our organisms.” (Damasio, 
1999, p. 320). We are not in contact with the world, but only with  representa-
tions (images) of the world, and when we think (according to proponents of the 
paradigm), we manipulate these mental representations, most often in the form of 
symbols, and it is the researchers’ task to find the rules and algorithms, inspired 
by computer science, by which we manipulate the representations and process the 
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information. This idea is also often followed by an application-oriented perspec-
tive that, for example, considers it likely that discovering the relevant rules and 
algorithms will enable us to optimize human learning processes. 
 In particular, the quotation from Crick illustrates the mereological fallacy that I 
mentioned earlier. It is nonsense to say that “neurons see” because neurons do not 
have eyes. But here I would like to investigate the very notion of mental repre-
sentations. The problem with the depiction of the human mind that functionalism 
and cognitive (neuro)science is based on can be put very simply: cognitive science 
needs a concept of mental representation, but for something to be a representation, 
there has to be public use of it (Hamilton, 2008, p. 120). This is an insight that 
Wittgenstein (1953) formulated in his rejection of the idea that a private language 
could exist (see also Proudfoot, 1997). For a language to be able to have mean-
ing there must be a reasonably consistent use of the language’s words, signs and 
symbols. There has to be a difference between correct and incorrect use, because 
if a word is used completely at random, then it does not have meaning. Language 
is thus fundamentally normative; meaning depends on normativity. What other 
than a language-using community can define the meaning of words, signs and 
symbols? Wittgenstein’s answer was: nothing. If the words in a language refer to 
something that only an individual speaker can access (a private world of mental 
representations, for example), then it would make no difference whether you use 
words correctly or whether it only  seems to that person that he is using them cor-
rectly. So in that case, we cannot talk about correctness at all, because this presup-
poses a difference between correct and incorrect usage in the normative sense. 
 Since language is normative in the sense that it has meaning only by virtue 
of a difference between correct and incorrect usage, then for language to even 
exist at all there has to be a language-using community, i.e. something outside 
the speaker himself, which determines the language’s normativity. Something can 
mean something only if there is a  practice of using it in a particular way: a road 
sign does not mean anything in and of itself – it has meaning only because the 
sign is used in a specific and relatively consistent way by a community. So noth-
ing means anything inherently and nothing has intentionality in and of itself; this 
is only the case against the background of a social practice that allows one to be 
corrected based on current norms. If mental representations are assumed to be like 
(inner) road signs in that they designate a particular form of behaviour as appro-
priate, or they represent something other than themselves, then they cannot be 
private. Therefore, the mind is in reality public in a sense that the theory of mental 
representations cannot capture. If a person is happy, smiling and whistling, then 
it is not a matter of him having specific inner representations that are translated 
into an outward expression. The outward expression  is the psychological phenom-
enon of being “happy”, or at least a significant part of it. And we can see that the 
person is happy by observing him  directly – there is no need to scan the person’s 
brain or anything along those lines to prove it. If we imagine that we nevertheless 
scanned the person’s brain and found that it did  not show the usual neural signs of 
happiness (but depression instead), then we would still have to maintain that the 
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person was happy, if he was sincere and said he was happy and his behaviour also 
confirmed it. Should there be any conflict between the individual’s ordinary folk-
psychological expression of mental states on one side and neuroscientific studies 
on another side, then the everyday, folk-psychological criteria of psychological 
phenomena like happiness should in general trump the “scientific” and neurologi-
cal criteria. This is a principal and essential point: folk psychology does not  need 
to be corrected or falsified by science, although it is often  affected by it. 
 Mental representations are supposed to explain how we can recognize some-
thing as being a certain thing. Simply put, the theory claims that the mind can 
recognize a beech tree as a beech tree, because we have formed a mental represen-
tation of beech trees. It can be argued that the reference to mental representations 
does not solve this problem, but merely serves to transfer it inside the person, 
because we can then continue to ask how the person can know that the inner, 
mental representation depicts a beech tree. If it is difficult to explain how we can 
recognize that an object in the outer world is a beech tree, why is it thought to 
be easier to increase the problem twofold and also have to explain how we can 
recognize that the inner mental or neural representation depicts a beech tree? This 
does not solve any problems; it merely creates new ones. 
 If Wittgenstein was right in saying that a sign or symbol can have meaning and 
thus represent something other than itself only because it is publicly used as such, 
then referring to an inner world of mental representations explains nothing at all. 
On the contrary, it merely makes the problem unsolvable, because the mental 
representations cannot mean anything in and of themselves. How can I know, for 
example, whether a given mental representation that “depicts” a heavy person is 
a mental representation of a pregnant woman or of a fat man? 2 I can only “know” 
it by using the symbol in some way, and this requires a social context in which 
this usage can take place. There is nothing about an image of a heavy person in 
itself that determines whether it depicts a pregnant woman or a fat man – or any-
thing else for that matter. It could symbolize a food lovers association or it could 
be an Egyptian hieroglyph meaning “God”. No image, no symbol, no sign, no 
word determines its own interpretation. Significance and meaning can occur only 
in a particular social context of usage within a social practice. This makes the 
whole notion of inner, private mental representations highly problematic, because 
it seems that this notion presupposes an idea of private language usage, which, 
according to Wittgenstein’s argument, is untenable. If meaning depends on con-
texts and communities, then an even more problematic issue is that a large num-
ber of cognitive science researchers are engaged in side-lining human life forms, 
cultural and social factors, as Gardner pointed out above. Life forms, culture and 
social interactions are precisely what constitute mental phenomena as such. True 
enough, the brain is one significant condition for the manifestation of mental life, 
but our bodies and social relations play an equal part, so there is no point in 
de-emphasizing them if you want to investigate the mind. The mind is  not inside 
the head, but is linked to the fact that we as individuals take part in social practices 
where significance and meaning can occur. 
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 The “mental representation” way of thinking is prevalent in modern psychol-
ogy and cognitive science as the fundamental view of the mind. The fundamen-
tal view, as has probably already become clear, is that the psychological realm 
consists of mental representations that can be processed and combined according 
to further specified algorithms and rules. These rules are often referred to as 
 syntax , and the linguist Noam Chomsky in particular has advocated for a syntac-
tic perspective on mental processes for years (Chomsky, 1966). In his linguis-
tic writings, Chomsky uses a critique of behaviourism with regard to language 
learning as his starting point. Behaviourism is a theory that psychology should 
concentrate on studying behaviour, and that behaviour is shaped by reward and 
punishment and nothing else. Behaviourism works well as a practical tool for 
training dogs and can also be used to guide human behaviour in desirable direc-
tions to some extent. A great deal of everyday psychology is based on behaviour-
ist principles, and in TV programs where psychological experts visit people in 
their homes to help them raise their children, they almost always recommend 
a behaviourist intervention. Such an intervention comes down to two things: 
rewarding the behaviour you find desirable (and a reward does not have to be a 
material thing – it can also be attention, for example) and ignoring the behav-
iour that you find undesirable. The undesirable behaviour will often gradually 
disappear. Behaviourism as a theory used to be quite influential in the world of 
research, but today it exists primarily because of its practical utility and not by 
virtue of its theoretical insights. 
 A basic problem with behaviourism as a  theory was pointed out by Chomsky, 
and this contributed greatly to its loss of status in the world of science. If people 
learn languages in the way that behaviourists imagine, i.e. exclusively by hearing 
adults speak and being rewarded for imitating the adults’ speech correctly, then it 
would be a never-ending process. In practice, however, children learn relatively 
quickly to construct sentences that they have not heard before, and they have an 
understanding of structurally complex sentences like: “The apple that is next to 
the book on the table that I painted last year is ripe.” According to Chomsky and 
his successors, this requires that they have an understanding of grammatical struc-
ture, which can only be inherited. According to these researchers, children have 
a language instinct, an innate mental  module for language learning, which is acti-
vated by the local language that they are exposed to in their culture. Chomsky’s 
approach has had enormous implications even outside the field of linguistics, 
where particularly the idea of modules, i.e. specialized information processing 
systems in the mind, has appealed to many researchers, and cognitive scientists 
have postulated the existence of modules for a wide range of abilities, such as the 
capacity for moral reasoning, for example (Hauser, 2006). The basic idea is thus 
in contrast with that of the behaviourists; they believe that our mental functions 
are learned, whereas modern cognitive science believes to a much greater extent 
that we have innate modules for language, morality, sociality, and more. In recent 
years we have seen a return to the forms of  nativism (a belief in innate qualities) 
that had otherwise been abandoned for many years. 
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 However, many have also been critical of the syntactic-modular approach to 
the mind in the tradition of Chomsky: the idea that the mind consists of modules 
that process information based on syntactical rules. The philosopher John Searle 
is a major critic. In a very famous article, Searle claimed that the approach cannot 
possibly account for the human ability to understand anything – not even to under-
stand language (Searle, 1980). Searle proposed a thought experiment, known as 
the Chinese room. An English speaking person is imagined to be in a room with 
an inbox and an outbox. He is then given a number of inputs in Chinese through 
the inbox, and he can consult a manual where he can see which relevant characters 
he is to send back via the outbox. In other words, he receives Chinese characters 
and processes them based on a manual and then sends different characters back 
out. Searle’s point is that, even though he can do this satisfactorily, we cannot say 
that he understands Chinese. He simply does not know what the characters mean, 
what they represent. The example is clear enough in analogy with cognitive sci-
ence’s view of the mind: the room is a language module, and the manual is to be 
understood as an analogy for the syntactic rules for combining linguistic elements, 
and Searle concludes that syntax is never enough to create understanding, because 
the English speaker in the room does not understand what he is doing. In order for 
a language to mean something to someone, the person has to participate in the life 
form in which the language is used, and this requires the presence of the whole 
person – both head and body – in a social community. 
 Searle’s thought experiment has been fiercely debated, and regardless of whether 
it is valid in the details, I believe that it is a very fine, concrete expression of the 
functionalist view of the mind as an inner symbol-processing system that is only 
connected to the world (both the physical and the social) via narrow input-output 
channels. Functionalism and much of cognitive science can rightly be accused 
of locking human beings inside their own minds, where we only have access to 
mental  representations of the world and not the world itself. Incidentally, we can 
also note that there have always been good alternatives to this view of the mind, 
in psychology as well, where John Dewey was an early representative of such an 
alternative (see Brinkmann, 2013). From the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, Dewey developed a perspective on the mind in which human  action plays 
the central role. Cognition does not passively copy the outer world into inner 
representations – it does something much more active: acting in the world in order 
to transform it to benefit the activities of human life. Cognition does not consist 
in passively filling the mind with information. Instead, cognition is a function of 
action; the typical cognitive situation is not one where some stimulus unexpect-
edly occurs in the presence of a passively observing person, but rather one where 
the person is actively trying to achieve a particular stimulus. People don’t merely 
 hear as a passive process; we  listen as an active process: 
 If one is reading a book, if one is hunting, if one is watching in a dark place on 
a lonely night, if one is performing a chemical experiment, in each case, the 
noise has a very different psychical value; it is a different experience. 
 (Dewey, 1896, p. 361) 
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 The same sound in a physical sense has different psychical or mental qualities 
depending on the activity that the person perceiving the sound is engaged in. 
Cognition and experience arise out of human activity and do not have to do with 
representing the world – but mastering it. It can be stated more elegantly as fol-
lows: it is not about “copying the world” but about “coping with the world” 
(Rorty, 1980). The school known as ecological psychology also rejects the rep-
resentational view of the mind in cognitive science and believes that we can best 
explain our perception of the world based on a notion of “direct perception” that 
is not mediated by inner, mental representations (Gibson, 1986). Just as we can 
often directly see happiness in another’s face and behaviour, we can often recog-
nize the meaning of objects because we actively explore the world on the basis 
of particular habitual patterns of action. If you have experience with eating in 
the imagined hemisphere of the West, then you can directly recognize the impor-
tance of knives and forks as tools to facilitate the intake of food. We do not need 
to compare the visual impression of the knife and fork with mental representa-
tions of these tools. Both pragmatism and ecological psychology break down the 
image of the mind, which leads us to introduce a level of mental representations 
to explain cognition, but these traditions have regrettably been minority positions 
in mainstream psychology. 
 Qualia 
 The reader may accept the inherent problems in cognitive science and the concept 
of mental representations discussed above, but what about the way it  feels to see, 
hear, touch, smell and taste the world? Do we not need a concept for our experi-
ences here? According to many consciousness researchers, what makes the mind 
problem so difficult is precisely the problem with these experiences, or  qualia . 
Qualia is the term that philosophers and psychologists use to describe the very 
quality of experiences themselves, such as the experience of the  taste of beer, the 
 nuances in the colour of the sunset, or the tingling  sensation I get when my arm 
falls asleep. Regardless of how many physical facts science has managed to state 
about the brain, central nervous system and our sensory systems, according to 
some researchers there will always be a subjective experience, a  quale , associated 
with our recognition of the world, which cannot be described scientifically from 
an objective point of view, such as by describing the processes in our brains. In 
short, there is a way that it  is like to have experiences that are irreducibly subjec-
tive (Nagel, 1974). There is no way in which it is like to be a brick or a river, since 
these objects are not conscious, but there is a way in which it  is , or  feels like , to 
be a bat, a dolphin or a human. This “how-it-is-like-ness” is perceived by some to 
be the main problem in consciousness research. The discussion of qualia has been 
central for a number of years and it divides people into two groups: those who 
believe that the subjective-experience perspective is of an entirely different nature 
than the objective-scientific perspective and cannot be reduced to this, and those 
who in contrast believe that a scientific perspective will also be able to explain the 
qualitative dimensions of our experiences. 
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 I believe that the most productive approach to the discussion is based on a con-
ceptual analysis (Bennett & Hacker, 2003). Doing so will rightly cause us to doubt 
whether we can meaningfully talk about there being a specific way in which it “is 
like” or “feels like” to hear, see or smell anything, apart from actually hearing, seeing 
or smelling something. The qualia problem is thus a pseudo problem that is based on 
false premises. If we ask a normal person about how it is or feels to see an armchair, 
an answer such as “splendid!” would not be out of place if the person was tired and 
wanted to sit down. But if we ask for an answer to the philosophical question about 
qualia, the person would probably not know what he or she should answer. There 
simply is no particular way it  is or  feels like to see an armchair. To believe otherwise 
is to be seduced by our problematic psychological depictions of the mind. The expe-
rience of seeing an armchair is of course different from seeing a coffee table, but 
this, as a matter of course, is because the two  objects being observed are different, 
and not because we are dealing with two different qualia in the philosophical sense. 
 From an ordinary language analysis, we have to doubt that we can meaningfully 
talk about there being a specific quale associated with any given experience. If we 
are to speak meaningfully about qualia, we have to speak of them as properties of 
objects and not of experiences. When I see that there are grey clouds in the sky, 
then the clouds’ greyness is a property of the clouds and not of my experience. It 
makes no sense to say that an experience is grey – any more than it does to say it 
is  not grey. Objects can have colours, but mental processes cannot: “What colour 
was your experience?” is a meaningless question. The problem of qualia arises 
because of the Cartesian tradition, which constructs the relationship between the 
seeing and the seen as a relationship that involves the seen being copied and 
observed in an inner world. From the perspective developed in this book, the 
objective should not be to solve the qualia problem, but to dissolve it by showing 
that it is based on false and confusing premises. 
 If we start with Aristotle rather than Descartes, then the qualia problem does 
not even turn up. Of course we should not deny that our experiences can have 
qualitative characteristics. For example, they can be pleasant or unpleasant, amus-
ing or boring, but this is a matter of a person’s affective relation to experiencing 
something specific and does not concern a mythological quale. The phrase “the 
film was amusing” makes sense, whereas the phrase “my qualitative experience of 
the film was amusing” does not. When we talk about “an amusing experience”, we 
are in fact talking about having experienced something amusing (e.g. a film) – we 
do not mean that we had a certain inner object – a quale or mental representation – 
that was amusing. And when I see a red apple, there is only one object involved: 
the red apple – and not an  experience of seeing a red apple. What I see is the apple, 
and not the fact  that I see it. In reality there is no problem with qualia, at least not 
if we start from the right basis and avoid the Cartesian consciousness tradition’s 
manner of approaching the questions. In short, we need to wean ourselves off of 
the bad habit in philosophy and consciousness theory of thinking about the mental 
realm as inner objects. If we wean ourselves of it, then it also becomes meaning-
less to try to reduce the mind to the brain. 
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 Evolutionary psychology 
 As psychology appears in the mass media, not only are biological explanations 
for human behaviour involving the brain apparently in demand, but evolutionary 
explanations are as well. It is not simply a case of trying to understand the psy-
chological realm based on the brain’s functioning, because we also want to know 
 why the brain looks like it does. One response to this is that the brain’s structure 
and form are the result of an evolutionary process. These days, no serious scientist 
would deny that Darwinian evolution has to be taken into account when analysing 
our mind, but the question is: precisely what role does evolution play? In recent 
years, a significant segment of functionalism and cognitive science has entered 
into a partnership with evolutionary psychology, which is interested in how men-
tal capabilities developed in response to evolutionary pressures during human pre-
history. Prominent researchers such as David Buss, Steven Pinker, Leda Cosmides 
and John Tooby have developed a type of evolutionary psychology, based on the 
basic premises of the cognitive science paradigm, not least of which is the premise 
that there are innate, mental modules that process certain types of information and 
result in certain behaviours. The idea is that the mind, just like a computer, is an 
information processing system organized into modules that developed as a result 
of evolutionary pressure (Smith, 2005). We act the way we do because of our mod-
ules, and our modules look the way they do because of our genes, which, when 
all is said and done, is the ultimate explanatory factor for the mind. This way of 
thinking about evolution is attractive to many – scientists, journalists and laymen 
alike – presumably because it is elegant, simple to communicate, and seems to be 
able to answer all kinds of question about the mind, from why men rape women 
to why we are so afraid of spiders but not electrical outlets, which are objectively 
much more dangerous. 
 Psychologists sometimes talk about these mental modules as “mental mecha-
nisms”. Katzenelson has described four of their properties: (1) They have their 
current form because they have been adaptive by being able to complete a particu-
lar task in life such as reproduction; (2) they are created to capture a certain small 
amount of relevant information that is significant for precisely this task; (3) the 
module’s input information tells it which task is to be completed, upon which the 
input is transformed into an output; (4) the output can be physiological activity, 
information to other modules or behaviour (Katzenelson, 2007). We see that this 
entire input-output idea is akin to the theories that view the mind as a kind of 
advanced computer. It is a very mechanical approach to mental life. According to 
this theory, the mind is like a Swiss army knife with a number of separate tools 
(modules) that have developed because of evolutionary pressure to solve certain 
tasks (take down enemies, find a mate, care for the offspring, communicate with 
others in the group, etc.) (Bem & Looren de Jong, 2006, p. 210). Like the tools of 
a Swiss army knife, the modules have evolved relatively independently, but the 
modules themselves (for language, morality, etc.) are perceived as universal for 
the human species. The mind thus has a universal, modular architecture, which is 
adapted to the hunter-gatherer societies in which our prehistoric brains evolved. 
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 As mentioned, this story has proved highly marketable in the media, which 
gladly provide explanations, based on evolutionary psychology, for fashion, moral-
ity, gender differences and much more – for example, that men are promiscuous 
“by nature” because they are designed to “spread their genes”, whereas women are 
relatively more faithful because they are designed to be stable caregivers. Besides 
the fact that it is a bit odd how often explanations based on evolutionary psychol-
ogy are consistent with the prevailing moral notions in American society (where 
most evolutionary psychologists are from) module-based evolutionary psychol-
ogy also suffers from the same basic problems as the more computer-inspired 
segment of  cognitive science : mental modules, syntactical rules and mental repre-
sentations are scientific constructs that are not supported by actual neuroscience, 
which in reality does not give us any reason to believe that the brain is “modu-
larly” organized (Hamilton, 2008, p. 107). If we cannot find clear evidence of 
mental modules in the physical brain, then we have only behaviour to go on, and 
this risks an instance of circular reasoning where we explain the module based on 
behaviour and behaviour based on the module. This circular reasoning is a general 
problem in evolutionary psychology: there is a risk of explaining the existence of 
a certain type of behaviour based on the idea that it was evolutionarily adaptive. 
And if we ask how it is possible to know that it was adaptive, the answer is that if 
it weren’t, it probably would not have survived to the present day! Such an expla-
nation obviously has no scientific value. 
 Not all evolutionary psychology makes use of such circular explanations, but 
you often see them: Why do women wear lipstick? Because it was adaptive in 
relation to attracting males, who are attracted to the health and sexuality that red 
lips represent. How can we know that? Because otherwise women would not wear 
lipstick! Besides the fact that this does not prove anything, there is undeniably a 
wide range of cultural differences that are ignored, specifically in regard to body 
decoration. Most cultures do not have lipstick, and black lipstick is worn in some 
sub-cultures (e.g. in punk communities), which is not exactly a sign of health, and 
other cultures have various ways of deforming the lips that are not attractive for 
the majority of the “Western world” (e.g. the Mursi people of Ethiopia). Evolu-
tionary psychology has a way of forgetting the many factors in the human world 
that are not universal, but which are associated with specific cultural contexts. 
 My criticism here is not directed towards an evolutionary approach to the mind 
as such, and there are a number of interesting researchers working in the border-
lands between biology, psychology and anthropology, who are also sharp critics 
of the computer-inspired model of evolutionary psychology, for example, anthro-
pologist Tim Ingold (2011) and psychologist Alan Costall (2004). My criticism 
is directed against the specific, but highly influential, segment of evolutionary 
psychology that suffers from what we could call the “neo-Darwinist Cartesian 
problem” (Hamilton, 2008, p. 109). This problem involves combining a cause-
explaining, nomic approach to human life with an exploration of the normative 
issues that evolutionary psychology is interested in (morality, language, social 
life, etc.). As previously mentioned, it is problematic to give mechanistic or nomic 
explanations for normative phenomena. This is not to say that I deny there is an 
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evolutionary basis for the mind. Since Darwin, we have known that nothing in the 
biological world is permanent and that the mental capabilities and dispositions of 
the human species also need to be understood within an evolutionary framework, 
broadly speaking. The problem does not occur until you try to make evolutionary 
explanations the only valid explanations in psychology. 
 A more productive perspective is to say that the mind is not a “thing”, but a 
range of complex abilities and dispositions, and then the mind can be said to be 
unique among the products of evolution, since people, by virtue of their mental 
capabilities, are not just passive victims of the randomness of evolutionary his-
tory, but are also capable of influencing the course of history. The fact is that man 
is a co-producer of his own living conditions, a fact which Karl Marx made the 
cornerstone of his philosophy. Also other animals do this, of course. Just think 
of spiders or ants that create their own ecological niches. Darwin even described 
earthworms as being organisms that have affected and created their own living 
conditions (the soil) just as much as they have adapted to their environment (Cos-
tall, 2004). Earthworms are a product of the soil, which in turn is a product of the 
earthworms’ activity, and so on in the cycles of life. Organisms and the environ-
ment have evolved together in a reciprocally influential relationship. But humans 
do this by using language, signs and symbols, and this brings us into the world 
of culture proper, which is why we have to supplement evolutionary explanations 
with cultural psychology. The cultural world is the  manufactured world, which 
is not handed down through genetic material, but through education, socializa-
tion and reproduction of society. This is the subject of  Chapter 4 . All this should 
remind us that we should not think mechanically about the mind as a fixed evolu-
tionary product, but rather as a range of abilities that enable us to transform and 
reconstruct the world we inhabit. 
 Giving evolutionary explanations a monopoly is problematic for the science of 
the mind, but it is even worse for our lives in general if we begin to understand 
and explain our own and others’ actions in light of evolutionary psychology. I 
recently read in the newspaper that some psychologists believe that lying has 
evolutionary advantages. Supposedly, this is why we lie, and that is why these 
researchers believe that lying is excusable in many cases and perhaps even justifi-
able. If people adopt such a view, they might manage to convince themselves that 
lying is okay – that is what evolutionary psychologists say, right? – and this would 
undoubtedly be detrimental to social life, particularly because it will destroy trust 
and loyalty between people. And this is just one example of how scientific meth-
ods for understanding the mind have found their way into our self-understanding 
in recent years. This is not just plainly bad – it can also make it difficult for us to 
understand the depths of human existence if it is exaggerated. 
 Conclusion: What is in our heads? 
 “There is nothing in your head other than your brain!” sociologist Harold Gar-
finkel once said (see Watson & Coulter, 2008). This chapter has presented an 
understanding of the relationship between the brain and the mind that essentially 
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shares this premise. There is no mind inside the head. There is no “inner world”, 
as we can plainly see by opening up the skull. When we open up the skull we see 
connected neurons that fire in complex patterns, but we do not see any mental 
modules, thoughts, feelings or memories. We should not think about the mind as 
a thing that is inside the brain. The relationship between the mind and the brain 
is not like the relationship between the heart and the muscle tissues that the heart 
is made of. The heart is made up of muscle tissues, but the mind is not “built up” 
of brain tissue in the same way. To continue with the same metaphor, it is rather 
like the relationship between the heart and the heart’s job, which is to pump blood 
around the body so that cells can get oxygen. The mind is a range of rational abili-
ties, and these cannot find expression without a brain, but that does not mean that 
the abilities can be  reduced to the brain, or that they  are the brain, because we 
cannot meaningfully say that abilities “are” an organ. 
 Although it is philosophically problematic to reduce the mind to the brain, this 
is nevertheless an endeavour that has been widespread throughout philosophical 
circles in Western societies in recent years. We initially looked at Lone Frank’s 
book as a well-known example in little Denmark. However, only few researchers 
have elucidated what happens when bio- and neuro-scientific insights circulate 
throughout society today and leave their mark on people’s self-understanding and 
on social practices. Some of them, however, are working on it. One example is the 
psychologist and sociologist Nikolas Rose, who in his earlier works was interested 
in how psychology’s forms of knowledge and practices “subjectivize” people in 
certain ways – i.e. how they create subjects that are autonomous, self-managing 
and self-evolving. In his most recent book he has shifted his focus to bio- and 
neuro-sciences, arguing that future subjectivity-forming knowledge will come 
from these fields (Rose, 2009; Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). The anthropologist and 
ethnologist Emily Martin has similarly worked on psychology’s role in American 
society, and she is now working to understand the meaning of the neuroscientific 
segments of psychology, among other things (Martin, 1999). She asks what sort 
of people neurologically based theories of the mind will foster. Her answer is 
that there are three likely consequences: (1) we will believe that our behaviour 
depends on our brains and not sociality, (2) we will believe that our brains are 
designed as an evolutionary product of a fight for survival and (3) we will believe 
that we essentially share the same neural structures (p. 582). This is not to say that 
all brains are equal, but that common structures form a background against which 
individuals vary. For example, a widespread educational theory is that we have 
different learning styles because of our brains’ differing abilities, which is why 
we should be given different kinds of learning assignments. Martin combines the 
spread of a neuroscientific approach to the mind with societal trends in network 
capitalism, where major social and government institutions lose importance and 
where individuals become nodes in the network (the brain is a frequently used 
metaphor for understanding the social sphere via the network metaphor). Our 
understanding of the mind has been influenced in recent years by our understand-
ing of the brain – and both have been influenced by the way we have organized 
modern society. 
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 Martin predicts that the built-in normativity in this view will mean that we 
will no longer spend time participating as much in public ways of life, but rather 
striving for individual improvement of our own minds based on knowledge of 
their functioning. We will be (even) more concerned with ourselves when we, in 
Frank’s words which I quoted earlier, recognize that we have a “responsibility for 
our own brains” – but we may not feel responsible for very much else. We risk 
coming to believe that “society” does not exist, and there would therefore be no 
reason to care about it. Everything is in the brain! Rose’s conclusion is similar: 
although the humanistic psychologists’ core self has been replaced by the brain in 
recent years, self-realization is still the dominant cultural imperative for individu-
als. Perhaps the goal is no longer to “find yourself” but, again to quote Frank, 
“to increasingly be able to choose yourself or mould yourself in the direction 
you want. Again, it is a message of liberation: your biology is not a prison but a 
lump of clay that you yourself can contribute to shaping.” (Frank, 2007, p. 301; 
my translation). Various bio- and neuro-medicinal options for self-improvement 
will probably increasingly be used not only to treat the mentally ill, for example, 
but they will also be used by “ordinary people” in the form of various drugs to 
make themselves smarter, better focused and – maybe – happier. Rose asserts that 
we have become “neurochemical selves” and that the future of self-improvement 
will be practiced as brain development, and Martin concludes that neurology is 
colonizing our self-understanding. If these diagnoses are even only approximately 
correct, then it is all the more important that we take care to understand the rela-
tionship between the brain and the mind properly. The fact is: you are not your 
brain. You have a brain, which is centrally involved in whatever you do. But you 
as a person are the doer; not your brain. 
 Notes 
 1 Politiken, January 17, 2009. 
 2 We are assuming here that a representation is figurative or “iconic”, which is just one 
theory of mental representations (see Gardner, 1987). 
 An image of the mind is beginning to take shape: if the mind is not a thing, but a 
range of abilities and dispositions, then we cannot say that the mind is inside our 
heads. In fact, attempting to  localize the mind at all is problematic and a more 
productive strategy is to examine the conditions under which what we call men-
tal abilities can find expression. We saw in the previous chapter that the brain is 
one such condition. Without a brain there is no mind, so the brain is a necessary 
condition for the existence of mental life. Is it also a sufficient condition in itself? 
No, because we can only say that living human beings, or things that behave in a 
human way, have sophisticated mental properties (Wittgenstein, 1953, §281). A 
well-functioning brain does not behave like a living person, but like the organ that 
it is. We do not attribute mental properties to a brain outside its physical body, 
such as a brain in a vat, for example. Our mental concepts can “grab hold” only 
when we are dealing with a moving, acting and explorative body. We need to have 
a self-propelling body that actively moves around in the world in a meaningful 
way. In order for mental abilities to be able to exist and manifest themselves, we 
need a body. The body is an essential condition for mental life. As Aristotle put it, 
the mind is simply the form of the living body. 
 The dualism between the mental and the physical is central to Christianity and 
Western culture. From this perspective, the body is viewed as an object, as part of 
Descartes’ “extended things”, whereas the mind is a subject – the acting, thinking 
and feeling factor that is imagined to “inhabit” the body in some way, perhaps as 
a kind of “ghost in the machine”, to use Ryle’s apt phrase (Ryle, 1949). A great 
deal of current philosophy is concerned with breaking down the walls between 
the body and mind. A good example is Mark Johnson, who talks about the body 
as the “body-mind” in an attempt to overcome the terminology of our problematic 
dualism (Johnson, 2007). Many adults in the Western world may sometimes have 
the feeling that the mind is an incorporeal and disembodied thing – for me, when I 
think about it, it feels a little like my mind is located about three centimetres behind 
my eyes. But from the outset, there is no doubt that from birth we are beings in 
motion; our physical being is absolutely essential. Foetuses are already moving in 
the womb; they orient themselves in their little worlds using their movements, and 
immediately after birth they start moving towards their mother’s breast if they are 
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laid on her stomach. As physical beings, we are in motion, and motion provides 
our basic access to the world. We can say that the first and fundamental manifesta-
tion of the mind is as movement and not as passive observer. We do not attain a 
capacity for cognition of the world in a broad sense by being  spectators to it, but 
only by  participating in it. Our mind, like our ability for cognition of the world, is 
inextricably linked to our ability for physically moving, acting, behaving, doing. 
 In this chapter, we will look at the body as a condition for the existence of the 
mind. Like the brain, the body is a necessary condition – a mediator (Brinkmann, 
2011b) – for mental life. Unlike some of the classic theories in cognitive sci-
ence that were mentioned in the previous chapter, we cannot say that a computer 
has a mind, because it lacks above all the ability to move in meaningful ways – 
motility – associated with having a biological, flesh-and-blood body. I will first 
give a brief – and by its very nature simplified – introduction to phenomenologi-
cal philosophy, which forms the basis for many of the current attempts to rethink 
the body as something more than an object. The body is  also an object, and can 
be studied as such by medical science, but it is first and foremost intimately con-
nected with our subjectivity, and is as such the basis for our cognition and creation 
of meaning in the world, which I will also touch on. Finally, I will look at the 
concept of habits in this chapter, since habits are closely linked to the body and 
the existence of mental life as such. 
 Phenomenology of the body 
 The French philosopher and psychologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) 
was  the modern thinker who most explicitly attempted to overcome modernity’s 
objectification of the body with his phenomenology of the body. Modern medicine 
viewed the body as a piece of machinery that was somehow almost magically ani-
mated. As mentioned, it is not wrong in itself to regard the body as a mechanical 
object. It is one perfectly legitimate approach to the body if you are interested in 
getting a broken bone to knit back together properly; the processes involved here 
are causal and nomic. But the body is more than just a biological organism. It is, 
above all, also a “lived body”, as Merleau-Ponty insisted. That is to say that we act 
in and have experiences of the world through our body. When you move your arm 
to pick something up, the experience is not one of first making the decision with 
the  mind and then moving  your body’s arm as two separate processes. No, you 
move your arm when you want to; the will to do so, in a certain respect, resides 
within your arm. My arm, as a part of my body, is also a part of me as a subject – it 
is “mental” in a sense. This phenomenological experience of being your body is 
part of what is meant by “the lived body”. 
 According to Johnson, we need five different ways of looking at the body in 
order to get a full understanding of it (Johnson, 2007, pp. 275–277): 
 1 The body as a biological organism: this is the body as it is studied by physiol-
ogy and anatomy and which is healed by medical science. It is the body when 
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viewed from the perspective of nomic sciences that explain processes caus-
ally, and it can function more or less well (there is thus a normative dimen-
sion here), but it is not the body itself that we praise or blame for functioning 
in a given way, but rather the person who  possesses the body without being 
identical with the body. When viewed as a biological organism, the body is 
different from the person and from the person’s mind. People have the right to 
vote – not their bodies. When we view the body based on traditional scientific 
methods, we turn it into an object and cannot fit it into our system of experi-
ence (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 63). When we view the body as a biological 
organism, we look at it as a collection of tissues and organs, and this is a 
useful view of the body for a variety of purposes – when we have to perform 
surgery on it, for example – but it is a completely inadequate view when we 
want to understand our human and meaningful “lived” presence in the world. 
 2 The ecological body: Here we see the body as connected with its environment – 
the ecology. Although we commonly think that we can easily differentiate the 
body from its environment using the skin as a boundary, this is actually a 
somewhat arbitrary and problematic notion (Mol, 2008). For example, the 
body depends on nourishment and oxygen, which are constantly moving into 
and out of it, and a large part of the body is made up of micro-organisms, 
which are independent beings that “live” inside of us, in a manner of speak-
ing. In addition, the tools that we avail ourselves of can be said to be a part 
of our body. There are outright body prosthetics, of course, but there are also 
things like the blind person’s cane or the visually impaired person’s glasses, 
which can, with a certain degree of justification, be said to belong to the 
body – at least when viewed as an ecological body that stands in close rela-
tionship with its surroundings. We will look at this more closely in  Chapter 5 , 
when I explain the significance of things for the mind. Johnson concludes 
that the body is not separate from its surroundings, and that any boundary we 
draw between them reflects our current attempt to support some particular 
point (Johnson, 2007, p. 276). In short, when viewed ecologically, we must 
consider the body and the environment as two aspects of a single continu-
ous process. Although we cannot yet explain human experience and complex 
mental life using this perspective of the body, it does provide a much more 
nuanced picture of the body than as a mere biological organism. Thinking of 
your physical being as closely linked and even confluent with your surround-
ings can also provide an aesthetic and almost religious experience: when we 
eat and drink, for example, we invite the world into our bodies. We receive the 
world within ourselves, and by reflecting on this we can experience an emo-
tional resonance with the world, which, through these everyday processes, 
appears as a nourishing place, a place that we owe our existence to (Krueger, 
2008, p. 608). 
 3 The phenomenological body: the rest of this chapter will deal with this way 
of looking at the body in particular. This is our body as we live and experi-
ence it, where it forms the basis for our experience of a meaningful world and 
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therefore for our mind as well (Johnson, 2007, p. 276). The phenomenologi-
cal body is the body as we know it prior to the scientific theories that we can 
learn about it (e.g. theories about the body as a biological organism). In other 
words, it is the body as it is experienced pre-reflexively and pre-theoretically, 
and this dimension of experience is precisely the field of interest in phenom-
enological studies. 
 4 The social body: The body is an element in a social world and not just in a 
physical or biological one. The body and its dispositions are shaped by the 
social interactions we enter into with others, from the time we are born and 
until we die. We are social and intersubjective beings from the beginning, and 
recent psychological research on infants and their interactions with caregivers 
has uncovered some of the ways in which the body and its habits are formed 
through early, complex patterns of interaction (a classic source is Trevar-
then, 1993). This perspective on the body is related to the others, especially 
the phenomenological perspective. For example, the phenomenologist Iris 
Marion Young, in an essay entitled “Throwing Like a Girl”, describes how 
young girls (at the time) in the United States were socialized to act in both 
the physical and social domains (Young, 1980). This was highly restricted in 
comparison with the boys’ ways of acting. Young illustrated this point with a 
phenomenological description of the manners in which girls and boys throw 
a ball: While boys “occupy” the space with their bodies when they throw by 
swinging with their entire body, girls primarily move their elbow joints and 
their posture is much more restricted. In the United States this is known as 
“throwing like a girl” and it does not allow for the powerful throws we see in 
American baseball. For Young, it was an expression of the more general way 
in which girls and women are taught to be reserved. They are not allowed 
to be assertive in the physical or social domain. Social gender inequality is 
therefore reproduced not only as a difference between the sexes in terms of 
thinking and feeling, but all the way down to the level of bodily habits and 
patterns of movement. This is possible because the body is social. It is not 
formed through constant exchanges with only the physical world (as in the 
ecological perspective on the body), but through exchanges with the social 
world too. 
 5 The cultural body: This body perspective is closely related to the previ-
ous one, but it focuses more on the cultural differences that exist regarding 
appropriate and inappropriate ways to behave bodily. The body is always and 
unavoidably enmeshed in a network of standards that govern appearance, 
size, clothing, decoration and movement. There are cultural differences in 
masculine and feminine ways of moving, but also in terms of the “taste” that 
we unthinkingly react to positively from a physical point of view. The anthro-
pologist and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) identified several of 
these differences within French culture (Bourdieu, 1980). Taste is linked very 
closely to how the body reacts, for example, to what we respond to as erotic, 
beautiful, delicious, etc., and such ways of reacting vary culturally and also 
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based on an individual’s socio-economic class. Note, for example, the deep 
class differences that can be expressed in a sentence like:  We sauté our pota-
toes in olive oil;  they fry their chips in vegetable fat (Paterson, 2006, p. 46). 
Culture is not something that affects the body from the outside, but the body 
is in essence cultural by virtue of its way of appearing, posing and gesturing, 
and in its taste, which we can “sense” directly in our bodies. 
 As mentioned, we will focus primarily on the phenomenological body in this 
chapter. Phenomenology is linked to its originator Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), 
who wanted to create a philosophical method to describe the world as it appears 
to us prior to creating scientific theories about it. Phenomenology is the science 
of phenomena and the term comes from the Greek  phainomenon , meaning “that 
which appears”. Husserl described the mind’s basic characteristic as intention-
ality, meaning that any mental phenomenon is characterized by being directed 
toward something other than itself. Phenomena always appear to  consciousness . 
The discovered and experienced world is the world in which man originally finds 
himself. Husserl called this world the “life-world”. The world is not what “I 
think”, states Merleau-Ponty (1945), but what I “live through” (p. xviii). Here we 
turn away from the view in the representational way of thinking, where cognition 
is a passive or receptive process of “thinking” about the world, towards a view 
in which we recognize the world through “living” in it as fully corporeal beings 
(Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015). 
 Part I of Merleau-Ponty’s  Phenomenology of Perception is about the body, and 
it states that humans cannot observe their bodies as objects for the simple reason 
that it is because of the body that objects can possibly exist for man (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945, p. 105). What does that mean? On the face of it we might say that 
objects are objects – no matter how our body and mind might otherwise be consti-
tuted. Most people naturally have a rather unexamined relationship with objects 
like medium-sized objects in time and space, perhaps with furniture as a proto-
typical example of an object. But upon reflection, it becomes clear that the object 
concept is more relative. Not least, it is relative to an organism’s size, shape and 
ability. For example, a blade of grass is an object for a fly that invites it to sit down 
on it in a way that does not apply to a human. And a microscopic parasite may 
relate to a person’s skin as a landscape of easy-to-penetrate channels, while a fly 
cannot penetrate the skin but would rather land on it (Johnson, 2007, p. 47). An 
object is always an object relative to a perceiving creature. 
 The fact that objects are relative to the organisms that interact with them means 
that, to the same extent, it is the organism’s constitution and behaviour that desig-
nates something as an object in the world, as it is the world’s “objective” arrange-
ment that determines how organisms act. In psychology this basic view is called 
“mutualism” since it is based on the fact that there is a reciprocity or mutuality 
between organisms (subjects) and the environment (objects) (Still & Good, 1998). 
The psychological realm exists in this mutuality and not in either of the poles in 
isolation. This view is further complicated by the fact that this reciprocity is not 
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static or permanently set in stone. It has dynamic or historic dimensions – not 
least in terms of evolutionary history; I previously mentioned Darwin’s observa-
tion that earthworms have shaped their environment to the same extent that the 
environment has shaped earthworms. This is all the more true in cases where we 
deal with an advanced species like humans; we shape the conditions under which 
we live to a very great extent – and are, of course, conversely shaped by these 
conditions (Sterelny, 2012). 
 Merleau-Ponty analyzed the ability to move as the fundamental form of inten-
tionality, and unlike Descartes he did not understand consciousness from an 
“I think” (“. . . therefore I am”) perspective, but from an “I  can ” perspective. 
Essentially, we are physically acting beings who acquire the ability to think reflec-
tively only as something secondary. Our mental ability for thinking abstractly 
and reflectively itself stems from, as we shall see below, a certain physical being-
in-the-world. “My first understanding of reality”, say philosophers Dreyfus and 
Taylor, “is not a picture I am forming of it, but the sense given to a continuing 
transaction with it.” (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015, p. 70). Our conscious intentional-
ity, including our ability to reflexively  want something, is derived from a more 
primitive and original transactional and  operative intentionality that “produces the 
natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in 
our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 
p. xx). Thanks to our bodies, there is generally a naturalness in our dealings with 
the world. If we open a door to an unknown room and go in, we do not feel, for 
example, any urge to check whether the room has a floor, because perception is 
a bodily activity directed at the surroundings, and the majority of it takes place 
naturally and without reflection (Vetlesen & Stänicke, 1999, p. 205). 
 The human being taken as a concrete creature is not a mind “attached” to an 
organism, according to Merleau-Ponty. Instead, the lived, phenomenological 
body – with its patterns of movement, reflexes and habits as a “body-mind” – is 
the entity that gives us experience of the world. Fundamentally, the body does not 
move because a disembodied mind has perceived something or seeks to achieve 
some specific objective. Instead, perception and cognition are functions of the 
body’s movements and actions. This is also a key insight in James Gibson’s eco-
logical psychology, which in many ways is reminiscent of both Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body and Dewey’s pragmatism (Gibson, 1986). Through 
psychological experiments in perception, Gibson showed that we gain knowledge 
of an object’s properties in time and space through the way we move in relation 
to the object. Information about the properties of the world is, in a manner of 
speaking, contained within the world itself, or at least in how a cognizant organ-
ism stands in relation to the world (again, a mutualistic principle), and  not in 
inner mental representations which, according to Gibson, are superfluous in terms 
of explaining perception. Our recognition of the distance between objects, for 
example, can be explained by the way we move in relation to them. If we move 
to the side while looking straight ahead, things that are far away will not move 
as much within our visual field, relatively, as things that are close to us. These 
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visual relationships alone allow us to recognize the location of objects in physical 
space. We do not need to introduce an illusory “inner computer” that is assumed 
to calculate these distances, precisely because they can be recognized without the 
use of mental representations. 
 Merleau-Ponty agrees that there is a need to reject the idea of mental represen-
tations. He says that consciousness has no “private life” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 
p. 32). As psychological beings we are always out near things and when we under-
stand other people’s minds, for example, it is not the case that we are interpreting 
their purely “outer” expression of supposedly “inner” factors. When we see an 
angry person, we do not see a “psychic fact hidden behind the gesture” that makes 
us merely  think of anger. No, we see the anger  itself directly in the person’s expres-
sion. Nor is thinking some “inner” thing that exists independently of the world and 
words (p. 213). We think, feel, act and understand each other  in the world – there 
is no veil between us and the world, which also means that there is “no privileged 
self-knowledge, and other people are no more closed systems than I am myself” 
(p. 393). In this way, we are surrendered to each other in public. The mind is not 
an inner thing. Since the mind is largely associated with the phenomenological 
body and since this body is in a world that is in principle public and intersubjec-
tive, then it follows that the mind itself is expressed in a public dimension that is 
not confined within a mythological inner world. 
 Meaning, body and metaphors 
 It is perhaps not so difficult to accept the argument from phenomenological stud-
ies of the body that fundamental intentionality, our primary way of recognizing 
and acting in the world, is embodied. It is easy to convince ourselves that the most 
“primitive” aspects of our mind are bodily. If you do not have a very strong theory 
about innate systems for cognition of the world or about a disembodied rational-
ity, then you have to work with some kind of theory about our access to the world 
being via the body – that it is because of our bodies that we even  have a world in 
the first place. At a basic level, most can understand that we thus need to start from 
an understanding of the mind as a “body-mind”. But at first glance, what is more 
difficult to understand, based on the body, are the more advanced mental functions: 
our conscious memory of past events, our ability to speak and reason, our ways of 
reflecting on our lives. It is one thing that our actual psychological connectedness 
to the world is physical in nature, but what about our capacity for abstraction as 
expressed in intellectual thinking, philosophy, religion, mathematics, etc.? Many 
people will argue that it is precisely here that we see the specifically human way 
of being a creature with a mind. Animals are also tangibly connected to their 
world in a physical way (even earthworms), so in order to understand what distin-
guishes the human mind, we have to understand man as a creature that can think 
abstractly. The human mind is  rational , as we previously emphasized, starting all 
the way back with Aristotle. We do not simply react immediately to any stimulus 
we are faced with, because we can apply concepts and reflectively consider our 
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desires and beliefs. We can consider whether our current desires are worth having, 
and whether our beliefs are based on sound reasons. We are not just animals, but 
 rational animals. Can our rational powers be contained and comprehended within 
a body-phenomenological perspective? 
 This is an open question, and it is also one of the most interesting questions 
in the current debate about the relationship between the body and the mind. The 
psychological realm is not understandable from the perspective of an embodied 
operative intentionality alone; it is also a complex  normative dimension, as we 
have seen, and above all it has to do with  meaning . One of the researchers who has 
worked out a convincing (in many ways) defence of the idea that our more abstract 
mental abilities can be understood based on the body is Mark Johnson, mentioned 
previously. In his book  The Meaning of the Body , he develops a coherent theory 
about the “body-mind”, which aims to prove that the body is the basis for mean-
ing, abstraction and reflection. The body is thus what makes it possible for some-
thing to appear meaningful – it enables the experience of meaning and also allows 
us to  create meaning in our lives, both personally and socially. Johnson goes 
so far as to say that both logic and reason are embodied dimensions (Johnson, 
2007, p. 102). Throughout the book he develops a complex theory not only about 
the body, but also about the brain and its “neural maps” (which Johnson does 
 not regard as mental representations) as well as what he calls “image schemas”, 
which are dynamic patterns of interactions between organism and environment 
that function outside of consciousness. But the basic leverage behind his theory 
of logic, reason and abstraction as embodied (or body-mind) abilities, is a theory 
about metaphors. It is above all metaphors that enable us as bodily beings to go 
from meanings, which are in an immediate sense bodily based, to abstract thought 
(p. 176). Johnson’s theory, which he developed in collaboration with the linguist 
George Lakoff in particular, involves the very strong and radical thesis that  all 
theories and abstract concepts are metaphorically defined (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; 1999). The mind in this sense is a bodily process that enables recognition of 
the world based on the metaphors it creates. Let us take a closer look at this thesis. 
 The body’s metaphors 
 What does it mean that theories and concepts are metaphorically defined? A meta-
phorical understanding is one in which we understand one phenomenon in light of 
another even though there is no literal connection between the two. In the previous 
chapter we encountered the metaphor “the mind is a computer”. Scientists may 
disagree on many issues related to the mind, but even the most stubborn computer 
functionalists will probably not say that the mind is  literally a computer. The mind 
does not use AC power, it does not have a keyboard, you cannot connect a printer 
to it, it cannot access the Internet, and Bill Gates does not have a near monopoly 
on its operating system. Computer functionalists will instead insist that it is pro-
ductive to think about the mind  as if it were a computer, just as it is productive 
to think metaphorically about psychological intimacy as physical proximity and 
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purposeful activities as movement. We can say “the two of them were very close” 
without indicating that the two people lived on top of each other in a physical 
sense. But concrete physical proximity is a source of metaphoric meaning for the 
more abstract area that relates to psychological intimacy. Similarly we can say 
“she took the first step to becoming a doctor,” even if the person did not physi-
cally move a muscle. Here, travelling in physical space is the metaphoric source 
that structures our understanding of engaging in a purposeful activity. Many other 
ways of talking about these things support the notion that our perception of psy-
chological intimacy and purposeful activities are built on metaphors relating to 
physical proximity and movement, respectively. 
 We can go a little deeper with a third example using a key mental phenomenon. 
We have the metaphor: to  understand something is to  see it. When you understand 
something (e.g. in mathematics), the understanding is not literally linked to see-
ing something, yet we say metaphorically “do you see what I mean?” or “can you 
see the logic?” The point is that it is an immediate, concrete and bodily based 
activity (seeing) that forms the background for our abstract notion of what it is 
to understand something. The source domain of the metaphor in this example is 
vision, while the target domain is understanding. An analysis of this metaphor for 
understanding can be made from this as follows (from Johnson, 2007, p. 165): 
 Source domain (vision) → Target domain (understanding) 
 The seen object → Idea/concept 
 To see an object clearly → Understand an idea 
 The person who sees → The person who understands 
 Light → The “light” of reason 
 Visual focus → Mental attentiveness 
 Visual sharpness → Mental sharpness 
 Physical standpoint → Mental perspective 
 Such an analysis of our visual metaphor for understanding may seem banal, but 
if we examine the importance of this metaphor in Western culture’s philosophy, 
education and science, it is anything but. Metaphors for cognition involving vision 
and light have permeated our thinking ever since Plato and have been critical for 
how we have developed essential social institutions, not least within the world 
of education (Brinkmann & Tanggaard, 2010). People understand and learn, we 
believe, when they are “exposed” to a “visual impression” of what they need to 
learn about. Here we are dealing with one of the most important metaphysical 
background factors for the educational system, which plays a key role in mod-
ern society reproducing itself. Children must sit down and learn. They must be 
“enlightened” to continue with the metaphor. Johnson’s point is that all of this 
stems from an immediate bodily, lived experience of vision. He would say that 
the abstract concept of understanding, metaphorically speaking, can be traced 
back to our experience of seeing something, to strive to see something more 
clearly. Our  abstract concept of the mental process, that is, trying to understand, 
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is metaphorically structured based on the  concrete experience of trying to see 
something. 
 Another point Johnson makes is that this metaphor for understanding is essen-
tial, but it is not unchallenged. There are competing metaphors and if these had 
been dominant, a lot of things could be very different, for example, in our educa-
tion and teaching practices. Another common metaphor for understanding is to 
grasp something. A schematic analysis of this metaphor can be made as follows 
(from Johnson, 2007, p. 166): 
 Source domain (grasp) → Target domain (understanding) 
 An object that is grasped → Idea/concept 
 To grasp an object → Understand an idea 
 The strength of the grasp → The depth of the understanding 
 To lose one’s grasp → When understanding fails or disappears 
 Object out of reach → Incomprehensible idea 
 In the same way as above, there is a logic in the source-target domains here, but 
different bodily “image schemas” are activated when we think of understanding 
based on the metaphor of “grasping” rather than on the metaphor of “seeing”. 
On the one hand, it has given rise to a hands-on teaching style, where learning 
is linked to actively working with and manipulating materials – exemplified by 
Dewey’s famous motto “learning by doing” (Brinkmann, 2013). This hands-on 
teaching style recommends, for example, that students learn geometry by concrete 
experimentation with three-dimensional shapes that can be manipulated. And on 
the other hand we have a visual teaching style, where one imagines that learning 
can take place by students “seeing” materials, for example, by reading about them 
in a book or by watching the teacher demonstrate geometry on the board, rather 
than by obtaining first- hand knowledge. Both metaphors for understanding stem 
from bodily experiences, but they derive their meaning from two different ways in 
which we have concrete experiences. The radical thesis here is that  all of our non-
literal concepts, theories and ideas derive their meaning from being metaphorical 
extensions of a certain type of bodily experience. 
 The above analyses of the two metaphors for understanding relate to what are 
called primary metaphors. Primary metaphors are based on an immediate experi-
ential correlation between a particular sensory motor domain and another domain 
that has to do with subjective experience (Johnson, 2007, p. 178). Most of us have 
had such an experience, where trying to  see something more clearly correlates 
with the  understanding of what we see. For example, we are familiar with the 
experience of “decoding” ambiguous images that can be seen as two different 
things (but not both things at once), and  seeing them involves trying to understand 
what they represent at the same time. We have also experienced  grasping a thing 
in the literal sense, such a tool, and in grasping it we have come to master the tool 
as a correlation to understanding it. Johnson mentions other glaring (note once 
again a visual metaphor – they are everywhere!) examples of primary metaphors: 
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positive emotions are warm (an experience that is established in very early child-
hood), something important is large, more is up/less is down, organization is 
physical structure, happy is up/depressed is down, states are locations, causes are 
forces, causality is forced movement, goals are destinations, time is movement, 
control is up, help is support, difficulties are burdens and categories are containers 
(p. 179). Each one of these is bodily anchored in a relatively straightforward way, 
but Johnson also examines a number of conceptual metaphors that are “further 
away” from immediate bodily experiences, but he still believes they can be traced 
back to the body, for example, within mathematical cognition. These are not pri-
mary metaphors, but conceptual metaphors and I would recommend the reader 
consult Johnson’s works to gain insight into them. 
 If we wish to apply this metaphor theory critically, for example, to criticize 
existing metaphors, then the goal cannot be to rid our language of metaphors in 
order to arrive at an original, non-metaphoric understanding. Without metaphors 
we would not be able to understand anything abstract whatsoever. In that sense, 
metaphors are cognitive and indispensable; they enable us to learn a great deal 
of complex aspects of the world. They are, in a manner of speaking (metaphori-
cally!), a sort of fuel for the mind, which makes it “run” when we have to deal 
with abstract phenomena. Of course, it may be legitimate to criticize certain meta-
phors for being fruitless and we may want to insert other more fruitful metaphors 
instead. I will not elaborate on this line of thinking here, but it might be interest-
ing to consider such an exercise with regard to seeing and grasping metaphors for 
understanding. Johnson himself is inspired by pragmatist philosophy, which is not 
so concerned with whether something is true. We do not ask “is the sight metaphor 
 true ?” Instead, pragmatism is interested in which ways of acting and experiencing 
are made possible if we base our actions on a particular idea. So instead we ask: 
“which actions are enabled by the sight metaphor – and which are excluded?” 
Whether one metaphor is better than another will depend on what effects it has 
(from a pragmatic perspective) on constructing a social practice. So, the ques-
tion is not about which educational metaphor is universally true, but about what 
opportunities for human learning, development and experience the two metaphors 
make possible. 
 All in all, the theory about our cognition being anchored in body-based meta-
phors provides a promising approach to understanding the body’s role in the 
creation of meaning, including the creation of meaning in abstract concepts and 
theories, and thus for understanding the mind itself. In a broad sense, the mind 
is the part of us that has to do with meaning, which is why it is important to 
understand the body’s (or body-mind’s) role in the creation of meaning. Dewey 
believed that the mind is the ability to respond to contexts of meaning: “The dif-
ference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a  mental act is that the 
latter involves response to a thing in its  meaning ; the former does not” (Dewey, 
1916, p. 29). If we respond to the world’s stimuli in a purely causal way, such as 
when a doctor tests our reflexes by tapping our knee, then we are not dealing with 
a mental process. We are not dealing with a mental process until we respond to 
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the  meaning that something has, and the reaction in this case is  normative , since 
there are norms for correct ways of reacting to meaningful events. We can con-
clude from Johnson’s metaphor theory that the body is a necessary condition for 
the existence of the mind because it forms the basis for experience and creation 
of meaning. 
 The body’s habits as background 
 Understanding the body’s role in the creation of meaningful experience through 
metaphors is essential for understanding the human mind, but the body has other, 
and in a sense even more basic, functions in our mental lives. In a very deep sense, 
our bodies form the  background for our conscious experience; it takes on this role 
because it is the seat of our  habits . In this sense, the body is the background for 
the mind. What do I mean by “background”? When we look at philosophy in the 
twentieth century, we can interpret many of the most important philosophical dis-
cussions as having to do with the background. A technical way of putting it is that 
the background consists of the non-intentional conditions for our intentionality. 
This means that what we think, feel or want can be in the foreground only because 
there is a background. In  Chapter 2 we saw an example, inspired by Wittgenstein, 
where a “picture” (e.g. in the form of an imagined mental representation) that 
unmistakably depicts a heavy person, does not itself indicate whether it represents 
a pregnant woman, a fat man or something else entirely. The picture is technically 
speaking intentional because it represents  something ; it refers to something other 
than itself. But it is not self-interpreting. It has to be interpreted by a person in 
order to mean something specific and the concept of “background” should point 
to the fact that it can be interpreted in a particular way, and thus mean something 
specific, only against the  background of something else that is not itself inten-
tional and which is part of the interpretation. 
 Another example may help us to understand what the background is (inspired 
by Searle, 1992): if two people are standing in front of a locked door, and one 
says “Give me the key” there is, in principle, an infinite number of ways that this 
utterance can be understood. In practical terms the utterance is almost always 
understood the same way as a foreground phenomenon: the person fishes in his 
pocket for the key and then passes it to the other person with his hand. This is a 
very simple process. But it is possible that the person could have swallowed the 
key and, using his stomach and oesophagus, he could have regurgitated the key 
and spat it at the other. Needless to say, this is an inappropriate way to give some-
one a key. Or the person could have gone to the post office to send the key to the 
other person’s address. Or the person being spoken to could have handed over a 
key different from the one that works in this door. It was not explicitly stated that 
the person wanted the key to  this door. For that matter, it was not explicit what was 
meant by a “key” in the first place. It might have been a car key, an answer key, a 
piano key or something else entirely. One could keep going like this: The possible 
interpretations are  endless . The concept of the background explains why, in real 
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life, we rarely misunderstand each other when we communicate and interact with 
one another in everyday life. The reason is that we share a common, non-thematic 
background through common habits. The likelihood of misunderstandings is obvi-
ously greater when people from different cultures interact, i.e. if they do not have 
the same background, but given that we are all human beings and share a bodily 
being-in-the-world to a great extent, there will be a certain degree of common 
background. 
 Searle, who is one of the most important theorists with regard to background, 
states that the background is not a system of rules (which computer functionalists 
generally believe) because rules can be applied only relative to a set of back-
ground capacities (Searle, 1992, p. 193). This means that the rule to “look in your 
pocket for the key-shaped object when a person asks for this object” itself has a 
certain meaning only in terms of a certain background. We can articulate more and 
more what we mean by the individual words, but any attempt to make this more 
explicit will unlock an infinite number of new possibilities for interpretation. We 
never reach something uninterpreted or given. Meaning is contextual and holistic 
in this sense. The fact that meaning is holistic means that nothing has meaning in 
itself, but only within a larger whole or a network of meanings. In order to have 
a single belief (e.g. that Mount Everest is 8,848 metres high), I need a network of 
other beliefs (about what a mountain is, what the metric system is, what height is, 
etc.) and such a network has meaning only based on a background, since none of 
the elements in the network are self-interpreting (p. 176). The background funda-
mentally consists of bodily anchored social practices, of abilities to act in social 
contexts of meaning (Dreyfus, 1991). 
 The mind as habits 
 Another, more psychological concept for the background is the concept of habit 
(Brinkmann, 2013). Dewey believed that the concept of habit ought to be fun-
damental to an understanding of the mind, but the concept has unfortunately 
fallen out of favour since then, especially because of the dominant position that 
the computer functionalists hold. The concept is interesting in that it mediates 
between socio-cultural and bodily aspects (Dewey, 1922). Habits are both at the 
same time: culture and body. Dewey stressed that it is through habits that we have 
practical knowledge of the world, or know-how (p. 177). Habitual know-how is 
a condition of our more reflective and articulable knowledge of how things are 
constituted. Things appear in a certain way in the foreground only because we 
have certain background habits with respect to interacting with them. The radi-
ologist who has habitually trained his skills at the hospital is able to see things 
in X-rays, i.e. in the “foreground”, which others fail to see. Habits are inscribed 
in the way our body unreflectively works, but at the same time they reflect the 
socio-cultural conditions of a society. Moreover, habits are more fundamental 
than both subject and object. We should not accept any strict division between 
organism and environment. We must begin by looking at the overall life process, 
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and the concept of habit is a productive point of entry for this process. Habits 
therefore do not entail just a “mental” dimension, but an “external” and material 
one as well, for instance in the form of tools and artefacts. Dewey states that: 
“Habits are arts, involving skill of sensory and motor organs, cunning or craft, 
and objective materials” (p. 15). Anyone who is a master stoneworker has spe-
cialized in certain habits that allow him to interact productively with his material, 
and the material and tools are just as much a part of his habits – and thus part of 
the person’s psychological constitution – as that which is “inside” him, e.g. brain 
and muscles. 
 It is through habits that we exist in the world, and they allow us to feel at 
home in the world as well. It is because of our habits that we ”in-habit” the world 
(Dewey, 1934). To inhabit the world through habitual activity is largely a non-
reflective and bodily process. Dewey stresses that our habitual background knowl-
edge “lives in the muscles, not in consciousness” (Dewey, 1922, p. 177). Our 
knowledge of how to ride a bicycle is not conscious knowledge, but physically 
based, practical knowledge. It thus becomes clear that habits are not something 
separate from us, not some external element that we can take up in order to master 
the world. We do not have a mind with intentions prior to, or independent of, our 
habitual behaviour. It is more correct to say that “we are habit”, “they constitute 
the self ” (p. 25). The mind is constituted by habits, and habits have a social origin, 
which leads us to the conclusion that the mind is social. This points us in the direc-
tion of the next chapter, which is about the mind’s sociality. 
 The basic point of this explanation about the concept of habit is to emphasize 
that, as psychological beings, we can reflect consciously on something specific 
only because so much else is habitual. We can put something in the foreground only 
because so much else is in the background and this background must be funda-
mentally understood as constituted by our bodily habits. Maybe we can also find 
seeds for a reinterpretation of the unconscious here, which played such a big role 
in psychology with Freud’s psychoanalysis in the past? Perhaps we can say that 
the unconscious is not so much a mental world in its own right – a world that the 
conscious mind is prevented from gaining insight into directly – but instead that it 
is made up of habitual patterns that our “body-mind” uses to guide its functions, 
and which are already established in early childhood through our interactions with 
caregivers. In short, the unconscious is perhaps what I referred to as the back-
ground above. Part of this background works metaphorically, as Johnson would 
say, to create meaning in our experience, and part is even more implicit in our 
unreflected bodily behaviour. 
 Development of the body-mind 
 Developmental psychology deals with how the abilities and dispositions of the 
mind develop throughout life, and although this book does not primarily aim to 
take a developmental perspective, it is nevertheless appropriate to outline how 
the body-mind develops in the earliest years of our lives. We are born as physical 
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beings with concrete experiences of hot and cold, satiety and hunger, and only 
later do our cognitive abilities develop to understand abstract phenomena. It is 
clear that we must develop a language with all of language’s relevant concepts 
in order to understand phenomena such as democracy and the climate crisis, 
and it is fascinating to think that our ability for abstract understanding, thinking 
and reasoning is associated with fundamental body-mind processes. Modern 
developmental psychology has been oriented towards at least two key things: 
the first is that young children can do much more, and at a much younger age 
than previously thought, and the second is that young children are social from 
birth. The British psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott (1896–1971) said that there 
is no such thing as a baby – there is only a dyad, a unit consisting of an infant 
and its primary caregiver. The dyad – not the individual – should be the small-
est unit of developmental psychology. These two main developmental psycho-
logical theses are related. Young children can do so many things (almost) from 
the beginning  because they are not alone, but are included in ongoing social, 
dyadic processes. For example, researchers have been able to demonstrate that 
newborn infants – as early as 42 minutes after delivery – are able to imitate 
adult facial expressions (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). They can, for example, imi-
tate adults sticking out their tongues, and they do so with a certain delay, which 
shows that it is not pure reflex. However, infants cannot imitate everything. 
They imitate human facial expressions, but not the movements of inanimate 
objects, and this means that even very small infants sense that other people are 
subjects to be imitated and not merely objects. More recent infant research has 
also demonstrated that even very young children possess a basic capacity for 
empathy. 
 The capacity for empathy is an ability to understand others as others – in other 
words, it is a capacity for intersubjectivity. As psychological beings we are neces-
sarily born in intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1993). A classic study using television 
screens demonstrated intersubjectivity in young children purely experimentally 
(Murray & Trevarthen, 1985). The researchers allowed infants between six and 
eight weeks old to interact with their mothers via television screens. Already at 
this age, mothers and children communicate intersubjectively in a way that can 
be described as a dance or as an interplay of facial expressions and sounds. This 
is a dyadic unit where the body-mind unfolds in a primitive but fascinating way. 
These “dance steps” are presumably biologically based and are crucial to child 
development. The children and the mothers could easily communicate with each 
other via the screens, as long as it was happening in “real time”, but when the 
researchers manipulated the transmission and delayed it by a half minute, the 
infants responded by looking away from the screen and showing signs of dis-
comfort. The rhythm of the intersubjective dance was disrupted and the infants 
could not get the intersubjective response they expected from their mothers. This 
and other similar experiments show that it is not just a speculative philosophical 
assumption that we are born in intersubjectivity, as social beings, but that it is 
something we can demonstrate empirically. 
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 During the first months of children’s lives, they possess a form of primary 
intersubjectivity. This means that child and mother both share in the communica-
tion and expect certain responses from each other, but they do not yet share in 
anything  outside of the communication itself. Around the age of nine months, the 
communication starts to change gears towards secondary intersubjectivity. The 
parent and child start to share in something  else during communication. They can 
engage in paying joint attention to objects and events. At this stage mothers are 
now able to start pointing to things, and children will look at the things rather than 
just looking at their mother’s finger; children also begin to be able to follow the 
direction of their mother’s gaze. Children will also be able to draw adults’ atten-
tion to things in the world. Secondary intersubjectivity is undoubtedly a neces-
sary precondition for people to be able to learn languages, since essential parts 
of language work through pointing to referents (Krøjgaard, 2007). Meaning and 
significance – including that of the language – are rooted in the fact that we can 
use one thing to represent another. We can use sounds and signs to identify and 
refer to specific objects and events, and this is an ability that develops out of basic 
physical and psychological interactions during the child’s first year. Most children 
will also say their first words when they are around one year old. Our capacity for 
language and abstract thinking is not based on “cold”, mechanical cognition, but 
is founded on “warm”, empathetic and intersubjective interactions with caregiv-
ers. Body-mind feelings are the foundation for language and cognition. From nine 
months of age on, children begin to understand references to things outside of the 
primary communication process, and this is also when they begin to be introduced 
into the cultural and social community of contexts of meaning. In the next chapter, 
I will continue with a description of the part of the mind’s development related 
to this stage. 
 Conclusions 
 For now we can restate the lived body’s importance for the mind. In  Chapter 2 , we 
saw that the brain is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the existence 
of mental life; in this chapter, we encountered a similar argument with regard to 
the body. It was emphasized that the mind is so closely linked to the body that it 
may be appropriate to talk about the “body-mind”, and we have seen examples of 
the body’s role in the creation of meaning, which is a crucial feature of the mind. 
The body should not be understood as an object in this context, but as a living 
and lived body. So being a bodily entity, being a moving, physically acting being, 
is a necessary condition for the mind – but is it also a sufficient condition? No, 
because as this chapter has also shown, the normativity that the body (or “body-
mind”) follows in life, and which is defining for mental life, is not understandable 
from looking at the body alone. Furthermore, we have to keep in mind the basic 
lesson of personism: that psychological terms make sense only when applied to 
persons. Thus, just as we cannot meaningfully say that the brain thinks, so we 
also cannot say that the body thinks. But what we  can say now – after having 
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reviewed significant ideas about the brain and the body – is that persons can think 
only because they are cerebral and embodied creatures. The brain and the body 
are indispensable mediators in the psychological processes in persons’ lives. If 
we want to understand the mind as a range of rational abilities and dispositions, 
we therefore have to involve not just the brain but also the body. But we also 
need to involve the community and sociality, which establish norms for how these 
abilities are formed and how they play out in social life. This will be done in the 
next chapter, where society, or the social community, takes centre stage as a basic 
condition for the human mind. 
 Chapter 4 
 The mind and society 
 Man is a social being. Animals other than humans live in groups or flocks, some 
animals even have a division of labour (e.g. ants and bees), and some species can 
hand down certain behaviours that are not coded in their genetic material over a 
span of generations. For example, researchers have observed that some monkeys 
can learn to wash potatoes from their elders (Kawamura, 1959). This is one defini-
tion of culture: the ability to pass on learned patterns of behaviour. But no animals 
besides humans are able to  negotiate the norms that apply to their culture or com-
munity. No other animal can reflectively consider whether the current practices in 
a group are the most reasonable. For some non-human animals, group dynamics 
are such that when the top of the hierarchy becomes too weak to be alpha male, for 
example, a new alpha male will take his place, and in that sense there is a change 
in the distribution of power among the individuals in the group. But what does 
not happen is a fundamental structural change in the power relationships. Mon-
keys cannot consider whether the alpha-male system is fair. And democracy will 
not spontaneously arise within the group of monkeys. No other animals besides 
humans can consciously change the norms that apply to social life. No other ani-
mals besides humans are therefore  political in the proper sense. The human being 
is a political animal – a  zoon politikon (Aristotle, 1978). This obviously does not 
mean that all norms are constantly under discussion in human society, although 
you almost get that impression in the post-modern era, but it does mean that, in 
principle, it is possible to negotiate almost every aspect of our social lives, as long 
as we do not negotiate all of them at the same time. 
 One word for man’s ability to take part in a world of norms, traditions, institu-
tions and practices, which we constantly reproduce and can negotiate to some 
extent, is spirit. When a philosopher such as G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) used 
the term spirit, he did not mean something ethereal or ghostly. Spirit is what the 
humanities have as a subject, i.e. the man-made, social and historical world in its 
meaningfulness. This is where man lives and develops as a psychological creature. 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) asserted in his definition of the self, that the spirit 
is the self, as a relation that relates itself to itself. We are all spiritual beings in this 
sense, when we not only stand in an immediate relationship to the world, but can 
relate to  how we relate to the world. We can do this because we can avail ourselves 
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of language and other meaningful signs. Through the use of signs, we can estab-
lish a distanced or mediated relationship to ongoing processes in the world, which 
is often necessary when, for example, we need to make a choice (Valsiner, 2007). 
We create distance from here-and-now situations, and can thus consider future 
actions, when we use language to imagine what is not – or is not yet – the case. 
Spirit, culture and language are therefore inextricably linked. 
 The world of the spirit is not static or unchanging, but is historic, changing and 
 normative . Hegel and his successors, especially Karl Marx (1818–1883), were 
intrigued by the duality that exists in the fact that people both live in  history , and 
thus are a product of their historical circumstances, but at the same time they  live 
in history, and thus themselves constantly produce the circumstances that shape 
them (see Lave, 1993). Man’s historical life is a social life. We can have our own 
individual  life history only because we take part in the “spiritual” world’s larger 
history through which we acquire a language that we can use to think about our 
own existence, and a set of norms for how we should live our lives. Human self-
knowledge is social and historical – or as the hermeneutical philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) said: 
 [H]istory does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves 
in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The 
focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the indi-
vidual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. 
 (Gadamer, 1960, pp. 276–277) 
 Psychologists have tended to direct their attention to the individual mind with-
out giving much thought to historical life, society and the state. But if Gadamer, 
Hegel and Marx are right, then this focus on subjectivity is in itself “a distort-
ing mirror”. To get a picture of the human mind that is not distorted, we need to 
look at the mind as a social product. According to the OED, society comes from 
Latin  societās meaning the condition of being associated for a common purpose, 
partnership, fellowship, communion or joint pursuit. The fact that the mind, in its 
complex manifestation, is dependent on people coming together in joint pursuits 
is the subject of this chapter. In the previous two chapters we saw that the mind 
can exist only because we have a brain and a body, but we must not forget that 
society is an equally necessary condition for the existence of a fully human mind. 
It is one of the mind’s mediators. 
 I begin by outlining the basic assumptions behind the forms of current think-
ing about the mind that most clearly present the mind as a societal entity, often 
in continuation of Hegel and Marx. This concerns socio-cultural psychology in a 
broad sense. In this tradition, mental life is primarily linked to social  activities . 
The mind is a range of abilities and dispositions and not a thing. The description 
of socio-cultural psychology will subsequently be combined with an explanation 
of the normative dimensions of human sociality, which are centred on the concept 
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of social practices. Finally, I will briefly touch on how different cultures find 
expression through various forms of mental life, and I will give a brief analysis of 
a central arena for mental development in most societies: the family. 
 In short, the chapter’s mission is to continue to expand the boundaries of the 
mind begun in the preceding chapters: we cannot say that the skull or the body’s 
skin forms the boundary line for the mind; we must also involve the society in 
which mental life takes place. However, we need to be careful with the spatial 
metaphors here. The brain is inside the body in a completely literal way, but the 
body is not “inside” society in quite the same way. Thinking metaphorically about 
society as a container that holds individuals is not a very productive approach, 
since it invites us to analytically separate the individual from society, culture and 
community. It invites us to reify the mind as a thing and to think about society or 
the social realm as a kind of material (Latour, 2005, has attacked this substantial 
idea about the social). Neither the mind nor society is a “thing”, and the individual 
is not “in” society, like an apple is in a fruit bowl or the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. 
We can take an apple out of the bowl and still have an apple, but we cannot in the 
same way abstract the mind from societal processes and still have a mind. We are 
not in society like apples in a bowl, but more like events in history. If we abstract 
a particular event out of the historical circumstances surrounding it – for example, 
the fall of the Berlin Wall – then the event, as such, ceases to exist because we 
cannot understand the fall of the Wall without understanding the historical back-
ground and the importance of the political ideologies involved. The interesting 
thing about the fall of the Wall was obviously not the physical collapse of the 
structure (a nomic process), but the  meaning that the physical collapse had (an 
intentional and normative process). This brings us to the societal world of mean-
ing and normativity, which is crucial for the existence of human mental life. 
 Just as the mind is not a thing, neither is society. We cannot take a walk and 
observe society as an object. Society is an abstract name for certain relationships 
and processes among people, which are sustained by social practices, institutions 
and technologies. The concept of society did not come into widespread use until 
the nineteenth century and since then people have regarded it as something akin 
to a secular deity with its own wants and needs (Valsiner, 2007, p. 75). For exam-
ple, we can tell people that they need to do something “for the sake of society”, 
whereas in the past we would have said they need to do it “for God’s sake”. 
Politics are conducted in large part by creating and debating certain conceptions 
about society. 
 Socio-cultural psychology 
 A line of work in socio-cultural psychology has developed in continuation of 
Hegel and Marx, which is based on the fact that man is a social being. Parts 
of socio-cultural psychology are also inspired by Wittgenstein and his life-form 
concept. Michael Cole, who is a major contemporary researcher in socio-cultural 
psychology, mentions three basic principles for this type of psychology (Cole, 
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1996). The first is that the development of the mind takes place through artefacts. 
Artefacts are anything created through crafts, arts or other forms of processing of 
materials by human hands. This means that the mental processes in their present 
form arose when people began to reshape material objects into artefacts and tools 
in order to regulate their interaction with each other and the rest of nature. An 
evolutionary leap occurred at the point when people started using tools and thus 
acquired culture. The second principle is that there is (therefore) a basic assump-
tion that human life is the result of historical development within a cultural con-
text. Cole defines culture as “the entire pool of artefacts accumulated by the social 
group in the course of its historical experience” (p. 110). In this way, culture is the 
medium for development of the mind. A person without culture is a myth, because 
even the earliest interactions between infant and caregiver are imbued with the 
given cultural context. The third basic principle Cole lists is that scientific analy-
sis of the mind must build on the fact that human beings are engaged in practical 
activities of daily life. We are primarily  participants in various practices rather 
than  spectators who observe the world from a distance. As established in the pre-
vious chapter, we are first and foremost beings who conduct ourselves actively 
and whose relationship with the world is one of use. And the things we “use” as 
mental beings are primarily artefacts and language. 
 If Descartes, Hume and Kant are background figures for the problematic cogni-
tivist and mindist form of psychology that was discussed in  Chapter 2 , then other 
philosophers have inspired socio-cultural psychology. As mentioned, these were 
specifically Hegel and Marx, but Darwin’s naturalism also plays a role, particu-
larly because of its emphasis on the changing nature of the world. In addition, 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the socio-cultural context of human life can be found in 
the views of socio-cultural scientists. However, the most significant psycholo-
gist within this tradition is probably the Russian Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934). He 
founded the specific tradition that is referred to as cultural-historical psychology. 
Vygotsky was involved in investigating mental functions such as thinking, mem-
ory, will and language, not as static phenomena that are permanently established, 
but as processes in development. He distinguished between natural or lower men-
tal functions on the one hand and higher mental functions on the other (Vygotsky, 
1978). According to Vygotsky, the former are developed dependent on biological 
maturation and include, for instance, our basic sensory abilities, while the latter 
are cultural and developed in individuals when they participate in social practices. 
 The development of the higher mental functions in individuals is a result of 
the individual’s mastery of certain cultural tools. Tools should be understood 
in a broad sense here, including language, for example. A simple example of a 
tool that is linked to the development of a mental function could be knots on a 
string, which some pre-Columbian cultures in South America used as a tool to aid 
memory (Chaiklin, 2007, p. 277). Use of this tool was rooted in specific needs 
and challenges within the given society to keep track of goods, and therefore the 
practice of using it to assist memory developed. Once a social practice in which 
this artefact is used is in place, new generations will learn how to use the tool by 
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participating in the practice in such a way that the practice is reproduced. Social 
and historical factors thus go in advance of the individual. In the next chapter we 
will focus in more detail on the significance of the world of things and artefacts 
for the mind, in particular on the significance of tools and technologies. From this 
perspective, higher mental functions – and thus the specifically human mind – are 
a product of social history (p. 276). Briefly put, the mind is social. 
 There is also a developmental approach built into this perspective since the indi-
vidual psychological level must be understood as an internalization of socially and 
historically determined patterns of interaction. The individual’s mind reflects social-
ity, so to say. We develop mentally when we increasingly come to master the social 
practices on which a given society is dependent (agriculture, medicine, construction 
and many others). Bearing the concept of habits from the previous chapter in mind, 
we can say that society, with its social and cultural practices, precedes individual 
habits. Vygotsky famously argued that every mental function appears twice during 
children’s development: first socially, among people, and then individually, “inside” 
the child (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 57). For Vygotsky, the mind is thus a function of the 
social world. A well-known example of this is his analysis of the development of 
the ability to point. Adults have no problem identifying objects in their surround-
ings, normally using their index finger. As we saw in the previous chapter, such 
intentional movements are only possible because there is a background that is not 
thematized in the action itself; for example, the observer is expected to look in the 
direction of the index finger and not in the direction of the elbow, which is just one 
of many background conditions for pointing. The ability to understand pointing 
references begins at around nine months of age with the development of second-
ary intersubjectivity, where the communicating parties can share something outside 
of the communication process itself. I made reference to this earlier, but how do 
we understand in greater detail the child’s beginning mastery of the activities that 
include ostensive or indexical references such as the act of pointing itself? 
 Vygotsky took an interest in how such intentional behavioural patterns are 
developed. He observed that when young children make this gesture, it is initially 
an (unsuccessful) attempt to grasp an object (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56). Children 
simply reach for objects that they find appealing for one reason or another. The 
predisposition to make such grasping movements is an innate part of the child’s 
elementary mental functions that mature in the child’s early life. But when the 
child’s caregivers become aware of the failed grasping movement, they will typi-
cally react. They will often bring the child what it is reaching for, and Vygotsky’s 
point is that the movement is thus slowly transformed from being a grasping 
movement to one of pointing. The child realizes that it can use this movement not 
only to grasp things, but as an intersubjective  sign that is understood by others 
and often results in the child getting what it wants. Pointing is thus established as 
an  action – as a  meaningful movement – in a process Vygotsky called internaliza-
tion. The movement goes from being reflexive to being intentional and normative. 
 Meaning thus becomes an attribute of the child’s behaviour when the behaviour 
forms part of a larger social context with other people and objects – in other words, 
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when it forms part of a social practice. Dewey, whose pragmatic psychology can 
also be characterized as socio-cultural and reminiscent of Vygotsky’s in several 
respects, illustrates this with an example that looks at Vygotsky’s pointing sce-
nario from a slightly different angle: 
 A requests  B to bring him something, to which  A points, say a flower. There 
is an original mechanism by which  B may react to  A ‘s movement in pointing. 
But natively such a reaction is to the movement, not to the  pointing , not to the 
object pointed out. But  B learns that the movement  is a pointing; he responds 
to it not in itself but as an index of something else. 
 (Dewey, 1925, p. 178) 
 Vygotsky described the pointing scenario from the child’s perspective, while 
Dewey sees it from the other angle, from the perspective of the one observing 
the pointing. The argument is nevertheless the same: humans have a number of 
instinctive ways of reacting, for example, reaching for things and reacting to the 
movements of others. Such background ways of reacting are elementary as mental 
functions and in order to understand how the process is developed in the direction 
of  higher mental functions, we have to take an interest in the meaning or signifi-
cance that movements can have. A pointing movement in itself is not meaningful, 
i.e. as a purely physical event. It does not become “pointing” until the move-
ment is regarded within the context of a larger practice across contexts and time, 
where people can point out objects together. The movement also becomes part of 
a system of normative contexts in this respect. Not all objects, for instance, are 
legitimate to point to. The child learns later, at least in our culture, that it is inap-
propriate to point at strangers on the bus; in other cultures different norms may 
apply. The pointing example may seem banal, but it illustrates the fact that even 
such a simple gesture as pointing is part of a complex social choreography that 
is based on expectations and norms that are often not explicit, but which instead 
form part of the background. And when a person gradually learns to understand 
the practices associated with pointing, as well as a host of other social practices 
in his or her culture of course, then the person’s mind itself (i.e. the capacity to 
respond to normative contexts of meaning) develops. Psychological development 
is primarily about being led into society’s system of contexts of meaning; it is 
about becoming a full-fledged participant in social practices. A key Vygotskian 
insight is furthermore that this kind of development happens in what he called the 
zone of proximal development, where more capable individuals, typically adults, 
do something together with the less capable individuals, e.g. children, in a way 
that scaffolds the activity. Gradually, the novices (or apprentices) become able to 
perform the actions without the support of experts (or masters). A precondition for 
this is that masters treat the novices as slightly more capable than they actually 
are in order for them to develop (hence: the zone of proximal development). For 
example, adults must thus interpret the grasping gesture of the child as an act of 
pointing, before it really  is pointing, in order for the gesture to gradually  become 
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an act of pointing. More generally, this is how we become intentional and agentic 
persons: By being treated as such, before we actually  are such persons, in order 
for us eventually to  become persons. This is a most fascinating aspect of psycho-
logical development. 
 Vygotsky’s work was motivated by one main problem in particular: how to 
understand the origins of humans’ free actions and conscious behaviour (Chaiklin, 
2007, p. 274). As we have already seen, the answer is given based on a theory 
that people learn to use tools and signs in social contexts that give them a medi-
ated relationship with themselves. Thanks to language and other tools, we can 
establish a “distance” to ourselves – our immediate impulses and preferences – 
where we can consider both the past and the future reflexively. An illustrative 
example of this from Vygotsky is Buridan’s ass, which is taken from amongst the 
paradoxes of medieval philosophy (Vygotsky, 1997). A hungry ass is precisely 
midway between two equally appetizing piles of hay of the same size. What does 
the ass do? According to the classic paradox, it does not do anything because it is 
confronted with two equally strong stimuli, so it cannot make a choice and ends 
up starving to death. What would a person do in the same situation? According to 
Vygotsky, humans are capable of choosing and acting because, in contrast to the 
ass, we do not just react to stimuli directly, or in this case  not react because two 
stimuli are equally strong. People themselves contribute to structuring the stimuli 
that confront them because they can use historically developed tools. For example, 
a person in this predicament could flip a coin, because we have developed such 
a practice for getting us out of this type of situation. We can introduce stimuli in 
the form of signs and symbols for ourselves, and use them to make the choice. As 
a higher mental function, the will is thus mediated by tools, just like other higher 
mental functions such as memory or thinking. The mind’s higher functions are 
developed via the acquisition of societal tools and signs, and we can gain control 
over our actions by using them (Chaiklin, 2007, p. 279). 
 An essential point is therefore that, in the socio-cultural tradition, society is not 
regarded as an impediment to the individual’s free opportunities for development. 
Society is not something that limits the mind’s functioning. On the contrary, the 
social practices of society are a necessary medium for a mature mental life in 
humans to exist at all. Kant tells a story in his first  Critique from 1781 about a 
flying dove that, while soaring freely through the air, fantasizes about being able 
to fly much faster in a vacuum since there would not be any wind resistance. The 
point of the story is that the dove would not be able to fly in a vacuum, because 
the wind resistance is precisely what keeps the dove in the air. And it is very much 
the same with the society in which human life unfolds: the social conditions and 
norms for right and wrong are like a kind of mental wind resistance, enabling us 
to have a mind in the first place. Society is not a limitation of individual freedom, 
but a prerequisite for it. 
 After Vygotsky’s death in 1934, cultural-historical psychology continued to 
develop in various directions, but especially in the direction of what is called 
activity theory (Mammen & Mironenko, 2015). An important figure in this 
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development is A. N. Leontiev (1904–1979), who developed a systematic analy-
sis of the organization of human activity and practice to a greater extent than 
Vygotsky himself (the reference is to a Danish translation, and his name is here 
spelled differently: Leontjev, 2002). The term “activity” here refers to specific 
social “activities” (or social practices), often with a division of labour, such as 
education or production. According to Leontiev’s analysis, an activity contains 
a particular “motive”, which can be said to be the purpose of the activity, for 
example, educating people to carry out societal tasks (Chaiklin, 2007, p. 290). The 
motive can be achieved through many different kinds of actions, and actions can in 
turn be carried out through a number of different operations. A basic fact of action 
theory is that even the simplest actions can be physically carried out in an infinity 
of ways (for example, a door can be opened with your hand, foot, mouth or a stick) 
and Leontiev’s term for these action-oriented movements is operations. Activities 
consist of actions that in turn consist of operations, and this perspective allows 
us to link a general, societal level of analysis with an individual, psychological 
one. We can link social practices with actions. Below we will take a closer look at 
the role that the concept of social practices can play in relation to a socio-cultural 
understanding of the mind. 
 The mind and social practices 
 Social reality is historically changeable, open to multiple interpretations, and in 
contrast to physical reality it is negotiable. We can take a vote, in a meaning-
ful way, on whether we should have car-free Sundays in Denmark, but not on 
whether we should repeal the law of gravity on the first Saturday of every month. 
Despite its fundamental changeability, however, social reality still exhibits a rela-
tive stability and order. Unless we are mentally ill, we do not we get up in the 
morning and encounter a completely fragmented and confused social world, but 
rather a quite coherent and comprehensible reality. The order and regularity that 
events in the physical world exhibit can be explained nomically with reference to 
universal laws as described by great scientists such as Isaac Newton and Albert 
Einstein (1879–1955). The question here is whether the relative order and regular-
ity that events in the social world exhibit can be described by universal laws in 
the same way. Many socio-cultural scientists answer this question in the negative. 
The socio-cultural world is not ordered causally, but normatively, and norms can 
be said to be embedded in the social practices of society. 
 A simple example will serve to illustrate the difference between nomic and 
normative reality. There is a fundamental difference between (1) a situation in 
which an automatic door opens when a photocell’s light beam is interrupted, and 
(2) a situation in which a person opens a door for another person. The first situa-
tion is explained comprehensively when we know the mechanics of the photocell 
and the door, and this mechanism can be reasonably assumed to operate accord-
ing to the same universal laws, whether the automatic door is in a supermarket 
in Sheffield or a bank in Beijing. In the second situation, however, just knowing 
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the “mechanics” (e.g. the human brain and locomotor system) is not enough to 
understand what is going on. Even though the “mechanics” might be universal – 
physiology is essentially identical in Sheffield and Beijing – the same is not neces-
sarily true for the act itself. To understand why someone opens a door for someone 
else (say, a man opening the door for a woman), we have to know this person’s 
perception of the situation and the set norms and conventions of the given loca-
tion. The man’s action might be a kind-hearted attempt to help the woman, or it 
might be an attempt to be the last one to enter an uncomfortable encounter and to 
hide himself at the woman’s expense. Knowledge of causal laws does not help us 
to clarify whether the action is the one or the other. Only knowledge of the per-
son’s intentions and the greater cultural context helps us in this regard. In many 
cultures the man’s action could be understood as an expression of courtesy, based 
on a perspective of the sexes where the man is perceived as the active protector 
and the woman is perceived as passive and weak. In other cultures where femi-
nism has taken hold, the action could be perceived as condescending to the woman 
because it unduly portrays her as being someone who needs help and protection 
simply because she is a member of the female sex. 
 In this way, human mental life can be comprehended only if we are familiar 
with both people’s intentions and the applicable local norms. We need to know 
what people are trying to achieve (intentions), and we need to know what is con-
sidered becoming and unbecoming, right and wrong (norms and conventions), 
in order to understand what is happening in a given social episode. We can take 
note of two things in this example: first, we can point out an  action in the flow 
of events only because we can place the action within a general  social practice . 
Every action as an  action presupposes the existence of a  practice for performing 
the action . I can promise my family that I will do the dishes only because there 
is a practice we call “making promises” and another we call “washing up”. This 
utterance would be meaningless if this were not the case. If there was only a single 
person who had ever made a promise and if this had only happened once in the 
course of history, then we would not be able to understand what a promise was. 
One of Wittgenstein’s key points is that an action can make sense only as part 
of a publicly observable practice of performing that action over a span of time. 
According to this perspective on actions, there is no external view, distanced from 
human actions, from which existence can be understood. To understand human 
existence is to interpret an interpretation – which means, to interpret how the 
actors themselves interpret their world – and this can be done only “from inside” 
the interpretations themselves – by being familiar with the actors’ practices – and 
not “from outside”, for example, by using the objectifying methods of the natural 
sciences. We need first and foremost to know the local normativity rather than the 
causal mechanisms. 
 In the words of cultural psychologist Richard Shweder, we need to know “the 
intentional world” (Shweder, 1990a). According to Shweder, the intentional 
world is the subject of the cultural-psychological exploration of the mind. He 
defines cultural psychology as “the study of the way cultural traditions and social 
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practices regulate, express, transform and permute the human mind, resulting less 
in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, emotion” 
(p. 1). Shweder believes that the mind is a product of social practices. Our socio-
cultural environment is perceived as an intentional world. The Berlin Wall, as 
discussed above, is only of importance because it is part of the intentional world. 
If, by some cosmic coincidence, a physically identical wall had been formed by 
the wind and weather in the Kalahari Desert, it would obviously be quite a sensa-
tion when it was discovered, but the “wall” would not really have any historical 
significance other than as a geological phenomenon. In a way it would not even 
really be a wall at all, since a wall is a structure that is created by people under 
certain historical circumstances in order to separate something from something 
else – i.e. it is based on certain ideas and social practices. 
 The intentional world is organized in and by social practices. We could say that 
individual expressions of human mental life – thoughts, feelings, actions – all 
require a practice that gives the individual expression meaning. Such a practice 
is  normative , since it is based on a difference between proper and improper. This 
was illustrated in  Chapter 1 with anger as an example. Briefly put, mental life is 
ordered by societal norms, without which our forms of mental life could not exist, 
and these norms are realized in social practices. 
 But what are such practices more specifically? More recent social theory has 
taken a “practice turn” (Schatzki, 2001). In the middle of the twentieth century 
we saw a “linguistic turn” in the humanities and social sciences, but in recent 
years the concept of “practice” has proved productive in rethinking some of social 
theory’s basic questions. Social scientists like Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bour-
dieu believe that the concept of practice will be able to dissolve the (inappropriate) 
dualisms between actor and structure as well as individual and society. Both are 
viewed as being derived from a more fundamental level of practices. In the previ-
ous chapter I attempted a similar exercise based on the concept of habit. Andreas 
Reckwitz has created an overview of the diversity of practice theories and con-
cludes that a common characteristic is that practice theory does not put the social 
into mental qualities, discourse or interaction, but into the practices themselves 
(Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). He defines a practice as “a routinized way in which 
bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, things are described 
and the world is understood” (p. 250). This is at first glance a fine and inclusive 
definition, but it fails to mention an essential element of a practice: that is  norma-
tive . Reckwitz emphasizes only that they are  routinized , meaning that we have a 
practice when many people act in the same ways over time. 
 For the purposes of this book’s approach to the mental as something normative, 
it is more productive to follow Rouse and define practices as normative account-
ability (Rouse, 2007). This means that the actors in a practice are  accountable to 
the fundamental normativity that constitutes a practice. Regularity, i.e. the fact 
that people behave the same way, is not sufficient for us to have a practice. For 
example, most people open the door with their right hand, but this is not a practice 
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in the strict sense because there is no normativity involved. We could say that this 
is a statistical  normality , but in the  normative sense it is a coincidence that one 
hand is used more often than the other. There is no  reason for habitually opening 
the door with our right hand, but there is definitely a  cause that has to do with com-
mon brain lateralization and the resulting left- or right-handedness. But people are 
not corrected if they use their left hand, and the concept of normativity is, as men-
tioned, closely linked to the possibility of making mistakes and being corrected. 
 If the presence of normative accountability is necessary for us to be able to talk 
about practices, then we need a theoretical definition that takes this into account: 
the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor provides one when he defines a practice 
normatively as “any stable configuration of shared activity whose shape is defined 
by a certain pattern of dos and don’ts.” (Taylor, 1989, p. 204). Activities that do 
not contain such a normative pattern are not practices. But agriculture, music, 
politics, medicine, education of children, etc. are cultural and social practices 
because, as activities, they are steeped in norms. And as mentioned, we can under-
stand individual actions (e.g. a child getting money for good marks in school) 
only if we understand the practices that make the action meaningful (in this case, 
educational and monetary practices in a capitalist society). Individual actions are 
the figure; practices are the background. The mind, as a range of abilities of per-
sons to perform actions, respond emotionally and solve problems, is dependent on 
practices with their inherent norms in order to exist. We can “perform” mentally 
only if there are practices in which to “perform” and relative to which we can be 
held accountable. 
 If a person’s mind is therefore to be understood as being situated in a social and 
normative field of practices, and if psychological phenomena therefore are norma-
tive, then the sciences of the mind come in contact with moral philosophy. It can 
even be expressed more strongly: in many ways, psychology can be seen as a part 
of moral philosophy (Louch, 1966). Within moral philosophy we are interested in 
the  reasoning behind actions, and not in what  causes behaviour. We concern our-
selves with whether a way of acting and living is  legitimate in an ethical sense, and 
not with the causal factors that underlie people acting or living in certain ways. I 
have argued in favour of the fact that psychological phenomena can only be under-
stood if viewed within a normative framework, where we distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate, appropriate and inappropriate, right and wrong. This 
does not mean that all psychological phenomena are good in a moral sense. People 
can act maliciously and irrationally, after all. But it means that all psychological 
phenomena can be judged morally. We can judge a person’s actions, feelings and 
thoughts morally – and they therefore belong to the field of the mind – but we 
cannot judge their physiology in the same way. Although in recent years a (prob-
lematic) tendency for moral condemnation has arisen, for example, with respect 
to obesity, it is not the weight itself that is morally condemned, but rather the 
person’s actions that resulted in obesity. The actions are psychologically relevant 
and subject to moral discussion. 
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 The mind across cultures 
 The foregoing observations suggest that there is a close relationship between 
morality and psychology. MacIntyre has expressed it as follows: psychologies 
“express and presuppose moralities” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 77). Psychological phe-
nomena are partly constituted by the structures of normative practices through 
which they are expressed: our ways of feeling, desiring, thinking, perceiving 
and acting only have meaning within a particular “set of norms of justification” 
(p. 76). Some things are legitimate targets of our desires (e.g. a second family car), 
which in the past would have been viewed as unnecessary gluttony, and perhaps 
in the future this will change again. In my opinion, it is important to realize that 
psychologies presuppose moral systems – but the reverse is also true. Psycholo-
gies also ”secrete” moralities (Much & Harré, 1994); they invite us into thinking 
in specific ways about right and wrong. And the various psychological under-
standings and explanations of actions that exist worldwide are also brought about 
by certain fundamental metaphysical notions. A culture’s psychological discourse 
reflects local metaphysics, i.e. a fundamental conception of people and the social 
order. Are people, for example, like atoms in social life (a widespread “Western” 
conception)? Or conversely, are people relational entities that are defined by their 
relationships to others (a widespread “Eastern” conception)? 1 
 Various psychologies arise from various metaphysics, and various moralities 
emerge from those in turn. It is obvious that in the first-mentioned view (the 
“Western” one), the concept of rights plays an important role in the culture’s 
morality. People as societal atoms have inviolable rights that take precedence 
over the considerations of communities. Communities become instrumental in 
terms of optimizing the lives of individuals and they cannot be seen as ends in 
themselves. In our part of the world we can hardly understand that it is possible to 
think differently, because the notions that underlie this thinking are so fundamen-
tal and pervasive in our lives. Conversely, if we take the “Eastern” view, the local 
prescriptive morality will typically be centred on the responsibilities that people 
have towards the community to which they owe their existence. All metaphysics 
and every psychology are teleological in this sense, meaning that they implicitly 
(or explicitly) say something about what  should be (Much & Harré, 1994, p. 293). 
 Cultural psychologists have conducted very thorough analyses of the relation-
ships between moralities, metaphysics and psychologies. An example is an analy-
sis of how the Christian view of the person on the one hand and Madhyamika 
Buddhism’s view on the other give rise to different moral systems (Much & Harré, 
1994). In Christian cultures, morality is about mastering the lust of the flesh, 
because they have a metaphysical and psychological notion of a dualism between 
the pure soul and the impure body. The Buddhist view of morality, however, 
demands that we cultivate our cognitive processes, because it has a metaphysical 
and psychological notion that it is not the body, but certain thought processes, 
which deceive us into having a distorted view of the cosmos, thus preventing us 
from being enlightened. The conceptual worlds of entire cultures are connected 
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to their basic psychological assumptions and associated social practices. Chris-
tian and Buddhist cultures, for example, have different practices with respect to 
exercising impulse control and mastering the lust of the flesh, respectively, which 
is essential in Christian cultures, and with respect to gaining insight into the illu-
sory status of the ego, which plays a major role in Buddhism. Despite the wide-
spread secularization of the Western world, I would argue that the basic Christian 
understanding of the person and the social order, and also the dualism between 
the spiritual and the corporeal, continue to structure many of our basic conceptions 
today. Not least of these are our conceptions about what the mind is, i.e. an inner 
“thing”, as we saw in  Chapter 1 . Descartes could probably not have developed his 
dualistic philosophy in a non-Christian culture, and of course this dualism still sets 
the stage for our discussions about the mind. 
 If there is such an inner relation between psychology and morality, then we 
can either focus on how psychological conceptions arise from a culture’s moral 
systems, or conversely on how a moral system arises from a culture’s fundamen-
tal metaphysical and psychological concepts. When we deal with interpretive, 
cultural-psychological studies, it is not possible to determine in advance whether 
it will be most productive to keep the one or the other factor constant. What we  can 
conclude is that cross-cultural studies almost always find that psychologies and 
moral systems vary together. Different cultures have very different conceptions 
of what the mind is, and they have correspondingly different conceptions of what 
morality is (although there might also be universally common ground between 
different cultures; see Shweder, 1990b). Theories about the mind are thus always 
moral and political as well – and vice versa. 
 In recent years, both cultural psychology and what is called cross-cultural psy-
chology have been growing. The latter type of research compares mental capaci-
ties and dimensions across different cultures. Cross-cultural psychology is part of 
mainstream psychology to a greater extent than cultural psychology, and leading 
cultural psychologists like Shweder have accused it of merely exporting the West-
ern version of general psychology to the rest of the world. The point of criticism 
is that we take Western personality theories, intelligence tests and fundamental 
psychological concepts and see how other cultures (typically East Asian) score on 
“our” tests. Cultural psychology, in contrast to cross-cultural psychology, would 
rather understand how people live, act, think, and feel from the perspectives of 
local social practices. Psychologists who have stood astride two different cultures 
at the same time report that it is difficult to find meaningful, simple comparisons 
or translations between psychological concepts in different cultures, for example, 
from Indonesian to American (Danziger, 1997). Folk psychologies can perhaps be 
outright incommensurable, i.e. largely incomparable if they differ in their basic 
parameters – if, for example, they disagree on the basic concepts of thinking, feel-
ing and action. 
 This does not mean that we cannot undertake comparative studies of differ-
ent cultures. But it does mean that we should bear in mind that these studies are 
always done from a specific cultural perspective. Shweder sought to expose three 
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general codes that structure cultures’ functioning and which help to determine 
how different cultures regard and give meaning to the mind, self, morality, com-
munity and suffering. The three codes that different cultures use to organize their 
worlds of meaning are: (1) based on an idea of autonomy, (2) based on an idea of 
community and (3) based on an idea of a natural, sacred order (Shweder, Much, 
Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). These do not exist in pure forms, but (1) is clearly in 
the foreground in the United States, whereas (2) and (3) are in the foreground 
in India. In the case of (1), morality is conceived of as a system of rights that 
involves protecting the individual’s freedom. The self is seen as a structure of 
preferences that the individual should be allowed to realize to the greatest extent 
possible. The social sphere is implicitly conceptualized as a market where ser-
vices are freely exchanged between equal individuals. Code (2) is based more on 
so-called communitarian values such as duty and interdependence, and the self is 
seen as being embedded in a tradition-specific social community rather than being 
an autonomous individual. That is why people here have certain obligations that 
arise from the community (linked to family or region) regardless of what he or 
she might otherwise have in the way of preferences. The self is not a structure of 
preferences, but rather like an “official”, says Shweder, because the individual is 
born into a particular “office” by virtue of his or her specific social relationships. 
Code (3) is associated with religious notions of the spiritual dimension of the self 
and often with an idea of the purpose of life consisting in reaching for the divine. 
The world is seen as a natural, sacred order that must be maintained and defended 
if threatened. 
 The much talked about conflict over the caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed 
in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2005 can be interpreted as an expres-
sion of a clash between two different worlds of meaning: the Western idea of 
autonomy, which is a significant background value for freedom of expression on 
the one hand, versus an idea of an inviolable, sacred order on the other. Many peo-
ple in the West reacted with surprise at the violent reaction seen in several Muslim 
countries because it seemed incomprehensible that people could be  so offended 
by a caricature drawing. The problem on the part of the West was perhaps that it 
overlooked the fact that the Muslims were not offended on their  own behalf, but on 
behalf of God: for them it was God himself who had been violated, which is why it 
seemed important to restore the natural, sacred order. And the problem on the part 
of the Muslims was perhaps that they overlooked the fact that the newspaper did 
not intend to offend God – but rather to challenge certain human conceptions. The 
conflict escalated for many reasons, of course, not least for reasons of practical 
politics, but a major factor that made it possible for a few drawings to be able to set 
souls and flags on fire was without a doubt the very different worlds of meaning 
on metaphysical, psychological and moral levels. 
 Shweder sees key insights in all three codes, which promote different kinds of 
values. He is of the opinion that all the values involved are genuinely valuable, 
so it is not a case of some cultures being “wrong”, but rather about weighing 
values differently. In addition to the fact that different codes, world views and 
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cosmologies contain different folk psychologies and thus different perceptions 
of what the mind and morality consist of, they also include different explana-
tions for human suffering. There are three major widespread metanarratives of 
suffering: (a) the biomedical narrative, according to which suffering is explained 
as a result of material events, (b) the moral narrative, which frames suffering as 
a consequence of a breach in the moral order, and (c) the interpersonal narra-
tive that refers to magic, witchcraft or spirits as explanations for human suffering 
(Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997, p. 127). Most educated people in the 
West will probably agree to some variation of (a), but on a global scale only about 
15% of the explanations for human suffering fall into this category, and the same 
figure also applies to the moral explanations (b). The largest category is (c) with 
42%. 2 In spite of modernization processes, secularism and education, the world is 
still very “superstitious” when seen through the eyes of Western science. 
 Incidentally code (1) and (a) go well together: man and his mind are material 
manifestations that can be treated medically, and we are also endowed with an 
intellect that gives us dignity and rights, but which nevertheless can be viewed 
as being a property of a material brain. Code (2) and (b) also go well together: 
individuals owe their existence to the community, and suffering arises when the 
individual violates the community. Code (3) and (c) also go hand in hand quite 
often: there is a fundamental cosmic structure that cannot be mocked or changed, 
and if one mocks it or tries to change it then he is punished by spiritual entities. 
 It is easy to lapse into extreme views when reading ethnographers’ and cultural 
psychologists’ descriptions of how different cultures relate to reality: that “the 
others” are rather superstitious, silly, dangerous or stupid, and that only “we” are 
right. This is the trap of ethnocentricity. Or that no one can be right, or at least 
more right, than others, when there are such different interpretations of the men-
tal, cosmic and moral realms. Nothing is ever better than anything else, which is 
the trap of relativism. The cultural and historical psychologist Charles Tolman 
formulated a theory that may allow us to strike a sensible balance between these 
extreme views. His argument is based on a theory of practice and especially on 
the Hegelian view that our moral convictions can be derived from the nature of 
human practices that have arisen historically (Tolman, 2003, p. 44). According to 
this theory, everything that inhibits our expression of practices is a breach of the 
common good of the people; that is, the values that go beyond cultural differences. 
A practice is defined specifically by Tolman as the joint provision of basic human 
needs through the use of mediating tools (p. 43). Common goods or values arise 
in and with our collective practices that are dependent on trust, cooperation and 
justice in order to function. Common goods do not have value because we like 
them, but we  should like them because they are fundamental to important and 
basic dimensions of our lives. According to Tolman, maintaining and developing 
social practices as such is therefore a universal value against which all our particu-
lar notions of morality and value can be derived and justified. 
 The philosopher Anthony Holiday (1988) developed a similar theory based 
on the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Marx. Regardless of the many cultural 
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differences that exist in regard to morals, folk psychology, metaphysics etc., there 
are certain necessary conditions that must be in place for cultures and societies to 
be able to exist at all. I will not delve deep into the defence of a universal moral 
basis for human society, but Holiday analyzes three moral values in detail: verac-
ity (telling the truth as a moral value), justice and respect for rituals. He argues 
persuasively that no society could exist as such, if there were no practices in these 
societies whose function was to protect these values. If mental phenomena in the 
full human sense are dependent on a network of practices and their norms, and if 
norms are ultimately founded on universal moral values, then the possibility of 
mental life as we know it in humans, is in reality only conceivable on the basis of 
a common morality (I argue much more thoroughly for this in Brinkmann, 2011a). 
Now we are back to Aristotle: the city is man’s teacher (and of course women’s 
too), and there are certain moral values that every city (that is, every society) 
should build on and cultivate among its citizens. Far from all psychologists will 
go along with this thesis. My main concern has not been to prove this thesis once 
and for all, but simply to show that recognition of cultural diversity with respect 
to morality, folk psychology and basic cosmology does not automatically lead to 
either ethnocentrism or moral relativism. 
 The mind in the family 
 Of course, it is not just the “city” that is “man’s teacher” – not even the “city” in 
the modern sense of socially organized education through the school system – but 
also the family. For a society to survive over time, numerous functions need to 
be attended to: reproduction, so that deceased individuals can be replaced by new 
ones; production, so that physiological life can be maintained; social order, so that 
destructive conflicts are avoided; socialization, so that new community members 
can become competent actors in the community; emotional support, so members 
feel that they are part of a community, especially in crisis situations (Berk, 1997, 
p. 540). Early in human history, all of these functions were probably taken care of 
by the family, but as society evolved towards greater and greater complexity and 
there was a greater division of labour, the family could no longer manage taking 
care of all of these functions. In modern society, production has been transferred to 
the business sector and maintaining social order has become a state responsibility, 
and the state has gained a monopoly on violence, and a large part of socialization 
is turned over to specialists in pedagogy and teaching. Reproduction and emo-
tional support on the other hand are largely still functions that are carried out in 
and by families. It is therefore not surprising that the family has been regarded as 
an absolutely central arena for the development of the mind. Freud attributed the 
immediate family an almost overriding role in terms of mental development in the 
individual’s earliest years of life, whereas later researchers regard the family as 
but one important arena for mental development among several others. 
 Everyone has a mother and a father in a biological sense, and most people are 
brought up in a family. We could say that the family as an institution is situated at a 
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level between the individual and society, but this is somewhat misleading because 
society is not a “thing” out there in the world. It is more accurate to say that fami-
lies are an essential part of society; that families are a way in which societies are 
organized in probably all known cultures. For most individuals, family provides 
the introduction to the norms and practices that are a prerequisite for the develop-
ment of a mature mind. Some novelists have imagined a family-free society, such 
as Huxley’s  Brave New World , which incidentally are almost always portrayed as 
a dystopia, but in the real world there are hardly any communities or cultures that 
are not organized into families. 
 The fact that all cultures have familial institutions does not mean that the nuclear 
family is universal. This is a social-scientific myth (Valsiner, 2007, p. 172). There 
is considerable variation throughout the world in terms of the types of families 
that can be grouped by marriage relationships: monogamy, where one woman is 
married to one man; polygyny where one man has more than one wife; polyandry, 
where one woman has more than one husband; and polygynandry, which is group 
marriage where more than one man is married to more than one woman. Polygamy 
and monogamy are the most widespread forms of relations, and researchers esti-
mate that 80% of all societies have allowed polygamy (p. 193). The argument that 
is sometimes heard that the nuclear family – one father and one mother who live 
with their children without other family members – should be the most natural 
(and therefore the most correct!) way to live is therefore incorrect. Viewed histori-
cally, the nuclear family is an exception that has nevertheless been portrayed as 
normatively proper and natural in the West. Nor is it true that children necessarily 
prosper best when they have a close relationship with only one person in a nuclear 
family, e.g. their mother. There is no research to suggest that young children are 
naturally “programmed” to enter into a close relationship only with their mother, 
with the father taking on a role of protecting the nuclear family from the outside 
world (Dencik, Jørgensen, & Sommer, 2008, p. 207). Children have close ties to 
the person who cares for them regardless of their gender. 
 Nevertheless, the nuclear family is widespread today in Western societies, and 
if you look at it statistically, it is not in peril, although it has often been declared 
dead. The modernization and individualization of society does not lead to the 
dissolution of the nuclear family, but, on the other hand, we are witnessing great 
changes  within the nuclear family as an institution (Dencik, Jørgensen, & Som-
mer, 2008, p. 188). Although fathers still work more hours outside the home on 
average than mothers, and although mothers still spend more hours at home on 
housework and child rearing than fathers, the modern family is characterized 
by changes in gender roles, which is also of significance for children. Men and 
women today have to renegotiate the heterosexual family contract (p. 160). It is 
not certain what mothers should do and what fathers should do – even if the end 
result is often not so different than in earlier and more traditionalist societies. This 
is primarily a liberating and positive development that allows men and women to 
adapt flexibly and with equal opportunities for both sexes, but we must also be 
aware of the risk of confusion and negotiation problems that may be associated 
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with the disappearance of fixed norms. Well-functioning families are able to cre-
ate stable and secure conditions for mental development, where all participants – 
children and adults – are heard and respected, but where adults are in charge of the 
important decisions and are thus responsible for them. 
 The mental development of children in families is a complex and context-
specific process. Nevertheless, psychologists have attempted to draw general 
conclusions about how parenting styles affect the development of the mind. In a 
slightly simplified way, it is possible to distinguish four ways of rearing children 
using a combination of two properties: demanding and responsive (authoritative), 
demanding and non-responsive (authoritarian), non-demanding and responsive 
(permissive or laissez-faire) and finally non-demanding and non-responsive 
(uninvolved). A demanding style is one that, by its nature, places demands on 
children and seeks to influence children’s behaviour. A responsive style is one 
that listens to and enters into discussions with children. If you boil the extensive 
research on parenting styles down to a short summary, then it turns out that the 
most positive benefits for children in both the short and long term are associated 
with the first-mentioned authoritative style, in which parents are both demanding 
and responsive, i.e. they make demands, but at the same time they listen and are 
accepting (Berk, 1997, p. 546). Children who grow up in families that are charac-
terized by the authoritative style tend to be happier, have greater self-control and 
achieve greater academic success. In comparison, children in authoritarian fami-
lies tend to be less happy and are more reserved; children in permissive families 
are more impulsive, dependent on adults and do less well in school, while children 
with so-called uninvolved parents often lack basic social skills and also do less 
well in school. 
 These general comparisons are based on large studies and averages and do not 
say anything about individual cases. This means that we cannot know whether an 
authoritative style in a particular case will yield a fruitful result for that particular 
child, and of course we also cannot use backward reasoning and conclude that a 
child who lacks impulse control and performs poorly in school must have grown 
up in a permissive family. One thing we can be quite sure of, however, is that the 
possibility of developing mentally, i.e. developing the abilities and dispositions 
that enable one to participate competently in social practices, is cultivated in the 
family. A major mental capacity is the ability to distance oneself from here-and-
now situations, and the development of this ability is probably best supported 
in authoritative family relationships where children are seen and heard, but not 
forced to take on responsibilities that they cannot manage yet. In my opinion, there 
is a tendency these days to give children responsibility for a lot of things that they 
are not yet able to be responsible for. For example, there is talk about children 
being “responsible for their own learning” and parents are eager to expose their 
children to early school-related learning in the hope that they will go on to perform 
well in school. In addition to the problem of being given responsibility for some-
thing they are not ready for, it is interesting to note that a good deal of research 
suggests that successful school preparation can actually  be destroyed by exposing 
toddlers to school-related learning prematurely (Dencik, Jørgensen, & Sommer, 
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2008, p. 242). There should be warnings against pushing scholastics into early 
childhood, when children’s primary task is not to learn letters and numbers, but 
to play, test out different roles and thereby make sense of social relations, social 
order and social complexity. This is arguably the best way to develop the child’s 
mind. 
 Mental development consists of individuals increasingly mastering social codes 
and signals themselves, which they can master only in social situations with the 
support of more competent individuals, typically adults. In this sense, mental 
development consists of internalizing social patterns and gradually becoming a 
responsible actor among other responsible actors. In Denmark, the age of criminal 
responsibility is 15 years, which means that we then say that people have devel-
oped sufficient mental maturity to be accountable for their actions at this point. 
And at the age of 18 people are given the right to vote and are thereby formally 
included in the basic democratic process. I do not know whether these age demar-
cations are optimal, but it is clear that mental development takes place at different 
rates for different individuals, and depends especially on the social and family 
environment they have been given. Therefore, having formal limits for respon-
sibility from a specific age that apply to everyone is a somewhat questionable 
practice. But the question, of course, is whether it can be done any differently. 
 Conclusions 
 This chapter has brought us into many aspects of cultural psychology. Its basic 
message is that man is a social animal in a very elementary sense. As creatures 
with minds, humans cannot be conceived without culture, socialization and social 
interaction. Acting persons can exist only within such societal contexts, since we 
are what Aristotle called political animals. And sociality cannot be conceived 
without some basic values and normativities that are embedded in the practices in 
which we participate. A substantial portion of the practices that are very important 
for mental development are organized in family structures. But are there no other 
conditions for the social realm besides values and social practices? Yes, there are, 
and the next chapter is about things and artefacts as a necessary condition for the 
existence of complex social relations – and thus a condition for the occurrence of 
mental life in the human sense. Society and sociality are not free-floating social 
relations, but are largely held together and stabilized by the material objects that 
surround us. The same applies to the mind and its capacities in more general terms. 
 Notes 
 1 I put “Western” and “Eastern” in quotation marks because both categories represent 
a dramatic simplification and both cover very large differences within each category. 
Despite this fact, a great deal of cross-cultural psychology uses such a simple dichotomy. 
See for example Heine for an analysis of “Eastern” and “Western” self-concepts (Heine, 
2001). 
 2 The sum is not 100%, presumably because some of the explanation types could not be 
attributed to the established categories. 
Chapter  5 
 The mind and things 
 
We have seen that the mind in the traditional (but also highly problematic) West-
ern perspective is perceived as something “inside the head” – either as “an inner 
world” in the form of ideas, as in the philosophies of Descartes and the British 
empiricists, or as “mental representations” in much of the modern cognitive sci-
ences. We have also discussed a number of arguments for expanding the bound-
aries of the mind from being something inside the head to also include the body 
and the social realm. In this chapter, I argue for a further extension of the mind’s 
boundaries to also include material things, objects and artefacts. The mind extends 
not only to the  social world of practices, relationships and symbols, but also to the 
 material world of things and technologies. Or, in other words, it is unhelpful to 
depict the world as divided into a social or cultural realm on one side and a mate-
rial realm on the other. There is just one world, and the parts of the world, where 
human activity is significant, is at one and the same time social and material. What 
does that mean? 
 Let us consider the following example as an introduction to the topic: the ability 
to count and calculate can be said to be a prototypical psychological process. As 
children we learn to count and eventually to do sums. Initially we learn perhaps 
by rote memorization, including counting from one to ten as a kind of recita-
tion and saying “two plus two equals four”. Later we learn more genuine mental 
arithmetic. “Mental arithmetic” is precisely something that can be done using the 
head alone. Not because the numbers are “inside the head”, but because you can 
add numbers together without others knowing that you are doing it. But we can 
also learn to count on our fingers. This expands the range of possible mathemati-
cal operations for children. It is easier to add and subtract when you can see the 
amounts in front of you, represented by your fingers. In this moment, your fingers 
are part of the cognitive or mental process of working out mathematics problems. 
They play an equal part in working out the problems as do processes in the brain, 
which of course are also necessary. You can even take it a step further, like my 
own son, and use your nose to count your fingers with by pointing to each finger 
with the tip of your nose. He found this necessary when he was using all of his 
fingers on both hands to represent amounts so he could not use them to count with! 
Later we learn more complex forms of calculation using mathematical symbols, 
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which we write down using pencil and paper. Can we say that the pencil and paper 
then become part of the mental process, aligned with the involved processes in 
the brain? 
 Yes – why not? At least this is the argument of philosophers such as Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers (1998), for example. It is certainly difficult to find good rea-
sons to deny that these things are mental, other than insisting that this does not fit 
our dogma that the mind is “inside the head”. What about when we learn to use 
a calculator? Does it matter whether the “processing power” is outside the head 
(in the calculator’s chips and circuits) or inside the head (in the brain’s neural cir-
cuits)? No, not according to Clark and Chalmers. They say that in principle it does 
not really matter at all. We cannot draw a line between the mind and the world 
based on an inner-outer understanding. The mind (as an array of skills and dispo-
sitions) is in the world, and the world is in the mind (because the relevant skills 
and dispositions demand a material world in order to be enacted). For example, 
when we talk about calculating mathematically, the fingers, nose (!), paper, pencil, 
calculator and many other  things , from a functional and ontological perspective, 
play an equal part in the mental process of working out mathematical problems 
as brain processes do. 
 In this chapter, I will elaborate this perspective on the importance of things for 
the mind. I will talk about “things” in a very broad sense. Other words, such as 
artefacts or objects, could have been chosen, but the more everyday word “things” 
is perfect, in my opinion, and highlights the fundamental material dimension of the 
objects that are important for the mind. The things that are important for mental 
processes are primarily  technologies . Technologies are things that are combined 
with a practical rationality in human practices (see the previous chapter on social 
practices). A calculator is thus a material thing, but it is also part of a calculation 
 technology that enables people to perform all kinds of mathematical operations. A 
piece of paper is a thing, but when the paper is part of an intelligence test, it is part 
of a powerful  social technology that can allow or prevent access to certain social 
positions and sort people into special education classes, the Military Academy or 
the director’s chair. 
 I will thus use the term technology in a very broad sense. Technologies do 
not just include computers and drilling platforms but also, for example, things 
like shopping lists, speed bumps and psychotherapies, which are also examples 
of technologies. The latter three belong to what I will call mental technologies, 
social technologies and technologies of the self, respectively. This distinction is 
somewhat arbitrary, and it could be drawn differently, but I introduce it here in the 
hope of being able to give a certain overview of the many implications that things 
and technologies have for the mind. Mental technologies are the things that we 
use to expand our ability to think and act in the world, i.e. our cognitive abilities 
in a broad sense; social technologies are the technologies that allow certain types 
of societies and social relations to be created and maintained; technologies of the 
self are technologies used for human improvement in a broad sense. Often, a given 
thing as a material object will be part of all three kinds of technologies. There is 
96 The mind and things
no sharp distinction among them. But as an ideal type, a shopping list is a mental 
technology because it enables us to remember which goods we need to buy. The 
shopping list itself is a material object that we take with us to the supermarket, and 
when we are confronted with its stimuli (in the form of characters we have scrib-
bled down) we will be able to buy precisely what we need. Speed bumps regulate 
vehicle speed and thus help to regulate the complex social form of organization 
that we call traffic. And psychotherapy is a diverse technology of the self that 
trains humans in new and hopefully more productive habits, which ideally allows 
them to live better lives. These three types of technologies will be discussed in 
greater detail below as they are all important to the human mind. Finally, I will 
give an example of a type of object that I will call a symbolic resource, which 
is very important for our mental processes and which has aspects of a mental-, 
social- and self-technological nature. 
 Mental technology 
 In previous chapters we saw examples of approaches that very closely linked the 
mind to the concept of meaning. This applies to both the Wittgensteinian tradi-
tion and the pragmatic approach of Dewey, which understands the mind as the 
ability to respond to and engage in contexts of meaning. In this case the mind is 
normative, precisely because it is possible to respond more or less appropriately 
to a given context of meaning. A major discussion in philosophy in the twentieth 
century has been about whether meaning is in the head, e.g. in the form of mental 
representations, or not. If the mind is closely linked to meaning, then this is a rel-
evant discussion for understanding the nature of the mind. Therefore, I will first 
briefly outline the discussion. 
 More than 40 years ago, the American philosopher Hilary Putnam delivered a 
highly controversial argument in favour of meaning  not being in the head (Put-
nam, 1975). Putnam set out a thought experiment in which he imagined that our 
planet Earth has a twin, a twin Earth that is completely identical to ours except that 
the water on this twin Earth does not have the molecular structure H 2 O, but instead 
has a molecular structure XYZ. All of the superficial properties of the water are 
the same in both places: It is usually wet and can quench the thirst, freezes at zero 
degrees Celcius and boils at 100, etc. Putnam now asks: if a person on Earth and 
a person on twin Earth, who is 100% identical, molecule for molecule, both think 
about water, do their thoughts have the same meaning? Are they thinking about the 
same thing? And Putnam answers in the negative. Because the person on Earth is 
thinking about H 2 O, while his counterpart on twin Earth is thinking about XYZ. 
This is true even if they do not personally know the molecular structure of water. 
The point is that what they think about depends on the nature of the physical 
world and  not on their knowledge or mental representations. So it is not a differ-
ence in people’s “heads” that determines whether they think about the one thing 
or the other, but rather a difference in their physical surroundings. This thought 
experiment gave rise to the view called  externalism : the meanings of our thoughts, 
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utterances and attitudes are not determined by something inside the individual, but 
are instead based on properties that are outside the individual. Or, more generally: 
that the “contents” of the mind can only be understood by looking at the things 
that are “around” the mind (see also Noë, 2009). 
 The discussion about meaning, the Earth and twin Earth is ongoing, but other 
forms of externalism have emerged since Putnam started the debate. Putnam’s 
externalism can be called  semantic externalism because it principally concerns 
meaning and only indirectly the mind. One of the best known proponents of 
the externalist view today is the philosopher Andy Clark, and his externalism 
is not just semantic, but also  psychological externalism. Clark argues that we 
humans are “natural born cyborgs”. We use things and assistive technologies to 
expand and refine our cognitive processes (Clark, 2008). Everything from glasses 
that help us to see more clearly, to scientific instruments, books, charts, etc. are 
involved in human cognitive processes. Clark’s psychological theory can more 
accurately be called “active externalism” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Whereas 
Putnam’s aforementioned externalism was passive, since neither the individuals 
nor the environment on Earth and twin Earth did anything themselves that made a 
difference between the two people in question, because it was just a static differ-
ence in the environment that made a difference in the meaning of their thoughts, 
 active externalism focuses instead on how people and environments are actively 
and reciprocally involved in cognitive and, more broadly, mental processes. The 
conclusion is that cognitive processes are not in the head – at least, not exclusively. 
 This conclusion can be supported with a multitude of examples. Let us borrow 
from Clark and Chalmers and take a typical cognitive task that is often studied in 
experimental psychology as our first example: mental rotation. Mental rotation 
refers to the phenomenon that we can mentally imagine how three-dimensional 
figures will look from other sides that are currently hidden by rotating the figures 
with our “mind’s eye”. Let us now say you are given the task of determining 
whether a three-dimensional figure on a computer screen is the same as another 
figure that you can only see from another side, and you can either rotate the figure 
“mentally” or on the computer screen. Should we say that only the first situation 
involves something mental? Or what if future advancements allow you to have 
a mechanism implanted in your brain, a neural implant that allows mental rota-
tion just like on the computer screen – except that it is “internal”? There are no 
good arguments for there being any fundamental difference between the three 
scenarios. Whether we rotate the figure “purely mentally”, by using the computer 
screen or by using a neural implant is subordinate in the cognitive and mental 
sense. The mental technology that the computer program represents, and which 
makes it easier (for most) to imagine three-dimensional figures seen from the back 
than using the head alone, is as much a part of the mind in this situation as are the 
brain structures that normally enable mental rotation. 
 It is the same idea with a notebook, to use a more everyday example. If a 
patient with incipient Alzheimer’s manages to cope with everyday life by noting 
relevant information in a notebook, then the notebook is, of course, a substitute for 
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the “brainpower” that previously helped the person to remember, but there is no 
reason to believe that the notebook is any less mentally relevant simply because 
it is an external thing in relation to the skull. If someone asks the patient whether 
he knows how high Mount Everest is, and the patient says yes but can answer 
only by consulting the notebook, which correctly reads “8,848 metres”, then we 
have no reason to deny that the person indeed knows how high Mount Everest 
is. The notebook plays the same mental role for the person as memory plays for 
people whose brains work in such a way that they can use  it (their brain) to recall 
the height of Mount Everest. A person who is not suffering from Alzheimer’s may 
initially find it difficult to remember and say “Wait a moment . . . I need to think 
about it . . . okay, now I have it: 8,848 metres!” It is true to say that the person 
knows the height of Mount Everest the entire time, and it is also true to say that 
the patient who needs to look it up in the notebook to remember it knows the same 
fact the entire time. 
 A counter-argument could be that the notebook should not be regarded as part 
of the mind because it is physically separate from the person and can be located 
far away. You may lose the notebook, but you cannot lose your brain! In a sense 
this is obviously wrong, precisely because the Alzheimer’s patient can be said to 
have “lost” part of his brain. It is also more generally questionable to require that 
something be physically carried on your person as a condition for it to be called 
mental. A person who needs to wear glasses to be able to make out the letters in a 
book can still be said to be able to read, after all, even if he forgot his glasses at the 
top of Mount Everest. In much the same way, a blind person’s cane is a technology 
that enables an extension of his or her awareness of the external world, whether 
or not the cane is permanently attached to the person’s arm or can be set aside. 
 Making physical proximity to a person’s body the criterion for whether we 
designate a material thing as part of a person’s mind does not really work. What 
matters instead is whether the thing plays a relevant functional role in relation to 
the person’s ability to carry out specific mental tasks. However, this conclusion is 
not unproblematic, since the limit of things that can be said to belong to the men-
tal realm must be expanded almost indefinitely because all kinds of things play a 
functional role – large or small – in almost every conceivable mental process. For 
example, the notebook we mentioned earlier is manufactured from a specific mate-
rial that is processed by specific people through specific social practices. Should 
all of this be included in the person’s mind? It sounds absurd on the surface, and 
herein lies the greatest challenge for the externalist perspective, which concerns 
 delimiting the parts of an organism’s environment that are relevant to the organ-
ism’s mental processes. We can also play with a futuristic scenario where we are 
all constantly connected to the Internet, perhaps using a neural interface, where in 
a matter of milliseconds we can download all sorts of factual knowledge from a 
body of collective knowledge, a bit like when we use Google to find information 
today. Will everyone then know everything – that is, everything that is stored in 
the body of collective knowledge? It is hard to say whether we would talk about it 
in those terms if the scenario ever became a reality. But it is presumably true that 
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there would be a number of revolutions in our perceptions about mental processes. 
I already use Google for a wide variety of tasks – to find factual information, as 
a dictionary, for help solving various problems – and when the network can be 
accessed from anywhere it will represent a huge advance in our cognitive abili-
ties. Today, the Internet is a very significant mental technology for a large part of 
the population in the wealthiest parts of the world. Although it might sound crazy, 
in this sense the Internet can be considered as a part of our mind. Of course this 
also means that it will become increasingly difficult to separate the wheat from 
the chaff when our individual cognitive processes merge with the collective. It 
will be culturally and societally important from now on to develop methods to 
determine the credibility and usefulness of the information that we have access to 
at any given moment. 
 A further problem with active externalism follows from the previous chapters of 
this book. For I have argued that it is philosophically problematic to seek to local-
ize the mind in the brain. But this is not just about the fact that it is the  brain that is 
problematic as a location. No,  localizing the mind in the first place is problematic. 
At least if we accept Aristotle’s assumption that the mind is a range of abilities and 
dispositions, and not a thing. So “externalism” (the idea that the mind is extended 
and distributed over a collective world of things) is potentially just as problem-
atic as, for example, neural “internalism” (the idea that the mind is in the head). 
The mind is  not in the head, as the preceding chapters have hopefully shown, but 
in the strict sense it is not  outside the head either, because it is not any “place” at 
all. The mind is a range of skills and dispositions to recognize the features of the 
world, solve problems, act and respond emotionally to what is happening, and as 
such it has some conditions or mediators, which I have tried to unravel in this book. 
The conditions, at least some of them, are located in physical space: the brain is 
located in the head, the body is located on a chair, etc. but the mind itself is not 
as easily located in a purely physically sense. Having said this, active externalism 
is still significant in that it reminds us that we should examine the specific things 
and technologies that surround us and which enable us to recognize a number of 
features of our world. This will always be a relevant exercise when we want to 
understand the mental life of humans. 
 Social technology 
 Mental technologies are a kind of cognitive technology that also enable various 
forms of human action, but which are mainly relevant for cognitive psychology. 
The thesis about “the extended mind” and active externalism were indeed devel-
oped within cognitive psychology, but there is a need to thematize the significance 
of things and technologies in other fields of psychology as well. This is particularly 
true for social psychology, which is about how humans live together in groups and 
communities. In the previous chapter on cultural and social psychology, I outlined 
some basic concepts within social psychology. Given that social psychology is 
about human groups and social relations, there has often been a distinct lack of 
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understanding with regard to the significance of the world of material things. As 
the social scientist Bruno Latour describes it, it is often assumed in the social 
sciences, including social psychology, that our social aspect exists as a kind of 
world in its own right, or as a kind of material that has explanatory power (Latour, 
2005). You often hear wording like “the person’s actions were influenced by social 
circumstances” without it being clear what exactly about the circumstances makes 
them social. Latour accuses sciences that use social explanations like this of being 
mystifying. Explaining human actions with reference to “social aspects” or “the 
social context” is not really an explanation that teaches us anything, but is instead 
just passing the buck. This corresponds to explaining actions based on some kind 
of “social ether” that floats around and has a causal effect. It parallels mentalistic 
explanations of human mental life, which are often more mystifying than clarify-
ing, like in instances where a person in the field of psychology says that a person-
ality trait was the cause of a person’s actions – though it remains unclear how a 
trait could cause an action. Latour’s point is that we cannot begin to understand 
what social scientists call “the social aspect” if we do not involve the material 
world of things and technologies. Social life is held together by things – and not 
by ethereal “contexts” or the like. 
 Social life can be defined as the kind of life that exists when an individual actor 
can achieve a goal only through interaction with other actors (Latour, 1996). By 
this definition, many non-human species are social, which is now widely accepted 
(back in Aristotle’s time he described bees and swans as being social animals). 
Especially the higher primates have fairly complex forms of social life, but, as 
Latour describes it, there are clear limits to how complex the social lives of ani-
mals other than humans can be. Among apes, every social action and social struc-
ture is dependent on the actors themselves – and nothing but the actors. The social 
constructionist descriptions of sociality, which neglect the importance of things 
for the social sphere, can really only grasp the sociality of apes and not humans, 
precisely because the social life of apes is  not mediated much by tools and tech-
nologies. Apes therefore need to have constant contact with other apes in chains 
of specific interactions in order to maintain their “social” life. Apes need to be 
able to see each other, hear each other and touch each other to maintain the social 
order. The “social structure” in a group of apes is nothing but chains of interac-
tions that are characterized in particular by fights for dominance and parental care. 
Human society, in contrast, is organized and stabilized by various forms of social 
technology, which means that human sociality can be much more complex than 
that of apes. Complex sociality in humans in this context results not only from a 
more advanced brain, but to a great extent also from our ability to maintain the 
social aspect through time and space by means of things and technologies. And the 
relationship between the advanced brain and an advanced sociality is a two-way 
relationship: not only are our advanced brains a condition for the development of 
complex social relationships, but the brain itself is a plastic organ that is  formed 
in large part by the social influences to which it is exposed throughout its devel-
opment. The human brain continues its development in “the social uterus” long 
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after the baby is born. Not only does the brain affect social life, but social life also 
affects the brain. 
 Modern society is dependent on a variety of forms of technology to keep track 
of individuals and populations, including buildings, institutions, infrastructures, 
indexes, databases, legislation, parliaments and much, much more. These tech-
nologies are not random material things that people avail themselves of in social 
life. No, without such things, social life as we know it could not exist. Practically 
every human interaction involves things (Latour, 1996). And these things are not 
just a neutral means that we use to perform certain actions. This would imply that 
we had specific, solid intentions in advance of seeking to achieve these intentions 
via certain means. In reality things help to  shape and  constitute the intentions we 
can have. My intention of completing this book is possible only provided that 
there are books, alphabets and a publisher, and these are not just “means” that I 
can use to realize my desire, but which also help give shape to my desire. Latour 
uses the term “mediators” for things and does not just refer to them as “means”. 
As mediators they form the goals they mediate. We can now see that the previous 
chapters on the brain, the body and society’s social practices are exactly about how 
these are mediators of human mental life (Brinkmann, 2011b). 
 Because social technologies form what they mediate – and thus create our social 
life – they inevitably take on a political dimension. The social sphere is political 
in this sense. As per Aristotle, as rational, social animals we will also always be 
 political animals. As an example of a social technology with political implications 
we can mention such an everyday item as a baby bottle. A bottle is a container 
that can be used to nourish babies if, for example, the mother cannot breastfeed 
or she does not want to. But the bottle also allows the father to be included as the 
one who feeds the baby on an equal footing with the mother. New social relations 
and forms of organization can potentially arise from this technology: the father 
can take paternity leave, even in the very early part of the child’s life, homosexual 
fathers can potentially adopt since a nursing woman is not necessary to keep the 
baby alive. In principle, the baby bottle is a revolutionary technology that can radi-
cally change the relationship between the sexes. The technology  does something – 
it helps to mediate social opinion and enables changing social relationships, and 
thus it is political. Where theorists inspired by Marxism might be interested in how 
the spread of technologies depends on the applicable production conditions in a 
society, an approach based on social technology will focus just as much on how 
technologies  affect the societies they are in. Put simply, Marxism explains things 
and technologies based on society, while Latour and like-minded peers explain 
society based on things and technologies. 1 Or more precisely: they insist that 
social, and thus mental, aspects are basically something “artefactual” and techno-
logical. They insist on rethinking dualisms between nature and society, between 
the material and the symbolic. It is highly relevant to insist on this point in light 
of this book’s purpose, emphasizing the following correlation: first, the mind is 
social, second, the social is technologically mediated to a great degree – which 
leads us to the conclusion, third, that the mind, at least in part, is technologically 
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mediated. We cannot fully understand psychological processes if we do not under-
stand that the reality of social technology is an essential condition and mediator of 
mental life. This means that the mind is political as well. 
 Technology of the self 
 The figure who perhaps most strongly emphasized the technological and political 
aspects of the mind in the broad sense is the French philosopher and historian of 
ideas Michel Foucault (1926–1984). Foucault was particularly interested in the 
technologies involved in the formation, discipline and socialization of individuals. 
He called a number of these technologies “technologies of the self” and he was 
particularly interested in the technologies of the self that the sciences of the mind 
had produced and propagated. It is a historical fact that psychology has produced 
technologies that have regulated humans’ relationships with themselves to a great 
degree. Psychology has played a role in shaping society and the psychological 
subjects who inhabit it. Psychology – through its practical effects in therapy, men-
tal testing and psychological counselling, and also through its promise of personal 
development in the school system, organizations, clinics and institutions – has 
greatly helped to produce people who understand themselves based on the tools 
that psychology has provided. Psychology has thus been a co-creator of its own 
subject: the mind (Brinkmann, 2008a). 
 Historian of psychology Kurt Danziger, identified how a certain way of existing 
as a psychological creature – namely, as a “laboratory subject” or “test subject” – 
was developed in early psychological experiments and mental tests that have since 
proved to be of significant practical use, which explains why they quickly spread to 
a variety of practices outside the laboratory, especially in the educational system, 
treatment centres and businesses (Danziger, 1990). Here psychology was trans-
formed from a system of scientific ideas into a system of practices – part of the 
impersonal disciplinary power that, according to Foucault, is involved in the man-
agement of the mind through measurements, statistics and scientific procedures. 
Today it is practically impossible to get a management position without taking a 
personality test, for example. Countless other tests have become widespread in 
society to measure and, where possible, regulate our mental characteristics. 
 Nikolas Rose’s contribution to critical psychological history, by extension of 
this, placed a particular focus on exposing the practical technologies through 
which psychology has organized people’s everyday lives and their relationships 
with themselves (Rose, 1999). From this perspective, we should not think about 
psychological theories as abstractions – as mere phrases in articles and books – 
but instead as “intellectual technologies”, or ways in which thinking is used in the 
world to make the world understandable and manageable in particular ways. We 
must therefore analyze the development of technologies of the self if we want to 
understand the history of psychology (Rose, 1996): considering that traditional 
psychological history usually reports about how psychology has increasingly 
gained ground in terms of neutral knowledge of  who we are as psychological 
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beings, then we should, based on a “human-technological” or self-technological 
analysis, be critically concerned to the same extent with whether it is  worth being 
“who we are” (i.e. as subjects shaped by psychological technologies), or whether 
we should rather seek to  change the technologies of the self that we have avail-
able: “Maybe our problem is now to discover that the self is nothing else than the 
historical correlation of the technology built in our history. Maybe the problem is 
to change those technologies (Foucault, 1993, pp. 222–223). 
 Foucault distinguished three areas in which people are made subjects by things 
and technologies (Foucault, 1994): (1) through scientific objectification, such as 
in psychology and psychiatry, (2) through “dividing practices”, i.e. through dis-
tinctions between things such as sick and healthy, mad and sane, criminal and 
moral, and (3) through technologies of the self: ways in which people make them-
selves subjects, for example, by taking a self-improvement course or keeping a 
journal. Psychology, in part because of its heterogeneous nature and lack of a 
unifying paradigm, has had a special penetrating power, and has been able to 
enter into all three areas. (1) It has provided methods of scientific objectification 
of human characteristics; not just in the form of theories of a “psychological” 
nature, but especially in the form of practical technologies for measuring and 
calculating mental characteristics and individual differences among people. (2) It 
has produced a number of “dividing practices” that have been institutionalized, 
and which now seem indispensable in modern society. (3) It has – and this is per-
haps its greatest cultural influence – developed a number of tools in the form of 
technologies of the self, which people can use to shape and reshape themselves 
as subjects: to “work on themselves”, realize themselves, develop personally, 
find their inner child, have increased self-esteem, release their inner potentials in 
professional and private life, become more assertive, process grief and suffering 
and so on (Brinkmann, 2017). In particular, the many competing psychotherapies 
have conspicuously become technologies of the self these days. The therapies are 
involved in a very direct manner in the cultivation of certain psychological char-
acteristics like autonomy, quality of life and self-knowledge. 
 Psychology has not only provided neutral forms of understanding the mind, 
but it has also been involved in reinventing the mind and our way of existing as 
mental beings (Hacking, 1986). One example that we can mention here is how 
psychology invented the multiple or split personality (Hacking, 1995). New mem-
ory sciences from the late nineteenth century created a new object of knowledge – 
memory – as something we could gain knowledge about through measurement 
methods and psychological techniques, which in turn allowed the emergence 
of phenomena like trauma, post-traumatic stress syndrome, hysteria and Mul-
tiple Personality Disorder. Diverse cultural movements then arose, including 
outright interest groups that were built around opposition to child abuse, which 
was believed to be the underlying cause of Multiple Personality Disorder, which 
in turn affected people’s understanding of themselves and their past. There is a 
“looping effect” between the scientific description of the mind and human actions 
and self-understanding (Hacking, 1995). There is an interaction between people’s 
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self-perception and the classifications and descriptions that they can take on, or 
have put on them. This interaction is technologically mediated. According to the 
philosopher and historian Ian Hacking, a person can be gay, autistic, a teenager, 
a high priest or a Dane only if these classifications and descriptive forms are dis-
cursively available at the particular time in history in which you happen to live. 
These classifications are dependent on a number of practices and institutions, 
and when they disappear, the possibility of being that particular kind of person 
disappears too. For instance, you can no longer be a samurai warrior, since the 
background practice for this category no longer exists, but you can be a stock-
broker instead. The development of new descriptive forms and categories thus 
makes new actions and new intentions possible. 
 If this is true, then every study of the mind should be interested in the reflexiv-
ity that exists in the fact that new knowledge about the mind can change the mind 
itself. Briefly put, the mind is shaped by our attempts to gain knowledge about 
it. Unlike molecules, which do not read chemistry books, people actually do read 
psychology books and can alter their actions to a certain extent based on what 
the books say about them. You could learn to reinterpret your life in the light of a 
new diagnosis (e.g. ADHD) and hence change your living conditions. Or you can 
object to certain mental classifications that others put on your own life, which is 
what happened, for example, when gay people succeeded in removing homosexu-
ality from the psychiatric diagnostic system. This became a reality as late as 1973. 
It is people as mental beings that produce psychological science, but it is also to 
some extent psychological science that contributes to producing the mind through 
its technologies in pedagogy, education, therapy, testing and personal improve-
ment in modern society. This technologically mediated interaction between the 
mind and the sciences of the mind is what the term “looping effects” refers to. 
 Mental development through material 
and symbolic resources 
 Not only human scientists like Foucault and Latour have been interested in the 
significance of things for the mind, but cultural psychologists have also analyzed 
mental development in light of things and artefacts. Analysing the pure “social 
interaction” between parents and children is not enough to understand how chil-
dren develop. We also have to involve the things that help to organize children’s 
everyday life, such as computer games, books, dolls, footballs, the way their 
rooms are laid out and their high chairs. In this last respect, it may at first glance 
seem entirely uninteresting, psychologically speaking, that in Western culture we 
typically put young children in high chairs at the dining table and feed them with 
a spoon. We often allow the child to use the spoon himself, and many of us gladly 
tolerate porridge on the table when the child is learning to master the movements 
his arms make. If we take a closer look at it, this is an example of a rich social 
situation that encourages certain forms of mental development to the detriment of 
others (Valsiner, 1987). Placing children at eye level with adults teaches them that 
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they are active and equal participants in family activities, whereas feeding chil-
dren while they are on a parent’s lap to a greater extent signals passivity and the 
fact that the child is not on an equal footing in the dining situation. This material 
arrangement and the things it involves teach us about society and norms from the 
time we are young, entirely without our being aware of it. We are instilled with 
specific habits in dealing with people and things that are extremely difficult to 
change since they are embedded in our daily routines – see, for example, “Throw-
ing Like a Girl” in  Chapter 3 . 
 One type of thing that is important for most people’s lives and development 
is cultural products such as music, books, films and pictures. We often consume 
these cultural products without thinking about what we are doing. Often it is just 
to pass the time. But when we use such things with specific purposes in mind, 
they are called  symbolic resources in cultural psychology (Zittoun, 2006). When 
studying human life, it turns out that symbolic resources are part of a great deal of 
developmental processes throughout life. The earliest use of symbolic resources 
might be songs that parents sing to their children, and later, for example, bedtime 
stories. Both types of symbolic resources function to reassure the child, i.e. to 
cause a change in their mood and create a safe and secure atmosphere. This is a 
use of cultural products that most people will continue to avail themselves of later 
in life, and most people are familiar with the experience of humming a tune to 
themselves when, for example, they are walking alone on the street at night and 
they are perhaps afraid. In this case people have internalized a particular use of 
the cultural product and they can use it to affect their own emotions. We can pres-
ent ourselves with stimuli and often thereby bring about a desired mental change. 
 Mental development can be described as a result of life transitions, after which 
our experience is reconstructed with the help of language and other signs. For 
example, a transition occurs in children’s development when they learn to walk; 
suddenly they can move about and they have to take new challenges into account, 
and a transition occurs in young people’s lives when they leave home. Follow-
ing a transition, people’s experiences and mental functions need to be partially 
reorganized and symbolic resources are an essential tool in this respect (Zittoun, 
2006). Traditionally, most cultures have had larger shared systems of meaning that 
involved organized uses of symbolic resources. In a predominantly Christian cul-
ture, it is clear that the Bible plays a major role as a symbolic resource that people 
turn to in order to make important life choices, to seek comfort, to understand the 
secrets of existence and to perform many other psychological processes. With 
widespread individualization and the breakdown of traditions, it has increasingly 
been up to individuals to seek out and use symbolic resources. 
 In the past, there were also more definite rites of passage in connection with 
these life transitions, where predetermined symbolic resources were involved in 
many ways, such as in baptisms, confirmations, weddings and funerals. Today, 
people increasingly need to act as  bricoleurs and piece things together them-
selves, i.e. by assembling a repertoire of symbolic resources that can be used 
in connection with life transitions and with mental development. The process, 
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which consists in living through a transition and then creating a future orientation 
through  bricolage and a composition of symbolic resources, can be seen as the 
core of human psychology (Zittoun, 2006, p. x). Most people can describe the 
benefits they get from reading books or watching films when they try to find their 
way through life’s questions, big and small. This is a very everyday way in which 
things, in the form of cultural products, form part of our mental processes in rela-
tion to thinking, acting and feeling. 
 Symbolic resources can thus function as a mental technology and allow specific 
ways of thinking, they can function as a social technology to organize social inter-
action, and they can function as a technology of the self – as a tool with which indi-
viduals develop themselves. There is no doubt that symbolic resources are a very 
important aspect of the formation of human identity, at least if identity is defined as 
the way a person understands himself and his life (Brinkmann, 2008b). Symbolic 
resources give us our bearings in life and help us to contemplate what is important 
and unimportant. For instance, when we need to make difficult moral choices in 
daily life, rarely do we consult a specific set of ethical rules. Instead we use nar-
ratives about certain people we find admirable as a model and we ask ourselves: 
How would the person I admire act in this situation? The person may be real, but 
might just as well be fictional, like a character from a novel or an action hero from 
a feature film. Psychologists and other scientists who study mental processes have 
begun to realise in recent years the degree to which these cultural products, which 
we are almost constantly surrounded by, play into our mental processes. 
 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have outlined three types of technologies and briefly examined 
their significance for the existence of mental life. The basis for the significance of 
things and technologies is radically different from the usual psychological ideas 
about the mind. The traditional perspective places the mind “inside the head”. 
Identifying the mind with the brain is an example of this. The externalist perspec-
tive, in contrast, says that the mind can be understood as such only by involving 
the external world and its mediators. The mind is not confined within the skull, or 
inside the body’s skin. The psychological sphere must be understood by involving 
material and social objects in the external world. We are – and always have been 
(as long as we have been people) –  natural born cyborgs . 
 Note 
 1 Latour’s perspective is known as Actor-Network Theory (or simply ANT) and is char-
acterized by insisting that things, and not just people, can be  actors who  do something. 
ANT is one perspective within a larger group of theories called Science and Technology 
Studies (or STS), which studies the social conditions and implications of technologies 
and sciences. 
Chapter  6 
 The mind between the brain 
and culture 
 
We have now been on a long journey from brain research to phenomenology of the 
body to cultural psychology and an analysis of technology. The general argument 
has been that these areas are all essential for an understanding of the mind, and 
that not one of them is sufficient on its own. They are in different ways conditions 
for, and mediators of, the mind as a range of skills and dispositions to be able to 
develop. In this chapter, I will summarize the book’s explanations of the neural 
basis for the mind and the cultural conditions for mental characteristics and pro-
cesses, respectively. I will try to rise above the specific areas that were analyzed 
in the previous chapters, and attempt to integrate them into a kind of “hybrid 
psychology” that takes into consideration both the brain and culture, which are 
otherwise often regarded as contradictory and perhaps incompatible approaches 
to the study of the mind. Using Rom Harré’s work as a point of departure, I will 
outline the contours of an overall hybrid psychology, and finally I will give some 
suggestions for the future study of the mind. In the next and final chapter I apply 
the theory to a specific phenomenon, viz. ADHD as an example of mental disorder 
that is currently heavily debated. 
 If only one conclusion is to be drawn from this book’s chapters, then it should 
be that psychology needs more than one form of understanding and more than 
one level of analysis. The brain alone is not enough, nor is the body, culture or 
materiality. This is why the attempts at monopolization that we have seen in the 
history of psychology have been unproductive when they seek to dispel one of 
the two halves of psychology that were outlined in the beginning of the book – 
the nomic or normative. Against this background we have to conclude that both 
psychologies – or rather both  sides of psychology – are relevant and indispensable 
within its respective domain. But this is where the problem comes in: Can we have 
both of these psychologies at the same time? I think so, and in the following I will 
present a proposal for how this can be done, with inspiration from Rom Harré. 
 The human grammars 
 Harré’s hybrid psychology seeks a peaceful coexistence between the two psychol-
ogies based on the natural sciences (nomic) and the cultural sciences (normative) 
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respectively. In his book  Cognitive Science , he starts off by outlining an increasing 
polarization in psychology (Harré, 2002). On the one hand, there are researchers 
who insist that psychological phenomena are discursive, meaning that the phe-
nomena are constituted by meaning, intentionality and normativity and by the 
means we use to create and express meaning. These researchers are right, accord-
ing to Harré. And on the other hand, there are researchers who claim that psycho-
logical phenomena are based in a materiality that is comprised of the brain and 
central nervous system. These researchers are also right, says Harré, and his task 
is to show how both poles in this polarization can be right at the same time. 
 Harré’s thinking is in direct continuation of Wittgenstein. Therefore, the use 
of language and the practical circumstances in which language is given meaning 
form the chief focus in an understanding of the mind. An understanding of what 
Wittgenstein called  grammar is also key. As previously mentioned, grammar is an 
open set of rules for how different systems of symbols are used correctly. Gram-
mar is thus something normative, which expresses how we  should use language 
and its signs and symbols if we want to express ourselves in a meaningful way. 
As I argued in  Chapter 2 , it is a grammatical point that we, for example, cannot 
meaningfully attribute psychological states to the brain. We can attribute these 
states only to living organisms that move intentionally – and some of them apply 
only to advanced organisms, such as humans. 
 Harré distinguishes four different grammars, which structure the way we mean-
ingfully talk about the mind in our culture (see Harré, 2002, p. 148). He calls the 
grammars S (for soul), P (for person), O (for organism) and M (for molecule), 
respectively. 
 Soul grammar 
 S-grammar expresses the idea that every human being has a special substance 
inside themselves – typically in the form of an immortal soul. This grammar was 
particularly prevalent and significant a few centuries ago, and it still plays a role 
for many people today, though in general we have to say that it is less impor-
tant now than it was in the past. This grammar operates with two kinds of active 
beings, specifically God and souls, and it identifies key characteristics of actions 
based on the concepts of sin, temptation, forgiveness and confession. These con-
cepts have not disappeared from our language, even though the underlying gram-
mar has become obsolete in many people’s lives with the widespread process of 
secularization. The grammar allows certain actions and utterances to be meaning-
ful (e.g. “God’s grace saved his soul”) and excludes others from being meaningful 
(e.g. “God weighs 87 kilograms, which is twice as much as my soul”). Given 
the fact that many people still think, act and feel on the basis of S-grammar, it 
is important to include it when we want to understand why people do what they 
do, but – according to Harré – this grammar no longer has any direct bearing on 
scientific psychology. The example of S-grammar suggests that grammars are 
not set in stone at all times, but they evolve over time and some may even perish. 
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 Person grammar 
 While many people today manage without S-grammar – both existentially and 
in terms of understanding their own and others’ actions – none of us can get by 
without P-grammar. P-grammar expresses what we assume when we view other 
people as irreducible sources of actions. This is what we do when we relate to 
others as persons. If a person, for example, has the right to vote, then the person is 
regarded as an individual who has voting rights and who can put a tick on a ballot 
paper during general elections. We cannot meaningfully say that it is the person’s 
brain or body that has the right to vote or that ticks the box. No, within P-grammar 
it is irreducibly the person. The concept of the person is irreducible because it is 
primitive i.e. it cannot be derived from anything else. A person cannot be reduced 
to something more primitive, such as a soul or a body, because people cannot be 
divided into separate elements. In this sense, people are the atoms of social life 
(the term “atom” comes from the Greek word for indivisible). And that is why 
people have no inner complexity. They themselves are the source of action – it is 
not just a part of them that is acting when they act, but the person himself who is 
acting. This is the core of personism, which has been defended throughout this 
book with inspiration from Sprague (1999). 
 P-grammar is closely associated with our important concepts and practices that 
involve  responsibility , because only a person can be responsible. Dogs and babies 
are not responsible for what they do, because they are not persons (at least not yet, 
in the case of babies). At the same time, however, a condition for the development 
of personal status is that you are  treated as a person before you actually are one. As 
we have seen, this can be described based on Vygotsky’s understanding of devel-
opment, where an intention (pointing at something, for example) is attributed to a 
child by adults before the child is actually able to point (children can only grasp out 
of pure reflex), but this is also a condition for children eventually  learning to point 
intentionally. To become a candidate for having your actions described in terms of 
P-grammar, you need to be treated as a person before you are one, paradoxically 
enough. P-grammar is fundamental for most of the psychological concepts that we 
can apply to adults (it is by viewing them as persons that we can say that they go to 
work, build a house, play table tennis, celebrate Christmas, etc.). Even in terms of 
things like memory, which at first glance seems relatively simple and mechanical, 
P-grammar is presupposed when making meaningful statements. Remembering 
something means remembering it correctly – and only people can remember, and 
not, for example, their brains. If you say “Now I remember what happened”, then 
you make yourself  responsible for the authenticity of the memory, and responsi-
bility is only meaningful in light of P-grammar (Harré, 2002, p. 148). 
 Organism grammar 
 O-grammar expresses the norms for how we can meaningfully talk about organ-
isms, i.e. biological, living beings. Active beings in this case are not souls or 
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people, but organisms. We can meaningfully say many things about organisms 
that we cannot say about things. If a stone rolls down a mountainside and starts 
an avalanche, then this process is normally described in purely mechanical terms. 
There are other factors at play if we talk of a mountain goat that runs down the 
same mountainside looking for a fresh tuft of grass. The stone falls  because there 
is a specific causal process in motion that can be described based on the law of 
gravity. The mountain goat runs  in order to find some grass. It therefore has a 
specific goal as an organism, in that it has certain needs for food, and this justifies 
our description of it as something more than just a thing in motion. O-grammar is 
an expression of the latter and more. Mountain goats, dogs and cats appear to be 
creatures that, on the one hand, seek to achieve certain goals through their behav-
iour (e.g. catching prey), but their form of intentionality, on the other hand, does 
not justify that we fully attribute responsibility to them and we will therefore not 
regard them on the basis of P-grammar. But the boundaries are fluid here and we 
may potentially think that P-grammar should be extended to the higher primates. 
The fact that there is no sharply defined boundary between P- and O-grammars 
does not mean that it is pointless to make a distinction between them. In fact, the 
point is that we cannot  do without a distinction based on the way our conception 
of ourselves and each other works. 
 It is a fact that O-grammar has spread to more and more domains of human exis-
tence in recent years, especially thanks to successes in biological sciences. Behav-
ioural genetics and evolutionary psychology are examples of scientific attempts to 
colonize areas with O-grammar, which have traditionally been understood on the 
basis of P-grammar. In this perspective, parents’ love for their children is merely 
an expression of genes providing for themselves in a specific type of organism 
called offspring, as evolutionary psychologist David Barash has argued (Barash, 
1982, p. 70). Maybe the same thing that happened with S-grammar in the past – 
i.e. that it lost ground – is going to happen with parts of our P-grammar today. The 
majority of people today work from the assumption that people – and not a divine 
force – are responsible for their actions. But there are good reasons to believe that 
there are limits to the amount of P-grammar we can dispense with in favour of 
O-grammar (more on this below). 
 Molecule grammar 
 M-grammar is based on molecules and clusters of molecules as the basic active 
units. The molecular world can be described here as being of key importance in 
the area of psychology in broad terms. If a person’s brain is dysfunctional in terms 
of producing neurotransmitters, there are consequences for the person’s psycho-
logical capabilities in that they will not be able to think or remember as well. Most 
people make use of M-grammar in everyday life in various ways, such as when 
we explain the effects of alcohol on the central nervous system and thus its effects 
on human behaviour. We have seen that eliminative materialism believes that we 
should limit ourselves to using only M-grammar when we conduct psychological 
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science, since this is the only strategy that will be in line with the current scientific 
world view. We have also looked at some problems that arise when we eliminate 
the other grammars, and arguments against this kind of reductionism or elimina-
tivism are discussed further below. 
 In summary, we can say that O- and M-grammars express natural (nomic) neces-
sities while S- and P-grammars express semantic (normative) necessities. When we 
say that the former grammars express natural necessities, we mean that explana-
tions based on these grammars look at human behaviour with the goal of being 
able to establish empirical laws which, we assume, must apply to certain material 
mechanisms (organisms or molecules). The fact (if it is indeed a fact) that lithium 
can have a moderating effect on mood swings associated with bipolar disorder 
(formerly called manic-depressive disorder) is a finding that makes use of these 
grammars. In this case we are dealing with a causal and empirical explanation that 
builds on the assumption of specific mechanisms in nature. 
 P-grammar, on the other hand, does not express natural, but instead semantic, 
necessities. That is to say, it does not express necessities that have to do with empiri-
cal facts, but rather those that have to do with meaning. If someone sincerely says 
that they are happy about receiving a gift, then this is an expression of happiness 
that the person cannot be wrong about. Saying that you like a gift is not a  report on 
the happiness that you read from your inner mind (and which may be true or false), 
but instead is simply a personal  expression of happiness. This happiness can be 
compatible – or not – with local conventions for expressions of happiness (and is 
therefore normative), but it cannot be true or false. This is not because of a natural 
necessity regarding happiness, but instead concerns the meaning of the term. In 
much the same way, it is not a natural necessity or an empirical law that people 
experience surprise in unexpected situations, as we previously saw. Rather, it is a 
semantic necessity arising from the fact that surprise is defined as that which occurs 
in unexpected situations (because if no one was surprised then the situation was not 
unexpected). The fact that people are surprised in unexpected situations is a  norma-
tive or  semantic insight – and not an empirical one. 
 In short, P-grammar applies to the  discursive domain of human psychology, 
where thoughts, feelings and actions are  normative , which is to say that they 
can be judged as being more or less adequate and correct in relation to local 
standards. O- and M-grammars apply to the conditions for the mind that can be 
regarded in a framework that  explains causes . This does not have to do with the 
normative, but instead deals with what I called the  nomic earlier in this book. 
Psychologists and others who study mental processes avail themselves of all 
three grammars: M-grammar is used for example within neuropsychology and 
psycho-endocrinology (the study of the significance of hormones for behaviour 
and personality). A simple physical causality may be at play here, for example, 
an increased amount of adrenaline in the blood having immediate effects on the 
body’s muscles. O-grammar forms the basis for sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology, where the main concern is studying the behaviour of organisms in 
light of evolutionary-based background conditions.  Teleology is often involved 
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here, i.e. where we look at the purpose (from the Greek  telos ) that specific mental 
functions have. Certain features of organisms arise as a consequence of evolution-
ary pressure, and behaviour that is grounded in these features can be explained 
 functionally , and not only based on primitive physical causality. Explanations that 
refer to functions are based on a different logic than those that refer to mechanical 
causes. And finally, P-grammar is fundamental for our folk psychology, for every-
day explanations of human actions, and, for example, for cultural psychology and 
discursive psychology. We do not regard actions as causally generated events here, 
but rather as meaningful demonstrations relative to local standards for correctness. 
Explanations on this level will be genuinely  normative and  intentional . Some dif-
ferences between the grammars are summarized in  Table 6.1 . 
 Two principles for a hybrid psychology 
 The three grammars provide a basic overview of the different ways that we can 
talk about psychological phenomena and they form the basis for the wide variety 
of approaches to the exploration of the mind. But have we come any closer to a 
hybrid psychology simply because we have this overview? I think so, but we still 
do not have clarity about how the three grammars can be integrated into a com-
prehensive hybrid psychology. Harré also has a recommendation for this based on 
two basic principles. We will follow his lead and call the first principle the task-
tool metaphor and the second principle the taxonomic priority principle (Harré, 
2002; Harré & Moghaddam, 2012). Together they express how the grammars can 
be combined in a hybrid psychology and what kind of hierarchy we need to pre-
suppose between them when we conduct psychological research. 
 Task-tool metaphor 
 The task-tool metaphor is based on the fact that we, as mental beings, must be 
described as active agents. We are engaged in ongoing projects in our lives, which 
we seek to realize, and Harré refers to these projects as cognitive  tasks . These can 
be anything from writing a book to baking cookies or searching for an inexpensive 
hotel room. We need to avail ourselves of various tools in order to complete the 
tasks that we are engaged in. Some tasks require obvious tools in the completely 
conventional sense of the word. I cannot bake cookies without having access to 
Table 6.1 The three grammars in psychology
P-grammar People are seen as 
actors
Normative explanations Cultural psychology
O-grammar Organisms are seen 
as actors
Functional explanations Evolutionary psychology
M-grammar Molecules are seen 
as actors
Causal explanations Neuropsychology
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flour, butter and sugar, for example, but I also need to have tools like a rolling pin 
and an oven. Some chemical reactions occur when the ingredients are mixed and 
baked, and these can be described in terms of M-grammar. By the same token, 
the mechanism of the oven can be described based on certain physical principles. 
But the thing that justifies the activity itself being properly described as “baking 
cookies” is not something that can be understood in terms of M- or O-grammar. 
It is a genuine human activity only when we view it in terms of P-grammar. Only 
here does it make sense to talk about baking cookies as being more or less suc-
cessful. The fact that I, as the baker, seek to achieve a specific outcome (perfect 
cookies that are not burnt or inedible), means that normativity is involved in the 
practice. And if the cookies don’t turn out well, you turn to the person who made 
the cookies to complain! It is not the oven or the flour that is responsible (of 
course, an oven can be broken, but we do not hold the oven morally accountable 
in such as case). 
 The point is that our  tasks are always identified based on P-grammar, whereas 
the functioning of the  tools is described based on O- and M-grammars. The tools 
can be described in terms of their organic and molecular properties, whereas 
the way people  use them in order to perform certain functions must necessarily 
be described on the basis of P-grammar. Furthermore, the central assumption 
in hybrid psychology is that the brain is a tool for people’s projects. The way 
the brain functions should be described based on the fact that it is an organ 
(O-grammar) that has a specific neurochemical structure (M-grammar). We 
must avoid committing the mereological fallacy of attributing characteristics 
to the brain that properly belong to the domain of P-grammar. Such properties 
can be attributed only to people, who use their brains to complete specific tasks 
and carry out specific projects. A description of cookie baking as a hybrid psy-
chological process will thus include a description of the functions of the vari-
ous tools (ingredients, oven and brain) based especially on M-grammar, which, 
when we look at the process in terms of P-grammar, are all used by a  person who 
seeks to achieve a specific  intention (baking cookies) relative to specific local 
 norms for well executed cookie baking. The hybrid psychological assumption 
is thus that there is no contradiction between describing the brain’s functioning 
causally (e.g. based on M-grammar) and the person’s actions normatively (based 
on P-grammar), but rather that these are two complementary descriptions of the 
same process. 
 The taxonomic priority principle 
 Having said this, we still need to add something else which is just as important 
because, even though a hybrid psychology manages to bridge the gap between 
the different ways of describing things at the same time, this does not mean that 
the ways of describing things are equal. When we are dealing with the mind, the 
descriptions of people’s actions, thoughts and feelings based on P-grammar are 
primary – and the other descriptions are secondary. This is the key personist 
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principle. The understanding of the  tasks is primary and takes precedence – and 
the understanding of the  tools is secondary, if we are to remain within the task-
tool metaphor. It is precisely this relationship that the taxonomic priority principle 
identifies. 
 The taxonomic priority principle says that we necessarily point out material 
tools and mechanisms based on criteria that are derived from the meaningful, 
human world of cognitive tasks and projects. This means that the side of psy-
chology that works based on O- and M-grammars is always piggybacking on the 
side of psychology that works based on P-grammar. Or, in more positive terms: 
the causal and functional approaches in psychology are necessarily developed 
on the premises of normative psychology. P-grammar is primary, and O- and 
M-grammars are secondary. The principle thus emphasizes the fact that a tool is 
inevitably defined relative to the tasks that it can be used to perform (Harré, 2002, 
p. 138). We cannot understand what a tool is used for based solely on the knowl-
edge of the tool in isolation (only from the knowledge of its molecular or organic 
structure). It is possible to understand a tool only if we understand the social 
practices and life forms that give the tool its meaning. To emphasize this again: 
the functioning of the tool is understood causally, according to laws, or nomically 
based on O- and M-grammars. Tasks, by contrast, are understood normatively and 
in terms of intention based on P-grammar, where persons are to be understood 
irreducibly as acting based on specific normative reasons. The tools, the material 
mechanisms, are nomic, whereas the active agents operate normatively, i.e. they 
cannot be understood as elements in causal chains, but rather as people who can 
 follow norms and rules in their lives and actions (and thus can also break, develop 
and rebel against norms and rules). 
 Let us return to the memory example. Memory as a psychological phenom-
enon is a direct part of the normative person grammar. Remembering is a cog-
nitive task and is an important part of people’s everyday lives. Remembering 
something means to remember something  correctly – in a normative sense. And 
it is irreducibly people who remember, and not their brains, but people certainly 
could not remember anything if they did not have fairly well-functioning brains. 
If the brain as a tool starts functioning poorly, it is possible to resort to shopping 
lists, for example, as a memory aid, and, ontologically speaking, the shopping list 
will then be a part of the person’s memory to the same extent that the brain is. It 
is merely a question of an external versus an internal memory tool that enables 
the given cognitive task to be performed. The taxonomic priority principle should 
thus serve to remind us that it makes sense to examine the molecular or organic 
basis of memory only provided that we have already identified certain people’s 
actions as instances of what we call “remembering” (Harré, 2002, p. 160). We 
cannot start by putting people in brain scanners and examining the blood flow in 
specific cerebral regions unless we have already determined in advance that we 
want to examine what is happening in their brains when they try to remember 
something. 
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 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have referred to Harré’s prospect for a hybrid psychology that 
integrates nomic and normative perspectives in the proper way. It is important, 
exciting and legitimate to investigate the nomic, say, the neural basis for memory 
processes and other psychological phenomena, but it makes sense only on the 
basis of a normative determination of what exactly memory (or another phenom-
enon) is – under the conditions of P-grammar. And correspondingly so with all 
other psychological phenomena: thinking, problem solving, emotions, reading 
and so on. The criteria for whether a person is engaged in one of these processes 
are not what a brain scan or a blood test shows, or any other organic or molecular 
reading for that matter. The criteria are taken from the everyday world of human 
life, where we avail ourselves of P-grammar to understand ourselves and each 
other. If we eliminated this world – and our way of describing it – we would 
not know what we should look for in a brain scan or a blood test. Only on the 
basis of P-grammar – where acting, accountable individuals are the starting point 
and where the mind is fundamentally comprehended as people’s abilities and 
dispositions – can the remaining scientific grammars come into play in illuminat-
ing the mind. This is why personism should be foundational for psychology – in 
its hybrid version and otherwise. 
Chapter  7 
 Persons and disordered minds 1 
 
In this final chapter, I shall move on from the general psychological discussions 
about personism and hybrid psychology and seek to apply the theoretical frame-
work unfolded in previous chapters to what many people probably see as a most 
important field in psychology: mental disorders. Psychology may well be an inter-
esting science, but in terms of use value, its legitimacy lies in being able to under-
stand and treat mental disorders. As I have said, the personism defended in this 
book is best represented in contemporary psychology by what is known as cultural 
psychology (Valsiner, 2014). Cultural psychology is not monolithic, but rather 
happily internally divided into different perspectives that put emphasis on differ-
ent aspects of human mental life: intentional worlds (Shweder, 1990a), artefact 
mediation (Cole, 1996), and semiotic mediation (Valsiner, 2007), for example. It 
is also quite influential in educational psychology and organization studies that 
focus on human life within historically developed social practices. It is curious to 
notice, however, how relatively little today’s cultural psychology has to say about 
mental disorder, which is otherwise a key theme in psychology as a whole. Most 
theorizing on mental disorder in psychology has historically been dominated by 
psychodynamic, cognitivist and behaviourist schools, and more recently by the 
neurosciences. This is a mélange of mindist/mentalist and reductionist approaches 
to mental disorder, and the question is whether it is possible to develop a personist 
alternative. 
 It is well known that Vygotsky took a significant interest in abnormal psychol-
ogy in children, or “defectology”, as it was then called (Vygotsky, 1929), but 
browsing through today’s authoritative sources on cultural psychology, such as 
 The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology (Valsiner & Rosa, 2007), 
leaves one with the impression that an interest in mental disorder and suffering, 
particularly in adults, is more or less non-existent. This is probably an unfair ver-
dict, and there are certainly interesting studies of mental disorder here and there 
by cultural psychologists, but they are not in any way defining the field, nor does 
a well-developed theoretical account of mental disorder exist in cultural psychol-
ogy today. This chapter will tentatively begin to articulate a theoretical account of 
mental disorder from a cultural psychological perspective by seeking to combine 
awareness of the brain and body with socio-cultural norms and practices without 
Persons and disordered minds 117
reducing mental disorder to either of these. In that sense, it may steer a course 
between essentialist models of psychopathology on the one hand, and radical 
social constructionist ones on the other. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) in adults is referred to as an illustrative example, but the theory presented 
here has more general ambitions. Following the convention in much of the clinical 
literature, I begin by introducing a case of a person who has been diagnosed with 
a mental disorder (ADHD), before venturing into more theoretical discussions. 
 Tom’s story 
 In order to have a concrete case to use as a springboard for the ensuing discus-
sions, I shall introduce Tom. I first met Tom in the summer of 2013, when I began 
as a participant observer in a support group for adults diagnosed with ADHD 
(as part of the research project  Diagnostic Culture , which studied the impact of 
psychiatric diagnoses – depression and ADHD are singled out as key cases – on 
individuals and society) (Brinkmann, 2016a). The group members meet for about 
three hours once every month. Tom is there almost every time, and I have also 
interviewed him in his home. I have conducted this fieldwork in order to under-
stand how adults diagnosed with ADHD use the diagnosis in their own lives. They 
are not simply given the diagnosis as passive recipients, but are using it actively 
for a number of purposes (Brinkmann, 2014). Using a cultural psychological term, 
we can say that the category ADHD operates as a powerful semiotic mediator in 
their lives that enables them to interpret their past in a new light and develop spe-
cific hopes and possible developmental pathways for the future, while excluding 
others. Most of the people in the group (there are usually around 15 people pres-
ent at a meeting) have sought out the diagnosis themselves, either because their 
children have been diagnosed (and they can mirror themselves in the children’s 
problems), or because they have been through some sort of crisis in their lives 
(e.g. a stress related breakdown) that prompted a more thorough examination by 
the doctor and later the psychiatrist, which eventually led to the ADHD diagnosis. 
This is quite unlike the situation for children diagnosed with ADHD, who are very 
rarely (if ever) the ones who initiate a diagnostic process. 
 Tom, a man living alone in his mid-forties, has also wanted the diagnosis him-
self. When he tells his life story in an interview with me, he talks about a history of 
unruly behaviours, concentration problems, and also petty crimes in his late teen-
age years. He was adopted as a small child after having spent the first month of his 
life at an orphanage, and he talks repeatedly about his quite hefty temper. But there 
was no ADHD diagnosis in his school years, and he was simply seen as one of the 
“naughty boys”. After the school years, he was able to hold a number of jobs, he 
still has good friends, and he also used to have a girlfriend with whom he lived. 
He describes himself as “an ADHD person who is functioning well”. He seems 
quite determined in his choices and opinions. For example, when he discovered 
that there was a long waiting list before he could see the psychiatrist and obtain a 
diagnosis (paid by the state), he decided to pay for the psychiatric assessment out 
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of his own pocket, and he was finally given the ADHD diagnosis about six months 
before I met him for the first time. He is still in a process of reading and learning 
about the diagnosis and trying to adjust his medicine to an optimal level. He grows 
his own marihuana, which he consumes occasionally (but does not sell to others), 
and psychiatrists would probably see this as “self-medication”. He is currently 
unemployed, but, interestingly, his last job was as a support person for young 
people with various problems, many of whom also have the ADHD diagnosis, so 
he now knows the diagnosis both as a professional and as a patient. 
 Tom’s story is in some ways typical (e.g. concerning his history and problems 
as a child), but in other ways it is (like all life stories) unique. When interviewing 
Tom in his apartment, eating cake and drinking coffee, I remember very clearly 
that I had the thought that this person is not mentally disordered. So why was he 
given the diagnosis? What does it tell us about our current “diagnostic cultures”, 
in which more and more conditions are seen through the diagnostic lens that Tom 
received a psychiatric diagnosis? Two things about Tom’s situation are particu-
larly noteworthy in this context, and I shall use these as background informa-
tion in the following discussion about the concept of mental disorder and how to 
approach this in personist and cultural psychological terms: 
 First, Tom is a very organized person. His apartment is perfectly clean and tidy, 
and he has neat to-do lists placed on the refrigerator. He has prepared carefully 
for the interview with me, e.g. by reading from a book on adult ADHD authored 
by a well-known Danish psychiatrist and a psychologist, and he has written down 
a summary of its central messages that he wants to show me in order to convey 
what ADHD feels like for him. The capability of organizing his life and daily 
projects goes against the diagnostic criteria for ADHD, where having “trouble 
organizing tasks and activities” and “is often forgetful in daily activities” are cen-
tral. Tom is aware of this himself, but explains it by saying that “it is in order 
to avoid the chaos” that he has a high level of organization. In other words, he 
compensates so well – by using calendars and to-do-lists (mental technologies), 
and perhaps also his marihuana – that many of the symptoms of disorganization 
in fact disappear. The crucial question then becomes: If the symptoms disappear, 
is the diagnosis then still warranted? Diagnostic psychiatry has since 1980 (with 
the introduction of DSM-III) been based on an assessment of symptoms (rather 
than, say, an understanding of the etiology and underlying psychodynamics of the 
person), so, strictly speaking, it means that a disorder is only there if and when 
the symptoms are present (Horwitz, 2002). Paradoxically, this seems to imply that 
people’s compensatory actions will remove the pathology. Second, Tom describes 
how his problems really emerged after an injury he suffered while he was in the 
armed forces. He was on a three-year contract and wanted to make a career in the 
military, but his leg was more or less crushed in a traffic accident, and he had to 
leave the military. Tom describes the forces as a very good place to work, and it 
seems evident that the symptoms of ADHD were not present in his life during this 
period. So, the next question becomes: Did Tom in fact have ADHD when he was 
in the military? Is it possible to have ADHD in an extremely organized context 
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with clear hierarchies and task allocations? Do the social practices of the military 
provide an ecological niche, to use Ian Hacking’s (1998) term, in which the cogni-
tive problems otherwise associated with ADHD are eliminated? 
 The point of raising these questions is to say that how one answers them will 
depend on the theory of mental disorder that one (implicitly or explicitly) sub-
scribes to. To simplify: Essentialists on the one side will say that if one has ADHD, 
then one has ADHD all the time and everywhere, because the disorder is consti-
tuted by certain core neurocognitive deficits. Most social constructionists on the 
other side will say that ADHD is a socially constructed category that medicalizes 
and pathologizes problematic behaviours, and they thereby seek to deconstruct 
all pathological “essences” associated with the diagnosis. I shall explicate these 
divergent standpoints further in the following, before articulating a hybrid psy-
chological theory that is neither essentialist nor social constructionist (in a radical 
sense), but rather situational, relational, mediational and thus, I shall argue, more 
theoretically sound. 
 Essentialist and constructionist approaches 
to mental disorder 
 According to a number of leading analysts, the contemporary understandings of 
mental disorder in the West are heavily influenced by “biomedicalization” (Clarke & 
Shim, 2010). Despite the fact that no simple biomarkers have been found for any 
mental disorder in psychiatry (Singh & Rose, 2009), and even though diagnoses 
can be formulated only by evaluating and counting symptoms (and not through 
brain scans or blood tests), there is a huge interest among researchers in the neuro-
science of mental disorder that trickles down to the public and its “folk psychiatry”. 
As we have seen in this book, it is obvious that the brain is important in relation to 
mental disorders, but this does not mean that it is possible to diagnose a mental dis-
order by looking at a person’s brain. The enormous interest in the neurosciences of 
mental disorder these years (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013) goes hand in hand with the 
success of Big Pharma, if not concerning the treatment of mental disorder (where 
the results are mixed to put it mildly, see e.g. Healy, 2012), but rather concerning 
the marketing and spread of pharmaceuticals against a number of conditions such 
as anxiety, depression, and ADHD. Often, the marketing employs an M-grammar 
concerning mental disorder by talking about deficient brain chemistry in analogy 
with insulin and diabetes. 
 Concerning ADHD specifically, the now standard account in psychiatry is one 
that approaches this condition as a neurocognitive deficit, resulting in inatten-
tion, impulsivity, and hyperactivity to varying degrees, which are seen as chronic 
symptoms that can be treated with stimulant medicine, but which can never be 
cured (Buitelaar, Kan, & Asherson, 2011). The neuroscientific approach easily 
(however not necessarily) invites researchers to think in essentialist terms and 
look for the core dysfunctional brain mechanism that is thought to be involved in 
ADHD. Scores of brain imaging studies are now published every year, which are 
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interpreted in light of quite different theoretical paradigms. Some theories follow 
Russell Barkley who states that ADHD is at its core a disorder of behavioural inhi-
bition (Barkley, 1997), while others are in agreement with Thomas Brown, who 
argues that the deficit lies in the inner management system of attention (Brown, 
2005). Maiese (2012) provides a very helpful comparative discussion of these 
essentialist models and their respective shortcomings. In either case, the ambition 
is to be able to pinpoint exactly what the alleged deficit is in essentialist terms. 
Perhaps ADHD is even a natural kind, some will say, i.e. a specific illness entity 
that can be defined in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient properties, which 
ideally leads to a “strict in or out classification of all individuals” (Kincaid & 
Sullivan, 2014, p. 3). This, at least, seems to be the essentialists’ dream, which, 
if realized, would likely lead to more valid diagnoses linked directly to the brain 
rather than behavioural symptoms. 
 Among a number of problems related to essentialism, I shall merely mention 
two: First, as I have already pointed out, no “essences” (in the sense of simple 
biomarkers) have in fact been found in psychiatry as a whole, let alone in relation 
to ADHD. Essentialism rests on what the historian of medicine Charles Rosenberg 
has called disease specificity, which refers to the idea that diseases are specific 
entities that have a kind of independent existence beyond their unique manifesta-
tions in sick individuals (Rosenberg, 2007, p. 13). The idea of disease specificity 
is so ingrained in medical practices today that it is difficult to imagine that it was 
once different. But, according to Rosenberg’s studies, disease specificity is a cul-
tural idea from the end of the nineteenth century that has enabled people since to 
imagine diseases as discrete conditions in an organism, which can be defined and 
separated relatively clearly from other diseases, and which are therefore identical 
with similar conditions in other organisms. To simplify: Before the nineteenth 
century, there were sick people, and after there are actual diseases. Although the 
idea of disease specificity might apply to somatic medicine, where examples such 
as cancer or diabetes can serve as obvious illustrations, it seems quite problematic 
in psychiatry. 
 Second, and possibly even more detrimental to essentialism, is the sociological 
insight that disorders “are only intelligible due to the normative and social context 
in which they are found” as Bowden has recently argued (Bowden, 2014, p. 422). 
In the terms of the present book, not just a (deficient) brain is needed in mental 
disorders, but also a context of social practices and normativity. Among philoso-
phers of psychiatry today, there is widespread agreement that one cannot define 
anything as a disorder in the absence of social norms of normality and suffering 
(Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). Even if we grant that what is today referred to as 
ADHD is a ubiquitous trait in human populations across time and place (as some 
evolutionary psychologists will say), we still need social norms in order to estab-
lish whether this trait represents a disorder or simply is “a way of being human”. 
 Such arguments have led some to the belief that all mental disorders are noth-
ing more and nothing less than contingent social constructions. This, obviously, 
is the anti-thesis to essentialist accounts, which is often referred to as social 
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constructionism. Social constructionist models of disorder dissolve essentialist 
definitions and claim that the whole range of problematic human behaviours rep-
resent disorders only because of social categorizations and not because of any-
thing inherent in the people who suffer. Social constructionist models come in 
many versions that are more or less epistemologically and metaphysically radical, 
but they all “encourage the view that social values and priorities are the sole his-
torical determinants of medicine, music, and marriage”, as Church writes in her 
account of social constructionist approaches to mental disorder (Church, 2004, 
p. 393). Some, like Kenneth Gergen, seemingly prefer to eliminate the “deficit 
discourse” of mental disorder entirely, incarnated in the diagnostic vocabulary 
(Gergen, 1994), while others, such as the less radical Peter Conrad, argue that 
diagnosing people with the ADHD category is a species of medicalization that 
amounts to “social control” (Conrad, 2006). The point is that abnormal behav-
iours, such as the deviance labelled as ADHD, “is not inherent to the individual, 
the act, or the situation, but [is] rather a process in which certain alleged ‘rule-
breaking’ actions come to be defined as deviance” (p. 1). In other words, for a 
social constructionist, there are no mental disorders “out there”; they are all in the 
eyes of the pathologizing beholder. 
 If the essentialists tend to forget that social norms are needed to establish 
anything as a mental disorder, it can be argued that the social constructionists 
conversely tend to forget that suffering individuals very often look for “pathologi-
zations” to explain their problems. This was also the case in Tom’s story recounted 
above. Tom has wanted the diagnosis himself, because he has lacked an explana-
tion of his problems. With their eagerness to move beyond the individual to the 
social context, social constructionists not only fail to acknowledge that individuals 
may bring quite different problems into a context, but also that individuals may 
in fact be very positive toward the deficit discourses that social constructionists 
wish to eliminate for the sake of the diagnosed. It seems simplistic to say that 
ADHD, for example, is nothing but a matter of social control, just as it seems like 
a naïve dream to look for a never-changing “ADHD essence” in the brains of the 
diagnosed. To return to Tom, it is noteworthy that he has not had his brain scanned, 
and it is quite unlikely (although we do not know this for sure) that anything about 
his brain would appear abnormal. In any case, he functions relatively well in his 
everyday life. It also seems far-fetched to understand his problems in terms of 
social control. He does have a history of problems, which, however, have waxed 
and waned as he has moved through different life contexts. At the same time, we 
no doubt need to take both social norms and practices into account when seeking 
to understand him and other people diagnosed with ADHD, and also the fact that 
these persons have brains and bodies that appear in certain ways (e.g. the restless 
movements of hands and feet that are characteristic of many people with the diag-
nosis) and are affected by the drugs in ways that many people (including Tom) 
appreciate (almost all the people with the ADHD diagnosis that I have met in my 
fieldwork use drugs such as methylphenidate and generally praise their effects, 
although there are exceptions). In my view, there is a need for an integrative 
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understanding of mental disorders such as ADHD that is able to incorporate all 
these dimensions, and which steers a course between essentialism and construc-
tionism. This is where the personist hybrid psychology of the present book might 
be helpful. 
 A situational approach to mental disorders 
 The Danish medical sociologist Dorte Gannik devoted much of her career to 
developing a situational theory of illness, which is deeply congenial to the proj-
ect of the present book (Gannik, 2005). Her work, which was based on studies 
of somatic illness, notably back problems, is little known outside Scandina-
via, but her theory is noteworthy because of its simple elegance. While it is 
certainly relevant in relation to somatic medicine, it seems to be even more 
to the point concerning psychiatric problems. For reasons similar to those I 
articulated above, Gannik rejected essentialist theories of illness and disease 
(although there is a conventional distinction between illness and disease, this is 
rendered problematic by her theory). She sees illness as something relational, 
“identical with a person’s interactive relationship with her surroundings”, and 
also as performative: “The theory abstains from approaching illness as some-
thing ‘in itself’ beyond those actions or reactions with which a person responds 
to everyday, bodily experiences (p. 332). She refers to the well-established fact 
that symptoms are pervasive in our lives, and most of us experience unpleasant 
sensations in our bodies every day. But symptoms are not diseases or disorders. 
She argues that we should talk about illness, disease, or disorder as something 
people “do” (perform, enact) in relation to physical and social environments. 
They exist only in and through the ways in which they are performed. This has 
also been argued by ethnographer and philosopher Annemarie Mol, e.g. in her 
study of artherosclerosis (Mol, 2002). Mol says that we should not think of dis-
eases as “constructed”, since this metaphor solely emphasizes human symbolic 
activities of social construction, thereby leaving out the body and the material 
world (p. 32). Instead we should use the metaphor of performance or talk about 
enactment. Objects such as disorders are enacted in practices, but this should 
not lead us to the view that they are simply done by discrete actors (who could 
just choose to do otherwise). Instead, the idea of enactment should suggest “that 
activities take place – but leaves the actors vague.” (p. 33). Enactments presup-
pose a whole range of mediators that make the doing possible. If we ask “Who 
does the doing?” (e.g. of ADHD), then the answer has to include not just the 
suffering person, for events “are made to happen by several people and lots 
of things. Words participate, too. Paperwork. Rooms, buildings. The insurance 
system” (p. 25). And much more. The complexity involved leads to a need for 
what Mol calls a “praxiographic appreciation of reality” (p. 53), which studies 
how things are brought into being in socio-material practices (I refer the reader 
to her book to get an idea of how to work methodologically with this perspec-
tive). Contra essentialism, this means that it becomes impossible to isolate the 
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“essence” of a disorder in any one place (e.g. the brain), and, contra social con-
structionism, it means that many forces besides the purely human (e.g. symbolic 
or discursive) ones are involved. 
 Returning to Gannik we can say that her model likewise does not isolate illness/
disorder to anything in the person as such (essentialism), nor to anything in the 
social system in itself (constructionism). Rather, illness and disorder are always 
found in a relation between a person (or organism) and life situations (constituted 
by socio-material practices). This relational perspective means that people’s prob-
lems are radically situated. They exist in their concretely situated manifestations 
only, and not in anything behind or beyond this. Thus, essentialism fails. But it 
also means that the problems are irreducibly real – as real as anything gets – and 
sometimes stubbornly real. Thus, social constructionism in its radical versions 
fails. We should maintain a moderate social constructionist outlook, because 
certain important factors related to mental disorder are socially constructed (e.g. 
some norms inherent in our social practices), but we should also acknowledge 
the importance of factors that cannot be said to be socially constructed. It is the 
relation between these factors that should be in focus. Gannik’s theory implies 
that treating people’s disorders relationally may involve changing the person (e.g. 
through cognitive techniques or drugs) or changing the socio-material practices 
(e.g. by inventing new cultural prosthetic devices or new discursive practices). 
The point is that someone’s problems are not to be located in a single place, but 
dispersed over multiple mediators. 
 If we look at Tom’s story through this lens, we can see that his problems are not 
just socially constructed, and it seems unhelpful to claim that the ADHD diagnosis 
in this case is merely a species of social control. There is real felt suffering in his 
life, related to disruptive behaviours and a problematic temper, but, at the same 
time, this phenomenon seems to become ADHD only relative to certain socio-
material practices and their norms, where the problem can be enacted as ADHD. 
A hybrid cultural psychology of mental disorders should ask what mediators are 
involved in a given case that makes this form of enactment possible (I provide 
a sketchy answer below). A situational approach to Tom’s story also seems to 
imply that in certain contexts, such as the military, where the “symptoms” are 
not enacted, we should beware of concluding that he “has ADHD”. Perhaps we 
need to conclude that Tom did not have ADHD in the military. From the situ-
ational perspective, one does not simply “have” ADHD (or any other disorder) – 
here, there and everywhere – but enacts it only when certain contextual conditions 
and mediators are present. And even in life contexts where the condition can be 
enacted (such as in schools), we see someone like Tom being able to remove or at 
least diminish his symptoms with the use of culturally available technologies such 
as to-do lists. We may hope that future research into ADHD and related diagnoses 
does not only aim to develop new drugs to target brain chemistry (the brain media-
tor), but also the much more immediately significant (yet with much less prestige 
and money involved) everyday artefacts that may be used as cognitive “assistive 
technologies” (Gillespie, Best, & O’Neill, 2012). 
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 The mediated mind and its disorders 
 If we follow Gannik and Mol and look for a framework between essentialism 
and radical constructionism, the question becomes: What kinds of mediators are 
involved that makes the enactment of a given disorder possible? And the practice-
oriented question becomes: How can these mediators be changed in order to help 
persons? We have seen in this book that (1) psychological phenomena (our ways 
of acting, feeling, perceiving, and thinking) are normative in the sense that they 
do not simply happen, but rather are done (performed, enacted) by persons relative 
to social norms inherent in social practices; (2) that the mind should be thought of 
not as an entity, but as a name for the skills and dispositions that enable persons to 
enact psychological phenomena; and (3) that a range of mediators are involved in 
the constitution of this enactment. Some of the mediators are literally tools, while 
others, such as the brain, can be thought of metaphorically as tools (Harré, 2012). 
I shall now briefly discuss how the brain, the body, social practices, and material 
artefacts as mediators may be involved in the constitution of the ADHD phenom-
enon. Needless to say, I can provide only a sketch of the argument in this context. 
 Concerning the brain, it must be said that although no biomarkers for ADHD 
(or any other mental disorder) have been found that makes diagnosis possible, it 
is inconceivable for most researchers (including me) that the brain is not involved 
in constituting the ADHD phenomenon, for the simple reason that the central 
nervous system is active in relation to any psychological process imaginable. The 
brain is a tool that persons employ when they think, feel and act – or fail to do so 
in culturally sanctioned ways. A reductionist program in the neurosciences will 
study how thinking, feeling, and acting go on in the brain, but after reading this 
book it is hopefully obvious that only persons (and not their brains) think, feel, 
and act (sometimes in ways that are labelled “ADHD”), although they definitely 
need their brains to do so. Large research programs now investigate the brains of 
people with the ADHD diagnosis, and we will have to wait and see if something 
significant emerges (we know that the brain is plastic, which may mean that no 
common pattern – or essence – can be found in the brain across people diagnosed). 
In any case (and I consider this a quite trivial point), the brain is without doubt a 
mediator that is involved in constituting the ADHD phenomenon. 
 This also goes for the body. Not many researchers are concerned with the 
embodied nature of mental disorders, but Maiese (2012) is one exception in the 
case of ADHD. Based on a phenomenology of the body, she argues that ADHD 
represents a problematic bodily orientation through which a person interacts with 
and gives meaning to the world. She further argues that embodied affective fram-
ing mechanisms, which serve to help people understand what is important in dif-
ferent situations, are defective in people who suffer from ADHD. Nielsen has 
argued that bodies of people with an ADHD diagnosis are typically “out of sync” 
with the rhythms of the cultural world and interpersonal relations (Nielsen, 2017). 
It is difficult to assess the degree to which this perspective applies to Tom, in 
particular because of the ways that he has organized himself in his home, which 
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renders his everyday life predictable and “rhythmic”. But from meetings and con-
versations with many other adults diagnosed with ADHD, it is recognizable that 
some of them have trouble focusing on what for most other people is salient in a 
social situation and doing so in a way that is organized temporally in accordance 
with prevailing social rhythms (this sometimes leads to curious interpersonal 
misunderstandings). 
 Thirdly, and almost trivially from a social scientific perspective, is the way 
that ADHD is mediated by certain social norms as they are inscribed into social 
practices. Researchers have found, for example, that a child’s date of birth is a 
very powerful predictor of whether or not that child will get the ADHD diagnosis: 
Studies from the US show that a boy born in January has a 70% higher risk of 
being diagnosed than a boy born in December, because of the cutoff for being 
assigned to a grade (Frances, 2013, p. 141). What happens is that a child’s rela-
tively immature behaviours are pathologized as ADHD within the social practices 
of today’s schools. With this, of course, I do not mean to imply that children really 
have ADHD because of their date of birth, but this finding certainly makes it evi-
dent that ADHD is co-constituted by norms about concentration and unobtrusive-
ness in modern society and specifically schools. In his account of the historical 
creation of ADHD, the historian Matthew Smith has even gone so far as to link 
the hyperactivity epidemic in the US with the “Sputnik panic” that emerged after 
the Russians succeeded in launching Sputnik in orbit around the earth, leading 
panicked American educators to reform US schools in order to be able to beat the 
Soviet Union, which allegedly had much more discipline compared to the reform 
pedagogy of John Dewey that otherwise had characterized the American school 
system (Smith, 2012). It is fascinating if global politics in this way leads to very 
local consequences for individuals who are diagnosed. For Tom, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, it is quite clear that his symptoms appear as problematic only outside 
the strongly organized context of the military, when he has had to lead an inde-
pendent adult life, deciding every day what is to be done, when, and how. Modern 
life in the West has been described as involving a “tyranny of choice”, celebrating 
the autonomous, reflective decision-maker in numerous social practices, and this 
may create ecological niches in which people are prone to being diagnosed with 
ADHD if they do not live up to the norms of constant free choice. 
 Finally, the fourth kind of mediator is artefactual, involving all kinds of tech-
nologies. For some disorders, it is obvious that mediators of this kind are involved 
in the constitution of the problem: Dyslexia, for example, is only possible because 
of the existence of written language. Concerning ADHD, it is interesting that the 
diagnostic criteria include such things as “fidgets with or taps hands or squirms 
in seat” and “loses things necessary for tasks or activities (e.g. school materi-
als, pencils, books, tools, wallets, keys, paperwork, eyeglasses and mobile tele-
phones)”. In a world without seats (in school institutions), pencils, books etc. 
(which are representatives of “learning technologies” as such), and without the 
relevant socio-material arrangements of education in which bodies are socialized 
to a certain type of behaviour, it is difficult to imagine that ADHD could exist. 
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Technologies may assist in the creation of disorders, but may of course also help 
alleviate symptoms, and I have already described how material technologies are 
used by Tom in attempts to regulate his life activities in various fruitful ways. 
 The point of listing these is to emphasize that the disorder cannot be isolated 
to any one of these sets of mediators, but must be seen as distributed between and 
across them. There is no essence anywhere that makes up ADHD in and of itself, 
but different mediators may be involved in different cases to constitute a person’s 
problem as one of ADHD. Together, the mediators enable persons to enact their 
problems as ADHD: A working brain and body are needed, and so are social prac-
tices with norms and discursive categories, and also various artefacts (and I have 
not gone into details concerning the technologies of symptom check lists, pills 
etc.). Talking about enacting ADHD – or living under the description of “ADHD” 
(Martin, 2007) – is not to say that people do that consciously. Behaviours that we 
designate as ADHD are not chosen, but they are also not completely mechanical. I 
agree with Martin (who talks about bipolar disorder) that being hyperactive “does 
not fit easily at either end of opposites like conscious/unconscious, habitual/novel; 
compelled/chosen; or innate/learned” (p. 83). We need a new language, a new 
scientific approach to “describe the terrain between these poles” (p. 83), since this 
is where most disorders are enacted. 
 I can now sum up my argument by returning to briefly to Tom. If my argu-
ment is valid, we should see Tom’s ADHD as mediated by his brain, body, social 
practices and various technologies. Contra essentialism, it is not isolated to any 
one of these, and, contra constructionism, ADHD represents much more than a 
(pathologizing) discourse. Hopefully, a hybrid psychological broadening of our 
approaches to mental disorder can also lead to innovative and humane ways 
of helping people with their problems. Sometimes, the best help is likely to be 
found by looking at a few of the mediators, but, in principle, I will claim that we 
should be able to address all of them. Cultural psychologists are particularly well 
equipped to study the mediators of social practices and technologies, but they 
should also be sensitive to the embodied nature of mental problems. It could be 
objected that Tom is a special case, and that other disorders manifest themselves 
much more systematically in people’s lives. This is probably correct, but I do not 
think that it invalidates the general argument that cultural psychologists should 
theorize mental disorders as enacted relational, situational problems, related to a 
person’s mediated mind. 
 The future of the mind 
 In this book, I have sought to convey a comprehensive answer to what the mind 
is, and thus a comprehensive theory of the mind, and in this final chapter I have 
tried to extend the theory to mental disorder. The argument implies that the future 
should belong to a pluralistic and cross-disciplinary approach to the mind that, 
on the one hand, entails a corrective to the current brain fetishism (and its reduc-
tionism) and, on the other hand, recognizes that the mind is biological as well as 
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cultural (against radical constructionist perspectives). Human beings’ mental lives 
are molecular, biological  and meaningful to persons. In order to understand the 
mind in its totality, we need to speak in all three ways, which is to say that we need 
to use all three grammars that were introduced in the previous chapter: M, O and 
P. But we must also keep in mind the personist point of departure that any study 
of the cultivated mind can take, and this is to be found in the personal perspective, 
where people are understood as intentional beings who can act based on reasons 
that can be more or less good. 
 A hybrid psychological understanding of the mind is therefore inclusive, but it 
is also aware of the fact that the psychological point of departure is always in our 
world of normativity. One way to put it is to say that (nomic) causal psychology 
always develops subject to conditions that come from an understanding of the 
mind’s fundamental normativity. This applies even though it has been ignored or 
denied by a number of influential reductionist approaches to the mind in recent 
years. I have tried to treat these approaches as problems in need of a solution in 
this book, while rejecting a number of just as problematic – but very different – 
approaches. Namely the mentalistic or mindist approach, which regards the mind 
as a mental world in its own right, which can be discussed independently of neural, 
physical, social and technological conditions. Such a world does not exist. The 
mind is not a “world”, nor is it a “thing”, but rather a range of skills and dispo-
sitions that exists  in the world and which is identified on the basis of a norma-
tive order of human activities and practices. A number of different conditions are 
required for such abilities and dispositions to be able to flourish in life, and the 
individual chapters of the book (brain, body, sociality and things) have hopefully 
guided the reader in this direction. 
 Put positively, future studies of the mind will use this as their point of depar-
ture. In reality, scientific progress here will consist in returning to Aristotle’s basic 
understanding of the nature of the mind. We need to go “forward to Aristotle”, as 
Harré has put it (Harré, 1997). When we come forward to Aristotle we will real-
ize that it is necessary to view things through both scientific and cultural lenses. 
We will understand that there is a need for both quantitative methods, which give 
shape to experiments and process the collected data statistically, as well as quali-
tative methods that seek to describe and understand human experience, meaning 
and norms. And we will be obliged to recognize that there is also an asymmetry in 
the way that the cultural-scientific and qualitative approach is a primary condition 
for the remaining ways to investigate the mind to get underway in the first place. 
Even though the qualitative understanding of the mind is supported only rarely by 
research grants or disseminated in the profession’s leading magazines, this under-
standing is indispensable as a condition for being able to have a psychology at all. 
 From a more pessimistic perspective, we can fear that the fledgling hybrid psy-
chology will not stand a chance, but instead will be trampled by the dominating 
neuro- and bioscientific approaches to the mind. These approaches represent the 
biggest trend in today’s world of scientific psychology (Spear, 2007). And in both 
the media and in our daily lives, the biological perspective of the human being is 
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also becoming more widespread (Rose, 2009). If my analysis in this book is valid, 
then there is reason to fear the imperialism of scientific, nomic psychology to the 
detriment of the normative and folk psychological understanding we have of each 
other, but there will also be clear limits to how far this imperialism can go. Our 
folk psychological and normative understanding of thoughts, feelings and actions 
may well be colonized for a period of time, but it can never disappear entirely. 
 Note 
 1 This chapter reworks materials from an article that has previously appeared in  Culture & 
Psychology  (Brinkmann, 2016b). 
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